@article{Heldt2026c, title = {The Evolution of International Regime Complexes: Adaptation and Maladaptation in International Cooperation}, author = {Eugénia C Heldt and C Randall Henning and Orfeo Fioretos}, doi = {10.1093/isagsq/ksag139}, issn = {2634-3797}, year = {2026}, date = {2026-09-29}, urldate = {2026-09-29}, journal = {Global Studies Quarterly}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, abstract = {This article introduces a special forum devoted to the evolution of international regime complexes in three parts. First, it develops a novel distinction between adaptive and maladaptive evolution and maps diverse patterns of change in well-known and emerging international regime complexes. Second, it theorizes a variety of exogenous and endogenous sources of change that impact the configuration and effects of regime complexes. Here it draws on theories of regime complexity, along with theories of power transition, institutions, and delegation, to explain variations in evolutionary patterns. Finally, the paper summarizes eleven original contributions that make up the special forum and lays the groundwork for further theorizing about the conditions under which regime complexes adapt in ways that enhance or undermine international cooperation. We find, among other things, that the prevalence of endogenous sources of change is positively associated with adaptation of regime complexes, and invite further investigation of this relationship.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{Heldt2026d, title = {Adaptive and Maladaptive Differentiation within the World Bank’s Accountability Complex: How Rivalry between Principals and Agents Affects Accountability}, author = {Eugénia C Heldt}, doi = {10.1093/isagsq/ksag141}, issn = {2634-3797}, year = {2026}, date = {2026-09-29}, urldate = {2026-09-29}, journal = {Global Studies Quarterly}, volume = {6}, issue = {4}, publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, abstract = {Over the last 30 years, the accountability system of the World Bank Group institutions has evolved into a complex ecosystem, encompassing the Inspection Panel, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), and the Grievance Redress Service (GRS). The creation of the World Bank Accountability Mechanism (WBAM) in 2020, which encompassed the existing Inspection Panel and Dispute Resolution Service, added another layer of complexity to the Bank’s accountability system. This study examines the evolution of the World Bank’s accountability mechanisms by combining principal–agent theory with scholarship on regime complexity. It contends that the emergence of multiple, sometimes overlapping accountability bodies within the World Bank Group arose from competitive interactions and rivalry between the Executive Board (the principals) and World Bank management (the agent). Over time, the proliferation of accountability bodies has led to adaptive differentiation, with the creation of the CAO and GRS, increasing efficiency and introducing a division of labor between the Inspection Panel and the CAO. Conversely, as part of the principal–agent contest, the establishment of the WBAM introduced maladaptive differentiation and fragmentation into the Bank’s accountability system. By tracing the development of these multiple accountability mechanisms, the study helps us to better understand the evolution of the Bank’s complex multilayered accountability ecosystem.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{Dafe2026b, title = {The Political Power of Digital Multinational Companies in an Era of Geo-Technological Competition}, author = {Florence Dafe and Eugénia C. Heldt}, doi = {10.1080/09692290.2026.2645101}, issn = {1466-4526}, year = {2026}, date = {2026-09-03}, urldate = {2026-09-03}, journal = {Review of International Political Economy}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {2446--2467}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, abstract = {This commentary examines the political power of digital multinational companies (MNCs). Our review of the existing literature finds that comparative scholarship has focused on state-business relationships at the country level and sheds light on the sources of power flowing from the positions of digital companies in national political economies. However, to a lesser extent, comparativists have studied the power flowing from digital companies within global network structures. To address this research gap, this commentary makes two contributions to the literature. First, it systematizes extant scholarship and expands it by bringing together two different strands of literature – comparative political economy scholarship on business power and scholarship on interdependence in global networks in international relations and international political economy – to illuminate the power of digital MNCs in an era of geo-technological competition. Second, this commentary identifies factors countervailing the power of digital MNCs: replacement networks, international regimes, and mutual interdependence.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{Basedow2026, title = {Team Europe Goes Global Gateway: How China’s Geopolitical Rise affects EU Governance in Development and Infrastructure Financing}, author = {Robert Basedow and Eugénia C. Heldt and Sophie Meunier}, doi = {10.1080/07036337.2026.2715686}, issn = {1477-2280}, year = {2026}, date = {2026-08-18}, urldate = {2026-08-18}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {48}, number = {6}, pages = {1011--1031}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, abstract = {While existing research explains how China’s geopolitical rise caused the enactment of the EU’s Global Gateway (GG) Initiative, this paper examines how the EU adjusted its governance of development policy. European integration scholarship suggests four possible responses to exogenous pressure: additional supranational delegation, greater intergovernmental coordination, institutional status quo, or disintegration. Drawing on primary research and elite interviews, we argue that geopolitical competition with China has not produced a transfer of competences to the supranational level. Instead, it has accelerated coordination without delegation: member states and EU institutions have developed new mechanisms that reorganize how the Union formulates and delivers development and infrastructure finance. Empirically, the paper documents how the GG was implemented via Team Europe, producing institutional adaptation without supranational centralization. Theoretically, we identify when geopolitical pressure favours tighter intergovernmental coordination over supranational delegation, particularly in domains with fragmented competences and strong member-state preferences for visibility and bilateral ties.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{Heldt2026b, title = {The EU’s Global Gateway Initiative: The Geopoliticization of Development Aid and Foreign Economic Policy}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Sophie Meunier}, doi = {10.1080/07036337.2026.2716369}, issn = {1477-2280}, year = {2026}, date = {2026-08-18}, urldate = {2026-08-18}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {48}, number = {6}, pages = {901--921}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, abstract = {The European Union (EU) launched the Global Gateway initiative in 2021 as a strategic pivot in European approaches to development aid and foreign policy amid intensifying great power competition. This Special Issue examines the extent to which the Global Gateway constitutes a genuine geoeconomic innovation or consolidates and rebrands existing development policy with a new framing. Five years after its launch, contributors analyze three critical dimensions: the initiative’s novelty as an economic security instrument; its implications for intra-EU institutional balance between the Commission, Member States, and European Parliament; and its impact on the EU’s positioning in great power competition vis-à-vis China’s Belt and Road Initiative and U.S. infrastructure partnerships. Drawing on empirical analyses of flagship projects, financing mechanisms, Team Europe coordination, and perceptions across the Global South, this collection advances understanding of the EU’s geoeconomic turn and its capacity to act as a geopolitical actor in global infrastructure finance.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{Heldt2026, title = {How EU Industrial Policy Got Its Groove Back: Securitisation and Governance Shifts in the Geoeconomic Era}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Sophie Meunier}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2026.2627350}, issn = {1466-4429}, year = {2026}, date = {2026-02-10}, urldate = {2026-02-10}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, pages = {1--29}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the transformation of European Union (EU) industrial policy from market-oriented to securitised approaches. We argue that external pressures – the weaponization of economic interdependence and security-driven industrial policies by China and the United States – enabled the European Commission to reframe industrial policy through a security lens, making interventionist measures politically acceptable despite long-standing opposition from market-liberal Member States. Our theoretical contribution specifies three mechanisms through which securitisation transforms EU governance without treaty change: (1) bureaucratic shifts creating new coordination bodies focused on economic security; (2) procedural shifts from ex-post competition enforcement to ex-ante risk screening and emergency powers; and (3) coalition shifts that co-opt business opposition by framing intervention as necessary to protect, rather than distort, the Single Market. Through four case studies – the EU Chips Act, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, Important Projects of Common European Interest, and the Critical Raw Materials Act – we demonstrate how the Commission acts entrepreneurially to deepen integration in a core state power domain. However, securitisation has outpaced formal legal change: fiscal constraints and persistent Member State divisions limit the EU's ability to match U.S. and Chinese scale, revealing both the possibilities and limits of securitised industrial policy.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @collection{ech001, title = {Special Forum: The Evolution of International Regime Complexes}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and C. Randall Henning and Orfeo Fioretos}, url = {https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/issue/6/4}, year = {2026}, date = {2026-01-01}, publisher = {Global Studies Quarterly, Volume 6, Issue 4}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {collection} } @collection{ech002, title = {The European Union’s Global Gateway Initiative: The Geopoliticization of Development Aid and Foreign Economic Policy}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Sophie Meunier}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/geui20/48/6}, year = {2026}, date = {2026-01-01}, publisher = {Journal of European Integration, Volume 48, Issue 6}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {collection} } @article{, title = {Multilateralism à la Carte: How China Navigates Global Economic Institutions}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Henning Schmidtke and Omar Serrano Oswald}, doi = {10.1080/09692290.2025.2495694}, year = {2025}, date = {2025-05-15}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {Review of International Political Economy}, volume = {32}, issue = {4}, pages = {899-921}, abstract = {China’s engagement with multilateral economic institutions is neither fully supportive nor outright revisionist. While it supports institutions like the World Trade Organization and contributes to multilateral development banks, it also challenges aspects of the global economic order by withholding lending data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and bypassing the Paris Club. To capture this complexity, we introduce a framework that categorises China’s multilateral strategies into four types: Deep cooperation, shallow support, deep challenge, and shallow resistance. We argue that China’s strategic choices are shaped by three key factors: Domestic preferences, domestic capabilities, and the broader international strategic environment. These factors not only influence China’s engagement individually but also interact with each other, shaping its evolving multilateral strategies. Drawing on case studies from this special issue, we illustrate how China selectively supports or resists multilateral institutions across multiple issue areas—including global finance, multilateral development finance, and trade—depending on issue-area dynamics, domestic bureaucratic competition, and global power shifts. Rather than adopting a fixed position as a status quo power or a revisionist challenger, China pursues an à la carte approach to multilateralism—embracing cooperation where it aligns with national interests, resisting constraints when necessary, and even creating alternative institutions when opportunities arise. By offering a structured way to analyse these varied strategies, this framework provides insights into China’s broader role in multilateral economic governance and its implications for the future of multilateralism.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{, title = {China’s Rise and the Reconfiguration of Global Economic Governance}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Susan Park}, doi = {10.1080/09692290.2025.2482853}, year = {2025}, date = {2025-04-02}, urldate = {2025-04-02}, journal = {Review of International Political Economy}, volume = {32}, issue = {4}, pages = { 891-898}, abstract = {China ‘s rapid economic and political ascension is changing the configuration of global economic governance. In some cases, Chinese initiatives have improved and complemented global governance structures, rather than fundamentally altering and undermining them. In other cases, a sometimes more fragile status quo endures. This special issue examines how China seeks to reconfigure global economic governance. It introduces the issue in two steps. First, it focuses on how China’s rise is altering global economic governance in development finance, trade, and sovereign debt restructuring. Second, the special issue provides detailed analysis of China’s actions in global economic governance, establishing varying degrees of support and opposition ranging from deep cooperation to deep challenging. The special issue features contributions that explore how China is interacting with the global economic order by pinpointing how and why China chooses to challenge, support, or alter multilateral economic institutions. This provides more substance to the claims that China is either a revisionist or a supporter of the liberal international order and offers a more nuanced way to understand how China (dis)engages with multilateral economic institutions. More specifically, it highlights how China has changed economic institutions through its actions and responses by the West to its actions.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{nokey, title = {Divergent Attitudes of Eurosceptic Parties Towards Intergovernmental and Supranational EU Institutions}, author = {Nikolai Gad and Eugénia C. Heldt and Robert Csehi}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13701}, year = {2025}, date = {2025-03-01}, urldate = {2025-05-01}, journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies}, volume = {63}, issue = {4}, pages = {1259-1279}, abstract = {How do Eurosceptic parties position themselves regarding individual European Union (EU) institutions? Using Euromanifesto data from 1979 to 2019, this study addresses this question by disaggregating the attitudes of party families towards separate intergovernmental and supranational EU institutions. It focuses on the relationship between the identities of radical left- and right-wing parties and Euroscepticism. The findings reveal that post-communist parties are more sceptical of intergovernmental institutions than nationalist parties, whilst nationalist parties are more sceptical of supranational institutions. Despite widespread Euroscepticism in both nationalist and post-communist party families, nationalist parties' attitudes towards intergovernmental institutions align with those of other party families. In contrast, post-communist parties support the transfer of more competences to the European Parliament but are sceptical of intergovernmental institutions. These results suggest that foundational party identities influence party-based Euroscepticism, which has implications for the EU's handling of increasing Euroscepticism.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @collection{ech003, title = {China’s Rise and the Reconfiguration of Global Economic Governance}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Susan Park}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rrip20/32/4}, year = {2025}, date = {2025-01-01}, publisher = {Review of International Political Economy, Volume 32, Issue 4}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {collection} } @inbook{nokey, title = {The IMF and the Future of the Liberal International Order}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Orfeo Fioretos}, editor = {Bessma Momani and Mark Hibben}, url = {https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-handbook-of-the-international-monetary-fund-9780192858405?q=Oxford%20Handbook%20of%20the%20International%20Monetary%20Fund&lang=en&cc=de}, isbn = {9780192858405}, year = {2024}, date = {2024-10-17}, urldate = {2024-10-17}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of the International Monetary Fund}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, chapter = {36}, series = {Oxford Handbooks}, abstract = {Over 80 years, the IMF has been challenged by global power shifts, a more diverse membership, crises of legitimacy, populist backlash, and a more complex global institutional landscape that includes regional and informal economic institutions in its traditional areas of expertise. This contribution explores what past responses portend for the future of IMF beyond the Covid-19 pandemic. It argues that the IMF has overcome multiple past challenges without undergoing radical restructuring or becoming a peripheral organization by undertaking frequent and at times wide-ranging incremental changes to policies and governance structures. It shows how IMF adjusted to a more complex global landscape by expanding its scope and mandate to domains such as gender equality, climate change, sustainable development goals, and global health all while maintaining and boosting its expertise in the monetary and financial areas. The contribution concludes that the IMF has been a resilient organization that will likely experience similar developments in the future and maintain its centrality in the liberal international order.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @inbook{10.4337/9781802204780.00024, title = {Revitalizing the World Bank: Engagement with the Private Sector and Scope Expansion}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Thomas Dörfler}, editor = {Antje Vetterlein and Tobias Schmidtke}, doi = {10.4337/9781802204780.00024}, isbn = {9781802204773}, year = {2024}, date = {2024-09-12}, urldate = {2024-09-12}, booktitle = {The Elgar Companion to the World Bank}, pages = {143–153}, publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing}, chapter = {12}, abstract = {The World Bank has significantly shifted its multilateral development financing model in recent years, mobilizing private capital to finance projects of the International Development Association. What induced this major shift in the financing of the World Bank? This chapter argues that the World Bank received criticisms from several directions and was losing its focality in multilateral development financing. To cope with these new challenges, the Bank reinvented itself by resorting to private capital markets and widening the scope of its activities to include new transnational governance domains - including climate change, health, and gender issues. The chapter concludes by briefly reflecting on the consequences of resorting to private investors to finance multilateral development finance.}, keywords = {World Bank; Private sector; Mandate expansion; Adaptation strategies; Sustainable development goals; Revitalization}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @inbook{nokey, title = {Time in International Organizations and International Organizations in Time}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, editor = {Klaus H. Goetz}, url = {https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-time-and-politics-9780190862084?cc=de&lang=en&}, isbn = {9780190862084}, year = {2024}, date = {2024-08-28}, urldate = {2024-08-28}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, edition = {2.}, chapter = {19.}, keywords = {historical institutionalism, international organizations, multilateral negotiations, sequencing, time, time pressure}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{nokey, title = {In Europe We Trust: Selecting and Empowering EU Institutions in Disruptive Sircumstances}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Elena Ríos Camacho and Tony Mueller }, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2272037}, year = {2024}, date = {2024-00-00}, urldate = {2024-00-00}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {46}, issue = {2}, pages = {235-255}, abstract = {Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) made significant strides in economic and fiscal policy integration without formal treaty-based changes. After the euro crisis, member states granted the European Central Bank banking supervisory powers. During the pandemic, they entrusted the European Commission with raising EU debt through NextGenerationEurope. This article examines the empowerment of supranational institutions as a deliberate ajustment to disruptive circumstances. By so doing, it demonstrates that empowerment can happen through legislative acts and joint decisions by member states. The study reveals that when states have multiple agent options, like in the banking union, they select the institution they trust the most. Conversely, in nested delegation games, extensive monitoring and reporting requirements, as in the case of NextGenerationEurope, are aimed at avoiding the defection of single member states, what we call ”principal slack”, at the implementation stage.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{10.17645/pag.v11i4.7098, title = {Europe’s Global Gateway: A New Instrument of Geopolitics}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7098}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-00-00}, urldate = {2023-01-01}, journal = {Politics and Governance}, volume = {11}, issue = {4}, abstract = {In December 2021, the EU member states agreed on the Global Gateway strategy to mobilize public and private funds of up to €300 billion between 2021 and 2027, to invest in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research fields. With a geographical focus on Africa, Global Gateway links infrastructure investment projects with condition principles—including democratic values, good governance, and transparency—and catalyzes private investment into EU development financing. Against this backdrop, this study explores why EU member states agreed on this new geopolitical instrument. This piece posits that the confluence of three factors enabled the creation of Global Gateway. First, the EU established this new instrument to counter China’s role as a global infrastructure lender in Africa. Second, Global Gateway was possible through the shift to private investment in multilateral development financing. Equally important for the establishment of Global Gateway was the European Commission’s transformational leadership as an entrepreneurial agent in designing this geopolitical strategy of the EU’s power projection. The conclusion outlines future research avenues and enables readers to consider the wider prospects and caveats of the Global Gateway strategy.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{10.1111/rego.12432, title = {Orchestrating Private Investors for Development: How the World Bank Revitalizes}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Thomas Dörfler}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221098487}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-10-01}, urldate = {2022-10-01}, journal = {Regulation & Governance}, volume = {16}, issue = {4}, pages = {1382-1398}, abstract = {Confronted with a new wave of criticism on the in effectiveness of its development programs, the World Bank embarked on a revitalization process, turning to private investors to finance International Development Association projects and widening its mandate. To explain these adaptation strategies of the World Bank to regain relevance, this piece draws on organizational ecology and orchestration scholarship. We contend that international organizations rely on two adaptation mechanisms, orchestration and scope expansion, when they lose their role as focal actors in an issue area. We find that the World Bank has indeed lost market share and has relied on these two mechanisms to revitalize itself. We show that the World Bank responded to changes in the environment by orchestrating a private sector-oriented capital increase, prioritizing private funding for development through a “cascade approach,” and expanding the scope of its mandate into adjacent domains of transnational governance, including climate change and global health.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @inbook{nokey, title = {China und die BRICS in globalen ökonomischen Institutionen}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, editor = {Stefan A. Schirm and Andreas Busch and Susanne Lütz and Stefanie Walter and Hubert Zimmermann}, url = {https://www.nomos-shop.de/nomos/titel/de-globalisierung-id-107910/}, isbn = {978-3-8487-7503-3}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-09-09}, urldate = {2022-01-01}, booktitle = {De-Globalisierung}, pages = {123-138}, publisher = {Nomos}, abstract = {Dieser Band unternimmt eine Bestandsaufnahme der internationalen politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung über die verschiedenen Facetten der De-Globalisierung. Er folgt auf den Band „Globalisierung. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven“ in die Buchreihe „Internationale Politische Ökonomie“ im Nomos Verlag (Schirm (Hrsg.) 2006). Zielsetzung dieses Bandes ist es, in jedem Kapitel zunächst den internationalen Forschungsstand zu rezipieren und anschließend die eigene Forschung der Autorin bzw. des Autors zu präsentieren. Der Band bietet daher sowohl eine breite Aufnahme der aktuellen internationalen politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung zur Debatte um De-Globalisierung als auch die spezifische Expertise der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren. Der Kreis der Verfasserinnen und Verfasser repräsentiert einen zentralen Ausschnitt der deutschsprachigen IPÖ-Community, die überwiegend auf Englisch publiziert. Mit diesem Band sprechen wir nun explizit die im deutschsprachigen Raum Forschenden und Lehrenden an.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{10.1093/isagsq/ksac035, title = {When Do International Organizations Engage in Agency Slack? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of United Nations Institutions}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Patrick A. Mello and Anna Novoselova and Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac035}, doi = {10.1093/isagsq/ksac035}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-07-01}, urldate = {2022-01-01}, journal = {Global Studies Quarterly}, volume = {2}, issue = {3}, pages = {1-15}, abstract = {The extensive delegation of power to international organizations (IOs) has been accompanied by occasional agency slack. While prior studies suggest that IOs’ propensity for agency slack may be rooted in their organizational characteristics, this has rarely been explored empirically. To address this lacuna, in this article we propose a conceptualization and measurement of agency slack and develop a framework of organizational characteristics. Our empirical analysis applies qualitative comparative analysis to assess the conditions under which agency slack occurs across sixteen United Nations institutions. We complement the cross-case analysis with two case illustrations. Our results document the empirical existence of two paths to agency slack, providing confirmatory evidence for our theoretical expectations. Path 1 combines staffing rules that are favorable for the agent with wide access to third parties. Path 2 entails the combination of favorable staffing rules with extensive delegation of authority and a vague organizational mandate. L'importante délégation de pouvoir aux organisations internationales (OI) a occasionnellement été accompagnée d'une marge d'agentivité. Bien que des études précédentes suggèrent que la propension des OI à obtenir une marge d'agentivité puisse être ancrée dans les caractéristiques de ces organisations, cela a rarement été étudié d'un point de vue empirique. Dans cet article, nous proposons une conceptualisation et une mesure de cette marge d'agentivité et nous développons un cadre de caractéristiques organisationnelles pour combler cette lacune. Pour notre étude empirique, nous appliquons une Analyse comparative qualitative (ACQ) afin d’évaluer les conditions dans lesquelles la marge d'agentivité intervient dans 16 institutions de l'ONU. Nous complétons l'analyse de cas croisés par deux illustrations de cas. Nos résultats documentent l'existence empirique de deux voies vers la marge d'agentivité tout en fournissant des preuves confirmant nos hypothèses théoriques. La première allie des règles de dotation en personnel qui sont favorables à l'agent puisqu'elles lui offrent un large accès aux tierces parties. Et la deuxième consiste à combiner des règles de dotation en personnel favorables avec une vaste délégation de pouvoir et un mandat organisationnel vague. La amplia delegación de poderes en las organizaciones internacionales (OI) ha ido acompañada de una ocasional inactividad de los organismos. Si bien estudios anteriores sugieren que la tendencia de las OI a la inactividad está basada en sus características organizativas, esto no se ha estudiado empíricamente. Para abordar esta situación, proponemos en este documento una conceptualización y una valoración de la inactividad de las instituciones y desarrollamos un marco de características organizativas. Nuestro análisis empírico aplica el análisis comparativo cualitativo (Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA) para evaluar las condiciones en las que ocurre dicha inactividad en 16 instituciones de la ONU. Además, complementamos el análisis cruzado de casos con dos ejemplos ilustrativos. Nuestros resultados documentan la existencia empírica de dos caminos hacia la inactividad de las instituciones, lo que brinda evidencia confirmatoria de nuestras expectativas teóricas. El camino 1 combina normas para el personal que son favorables para el agente con amplio acceso a terceros. El camino 2 supone la combinación de normas favorables para el personal con la amplia delegación de la autoridad y un mandato organizativo impreciso.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{10.1177/14651165221098487, title = {Measuring Actual Discretion of the European Commission: Using the Discretion Index to Guide Empirical Research}, author = {Markus Gastinger and Eugénia C. Heldt}, doi = {10.1177/14651165221098487}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-05-16}, urldate = {2022-05-16}, journal = {European Union Politics}, volume = {23}, number = {3}, pages = {541–558}, abstract = {One key question in the study of the European Union has always been the extent of Commission discretion. We take the discretion index, typically used by principal–agent scholars to measure the Commission's designed discretion, to measure its actual discretion. Commission designed discretion can today be computationally generated with sufficient accuracy across all secondary acts. The study of designed discretion thus reaches considerable maturity. Therefore, we argue that scholars should prioritize studying Commission actual discretion. We present a systematic and transparent investigative technique based on the discretion index, which we use as a roadmap to guide our empirical investigation. The index facilitates the accumulation of knowledge across policy areas and time by providing exact values for Commission discretion. We illustrate our approach with the Development Cooperation Instrument.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{10.1017/gov.2020.36, title = {The Limits of Transparency: Expert Knowledge and Meaningful Accountability in Central Banking}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Lisa Herzog}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2020.36}, doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.36}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-04-01}, urldate = {2022-01-01}, journal = {Government and Opposition}, volume = {57}, number = {2}, pages = {217-232}, abstract = {Recent discussions of accountability in contexts of expert knowledge raise questions about the limits of transparency. Against this background, we discuss the nexus between expert knowledge and meaningful accountability – that is, context-sensitive accountability based on a genuine understanding of a situation. We argue that the concentration of expertise in certain institutions makes it difficult to hold those institutions accountable. In particular, three components challenge meaningful accountability: specialization, inaccessibility and potential biases or conflict of interest. We emphasize the role of ‘epistemic communities’ and their impact on the tension between expert knowledge and independence. Drawing on the deliberative systems literature, we discuss how expert knowledge might be communicated to outsiders to enable meaningful accountability. To illustrate our argument, we draw on the European Central Bank, a case study in which states have chosen a delegation design characterized by a high degree of independence and trust in expert knowledge, to the detriment of accountability. We sketch possible avenues for creating the conditions for meaningful accountability even in the case of institutions with highly concentrated expertise.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{10.1111/1758-5899.13048, title = {Persistence Against the Odds: How Entrepreneurial Agents Helped the UN Joint Inspection Unit to Prevail}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Patrick A. Mello and Anna Novoselova and Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13048}, doi = {10.1111/1758-5899.13048}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-03-17}, urldate = {2022-01-01}, journal = {Global Policy}, volume = {13}, issue = {2}, pages = {235-246}, abstract = {Since its inception in 1966, the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has prevailed in the face of significant existential challenges. Against this backdrop, we investigate how and why the JIU persisted over time. Combining delegation and historical institutionalist approaches, we posit that entrepreneurial agents and layering processes together help us better understand persistence of international organizations. Based on semi-structured interviews with UN staff and JIU inspectors, we examine three critical junctures in the history of the JIU. Our results show that entrepreneurial agents and stakeholders in the JIU managed to avoid the closure or demotion of the JIU by engaging in a strategy of institutional layering. Our analysis, however, also demonstrates that the JIU survived at the price of losing its privilege as the central UN oversight body. These findings have implications for the study of international organizations and for the reform of the UN system at large.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590, title = {Bringing Independence and Accountability Together: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Tony Mueller}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590}, doi = {10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-02-28}, urldate = {2022-01-01}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {44}, issue = {6}, pages = {837-853}, abstract = {The European Central Bank’s (ECB) role as a political actor during the euro crisis raised concerns about its independence and insufficient accountability. Against this backdrop, the article investigates how and why the ECB reacted to demands for more accountability during and following the crisis. To this end, we revisit the independence-accountability nexus, adding three qualifications to the conventional wisdom that independence and accountability do not go together. First, recurring to the governor’s dilemma, we argue that a delegation relationship characterized by a high level of independence favours competence over controllability. Second, we open the black box of accountability by investigating the extent to which the ECB made the strategic choice to improve selected accountability dimensions. Third, against the commonsensical view that ECB accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped, this piece shows that certain accountability dimensions have been continuously improved to defend independence. The findings contribute to the literature on accountability and the causes and consequences of delegating power to supranational institutions. }, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @online{ech014, title = {Haben Russland und China den Multilateralismus ausgenutzt?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.convoco.co.uk/podcast/c-spezial-haben-russland-und-china-den-multilateralismus-ausgenutzt-eugenia-da-conceicao-heldt/}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-01-01}, urldate = {2022-01-01}, howpublished = {C! Podcast Spezial zum Krieg in der Ukraine}, note = {C! Podcast Spezial zum Krieg in der Ukraine, 29.05.2022}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @inbook{pop00062, title = {Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung?}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, editor = {Corinne Michaela Flick}, url = {https://www.wallstein-verlag.de/9783835339316-neue-konstellationen-der-gegenwart-annaeherungen-institutionen-und-legitimitaet.html}, isbn = {978-3-8353-3931-6}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-08-03}, urldate = {2021-08-03}, journal = {Neue Konstellationen der Gegenwart: Annäherungen, Institutionen und …}, pages = {113 - 128}, publisher = {Wallstein Verlag}, series = {Convoco! Edition}, abstract = {Sind internationale Organisationen (IOs) die tragischen Helden der gegenwärtigen Weltpolitik? Wenn sie zu erfolgreich agieren und ihre Aufgaben vollständig erfüllen, riskieren sie, abgeschafft zu werden. Verselbstständigen sie sich und bewegen sich jenseits ihres übertragenen Mandats, werden sie von den Regierungschefs und der Öffentlichkeit kritisiert. Warum stehen IOs zunehmend am Pranger? Warum befinden sie sich in einer Art Dauerkrisenzustand? Und wie konnte es so weit kommen? Damit wir die gegenwärtige Krisensituation verstehen, ist es hilfreich, sich zu erinnern, wie alles begann. IOs gibt es schon seit über 200 Jahren und seitdem hat nicht nur ihre Anzahl stetig zugenommen, sondern auch der Umfang und die Komplexität ihrer Zuständigkeiten. Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts gab es um die 30 internationale Institutionen, heute sind es über 7.700. Die Mehrheit der heute existierenden internationalen Institutionen und Organisationen sind in der Nachkriegszeit entstanden – wie z. B. die Vereinten Nationen. Der Rückzug der alten Weltmacht USA, der Aufstieg Chinas zur neuen Weltmacht, aber auch die Fragmentierung der institutionellen Landschaft und der damit einhergehenden Entstehung neuer informeller Kooperationsformen – u. a. G7-, G8- oder G20-Gipfel – stellen die internationale Kooperation vor enorme Herausforderungen und zeigen, wie der Multilateralismus aus unterschiedlichen Richtungen angegriffen wird. Einige Beispiele aus der internationalen Politik verdeutlichen dies: –– Bei der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) blockieren die USA die Neubesetzung wichtiger Posten am Berufungsgericht und torpedieren somit die Funktionalität dieser Institution. –– Mitten in der Corona-Pandemie kündigten die USA und Brasilien an, aus der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) austreten zu wollen. –– Das Brexit-Referendum sowie der darauffolgende EU-Austritt Großbritanniens stellt eine Zäsur im Europäischen Integrationsprozess dar. Mit dem Vollzug des Brexits im Jahr 2020 kommt auch das Ende der Illusionen über die Irreversibilität des europäischen Integrationsprozesses. –– Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat zwar den Euro gerettet, sieht sich aber seit der Eurokrise mit Anschuldigungen wie Vertragsbruch und Überschreitung ihres Mandats konfrontiert. Das jüngste Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Anleihenkauf stellt einen weiteren Höhepunkt dieser Kontroverse dar. All diese Ereignisse zeigen, dass IOs heute mehr denn je umstritten sind. Einige Staaten erwägen inzwischen sogar, ihre Mitgliedschaft in diesen multilateralen Foren aufzugeben. Es war kein Zufall, dass das Motto der Brexit-Kampagne der UKIP-Partei »Vote Leave, Take Control« war oder dass Donald Trump im USPräsidentschaftswahlkampf eine »America First«-Kampagne verfolgte. Um zu verstehen, warum sich IOs momentan in einer Art Dauerkrisenzustand befinden und ihre Autorität permanent angezweifelt wird, werde ich in diesem Beitrag auf zentrale Forschungsgegenstände und -wellen in den Internationalen Beziehungen eingehen sowie Erklärungen anbieten, warum der Multilateralismus und insbesondere internationale Institutionen und Organisationen in Frage gestellt werden. Dabei werde ich auf folgende drei Bereiche eingehen, die die Forschung über IOs in den letzten Jahrzehnten geprägt haben: (1) Entstehung, Übertragung von Kompetenzen und Ermächtigung von IOs; (2) Politisierung und Infragestellung ihrer Autorität; und (3) Anpassungsfähigkeit und Resilienz von IOs. Der Beitrag endet mit einem Appell für mehr Multilateralismus.}, note = {Query date: 2024-10-04 10:56:01}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4, title = {A New Delegation Design for EU Governance: How Preference Cohesiveness of Multiple Principals Shapes the European Commission’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4}, doi = {10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-06-24}, urldate = {2021-01-01}, journal = {Comparative European Politics}, volume = {19}, pages = {576–593}, abstract = {The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the role of the European Parliament in free trade agreements. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of this new delegation design in EU trade governance. Specifically, it addresses the question how the preference cohesiveness of multiple principals—the Council of Ministers as a de jure principal and the Parliament as a de facto principal—shapes the Commission’s discretion in negotiating trade agreements. Exploring these two conjectures through a combination of primary materials and interviews, this contribution posits that those configurations of low degree of cohesiveness within the Council and high cohesiveness within the Parliament or high cohesiveness of the Council and low cohesiveness within the Parliament increase Commission discretion. A configuration of low cohesiveness within and between multiple principals, by contrast, is more likely to lead to paralysis of the negotiation process.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3, title = {Populism as a ‘Corrective’ to Trade Agreements? ‘America First’ and the Readjustment of NAFTA}, author = {Robert Csehi and Eugénia C. Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3}, doi = {10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-05-27}, urldate = {2021-01-01}, journal = {International Politics}, abstract = {The past few years have seen an upsurge in populist politics around the globe. Yet, its potential impact on the liberal international order has been analyzed mainly from a discursive perspective, and much less is known about actual policy implications. Adopting an ideational approach to populism and taking the case of the NAFTA renegotiation process as a building block in the liberal economic order, this article studies the populist imprints of the revised agreement. First, we demonstrate how the populist division of society between ‘the corrupt elite’ and ‘the honest people’ and the emphasis on popular sovereignty were used as narrative frames in criticizing NAFTA. In a second step, through selected provisions, we show how alterations to NAFTA are considered as ‘populist corrections’ to guarantee greater representation for ‘the people’ and better safeguards for popular sovereignty under the USMCA. The article concludes with a discussion of potential implications for global trade.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{doi:10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145, title = {The (Self-)Empowerment of the European Central Bank during the Sovereign Debt Crisis}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Tony Mueller}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145}, doi = {10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-01-30}, urldate = {2021-01-30}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {43}, issue = {1}, pages = {83–98}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {The European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the sovereign debt crisis as one of the most powerful supranational institutions. Against this background, this article explains how and why the ECB became empowered during the euro area crisis. Building on the delegation, governor’s dilemma, and epistemic community approaches, we argue that the ECB ability to play a strong role in this empowerment process and to convince member states to entrust it with more competences was the outcome of a combination of three factors: limited cohesiveness within the collective principal (Eurogroup); a fiduciary relationship characterized by broad discretion and independence on the trustee side (ECB); and strong specialization with the ECB acting as epistemic entrepreneur. We illustrate our argument with two cases: the Trichet letters exemplify an autonomous emergency empowerment and the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism demonstrates ECB influence on institutional design decisions in negotiating processes.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @inbook{ech007, title = {Are International Organizations the Tragic Heroes of World Politics?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, editor = {Corinne Michaela Flick}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-01-01}, booktitle = {New Global Alliances: Institutions, Alignments and Legitimacy in the Contemporary World}, publisher = {Wallstein Verlag}, note = {forthcoming}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @online{ech015, title = {E agora, Alemanha?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.publico.pt/aovivo/detalhe/alemanha-266?lg=pt}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-01-01}, urldate = {2021-01-01}, howpublished = {Público}, note = {Público, 28.09.2021}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech016, title = {Europa}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.rtp.pt/play/p8271/e542586/sociedade-civil}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-01-01}, urldate = {2021-01-01}, howpublished = {RTP2, Programa Sociedade Civil}, note = {RTP2, Programa Sociedade Civil, 07.05.2021}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech017, title = {Que prioridades para a Europa em 2021?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://rr.sapo.pt/2021/01/06/da-capa-a-contracapa/prioridades-europeias-no-novo-ano/artigo/221169/}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-01-01}, urldate = {2021-01-01}, howpublished = {Rádio Renascença}, note = {Rádio Renascença, 05.01.2021}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{nokey, title = {China’s “Health Silk Road” Offensive: How the West should Respond}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, url = {https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/12/2020/chinas-health-silk-road-offensive-how-west-should-respond}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-12-09}, urldate = {2020-12-01}, journal = {Global Policy}, volume = {Opinion}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @inbook{nokey, title = {Decreasing Importance of the UN - Rise of Informal Organizations}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Tony Mueller}, editor = {Michael Molls and Jörg Eberspächer and Hermann Auernhammer and Georg Färber and Birgit Herbst-Gaebel and Udo Lindemann and Klaus Mainzer and Winfried Petry and Ralf Reichwald and Jürgen Scheurle and Leo Hemmen van and Peter Wilderer}, url = {https://doi.org/10.14459/2021md1578813}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.14459/2021md1578813}, isbn = {978-3-00-065966-9}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-07-01}, urldate = {2020-01-01}, booktitle = {Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit}, pages = {48-51}, publisher = {Technische Universität München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{10.1057/s41295-019-00183-4, title = {Contested EU Trade Governance: Transparency Conundrums in TTIP Negotiations}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41295-019-00183-4?utm_source=toc&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=toc_41295_18_2&utm_content=etoc_palgrave_20200403}, doi = {10.1057/s41295-019-00183-4}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-02}, urldate = {2019-04-01}, journal = {Comparative European Politics}, volume = {18}, issue = {2}, pages = {215-232}, abstract = {During TTIP negotiations, the European Commission was severely criticized by civil society organizations and public opinion for its secrecy regarding negotiation strategies and priorities. The Commission responded by making some negotiating texts publicly available. This article explores the implications of increasing transparency in trade negotiations. Drawing on negotiation, politicization, and informal governance literature, it examines how the Commission’s choice for a partial transparency approach had three paradoxical effects on negotiations. First, greater transparency did not help the public perception of TTIP. Second, greater transparency increased the EU’s bargaining leverage but led to a low degree of negotiating discretion for the Commission. Finally, greater transparency transformed the nature of the negotiating process by making it more informal, allowing bargaining parties to act outside the public scrutiny. This contribution solves these transparency puzzles by showing that partial transparency is a double-edged sword. Whilst greater transparency has become an important legitimation strategy in EU trade governance, adopting a partial transparency approach fuelled public protest instead of muting it and led to the failure of the negotiations.}, keywords = {TTIP; Trade negotiations; European Commission; Transparency; Contestation}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{nokey, title = {Reforming International Organizations: How Partisanship and Ministerial Control Shape States Preferences towards the World Bank}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Laura C. Mahrenbach}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02604001}, doi = {10.1163/19426720-02604001}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, urldate = {2020-01-01}, journal = {Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations}, volume = {26}, issue = {4}, pages = {601–627}, abstract = {Recent scholarship has highlighted the role of domestic pressures in determining state preferences toward the reform of international organizations (IO s). This article adds a new dimension by examining how partisanship and ministerial control affect state preferences toward IO empowerment. The article derives two expectations from the existing literature. First, partisan position will determine preferences toward IO empowerment. Second, when a government is constituted by multiple parties, the position of the party with the IO’s ministerial portfolio will determine the government’s position toward IO empowerment. The article illustrates this argument by examining the positions of four net donors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and two net recipients (Brazil and India) during the World Bank’s reforms. By bringing domestic politics back in, this article complements existing studies on the politics of IO reform and weighs in on central debates in comparative politics and international political economy.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @inbook{ech008, title = {Sinkende Bedeutung der UNO: Stärkung informeller Organisationen}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Tony Müller}, editor = {Michael Molls and others}, url = {https://bit.ly/3rHoyik}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, booktitle = {Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit}, publisher = {Technische Universität München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @online{ech018, title = {Corona-Krise: Professorin warnt vor Egoismus in der EU}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, urldate = {2020-01-01}, howpublished = {BR24}, note = {BR24, 26.03.2020, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech019, title = {Zweite Chance: Europas Währungshüter müssen nun besser erklären, was sie tun, um das Vertrauen der Bürger zu gewinnen}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Tony Mueller}, url = {https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/forum-zweite-chance-1.4964525}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, urldate = {2020-01-01}, howpublished = {Süddeutsche Zeitung}, note = {Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.07.2020, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech020, title = {Internationale Organisationen als tragische Helden?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://tinyurl.com/y3uuwjou}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, urldate = {2020-01-01}, howpublished = {ARD Campus Talks}, note = {ARD Campus Talks, 28.09.2020, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech021, title = {Europa oder Nationalstaat – wer rettet uns aus der Coronakrise?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://sz-erleben.sueddeutsche.de/sz-veranstaltungen/sz-plan-w-salon}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, urldate = {2020-01-01}, howpublished = {SZ-PLAN W SALON}, note = {SZ-PLAN W SALON, 28.10.2020, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech022, title = {The US Election and its Implications for German-US Relations – Die US-Wahlen und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Zui8FPfRvw}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, urldate = {2020-01-01}, howpublished = {Webinar}, note = {Webinar, 04.11.2020, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech023, title = {Forscher geben Antworten: Was ich noch zu Corona sagen wollte – Neue Weltordnung}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.br.de/mediathek/video/eugenia-da-conceicao-heldt-neue-weltordnung-av:5ebe94355351850014fe5265}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, urldate = {2020-01-01}, howpublished = {Bayerischer Rundfunk}, note = {Bayerischer Rundfunk, 15.05.2020, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @misc{ech035, title = {Survival and Resilience of the UN Joint Inspection Unit over Time}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Patrick A. Mello and Anna Novoselova and Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, howpublished = {ECPR 14th General Conference, Panel: International Organizations in Times of Crisis, August 2020}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @article{doi:10.1080/09692290.2019.1635513, title = {Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance since Bretton Woods}, author = {Orfeo Fioretos and Eugénia C. Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1635513}, doi = {10.1080/09692290.2019.1635513}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-07-08}, urldate = {2019-01-01}, journal = {Review of International Political Economy}, volume = {26}, issue = {6}, pages = {1089–1111}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {The international economic system that emerged after the 1944 Bretton Woods conference became the most durable international arrangement devoted to economic openness. Seventy-five years after the conference, however, global shifts in power, institutional gridlock, and populist backlash figure prominently in accounts predicting the system’s demise. This article examines the legacies of the Bretton Woods conference for structures and practices of global economic governance and innovations that emerged over time to adapt the system to new political and economic circumstances. It explores how and why the Bretton Woods system became a more variegated system over time with respect to four features of governance: membership, legalization, organizational focality, and market embeddedness. It identifies sources and effects of expanding membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the emergence of new formal and informal institutions, the challenges of a more fragmented institutional landscape, and shifts in the underlying principles of economic governance. Finally, the article discusses lessons from past crises in and reforms to the Bretton Woods system, and their implications for understanding recent challenges to global economic cooperation.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{GlobalDemocracyinDecline, title = {Global Democracy in Decline?: How Rising Authoritarianism Limits Democratic Control over International Institutions}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Henning Schmidtke}, url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/25/2/article-p231_6.xml}, doi = {10.1163/19426720-02502005}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-06-10}, urldate = {2019-01-01}, journal = {Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations}, volume = {25}, issue = {2}, pages = {231 - 254}, publisher = {Brill | Nijhoff}, address = {Leiden, Niederlande}, abstract = {Over the past decade, rising authoritarian regimes have begun to challenge the liberal international order. This challenge is particularly pronounced in the field of multilateral development finance, where China and its coalition partners from Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa have created two new multilateral development banks. This article argues that China and its partners have used the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to increase their power and to restrict democratic control mechanisms. By comparing formal mechanisms of democratic control in both organizations to the World Bank, this article shows that civil society access, transparency, and accountability are lower at the AIIB and NDB than they are at the World Bank.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @inbook{nokey, title = {Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, editor = {Klaus H. Goetz}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190862084.013.12}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190862084.013.12}, isbn = {9780190862084}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-04-04}, urldate = {2019-01-01}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics}, pages = {391–412}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, chapter = {19}, abstract = {Time plays a central role in international organizations (IOs). Interactions among actors are embedded in a temporal dimension, and actors use formal and informal time rules, time discourses, and time pressure to obtain concessions from their counterparts. By the same token, legacies and innovations within and outside IOs can be examined as a dynamic process evolving over time. Against this background, this chapter has a twofold aim. First, it examines how actors use time in IOs with a particular focus on multilateral negotiations to justify their actions. Drawing on international relations studies and negotiation analysis, this piece explores six different dimensions of time in the multilateral system: time pressure, time discourse, time rules, time costs, time horizons, and time as a resource. Second, this chapter delineates the evolution of IOs over time with the focus on innovations that emerge to adapt their institutional system to new political and economic circumstances. This piece looks particularly at endogenous and exogenous changes in IOs, recurring to central concepts used by historical institutionalism, including path dependence, critical junctures, and sequencing. This allows us to map patterns of incremental change, such as displacement, conversion, drift, and layering.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{10.1080/09692290.2019.1631205, title = {Explaining Coherence in International Regime Complexes: How the World Bank Shapes the Field of Multilateral Development Finance}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Henning Schmidtke}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2019.1631205}, doi = {10.1080/09692290.2019.1631205}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, urldate = {2019-01-01}, journal = {Review of International Political Economy}, volume = {26}, issue = {6}, pages = {1160-1186}, abstract = {The landscape of multilateral development finance has changed dramatically in the past decades. At Bretton Woods, delegates envisioned the World Bank as the focal organization mobilizing financial support for national development strategies. Today, this issue area is populated by no less than 27 multilateral development banks including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank created under Chinese leadership. This paper shows that, despite this institutional proliferation, the development finance regime remains largely coherent and core governance features designed at Bretton Woods continue to shape the emerging regime complex. We develop a historical institutionalist argument for why newly created institutions are likely to imitate extant institutions. We suggest that states add new institutions not only in response to deficiencies in extant institutions but also to increase their control and reputation. We analyze three causal pathways – path-dependence, orchestration, and independent learning – that contribute to a coherent regime complex. We show that focal international organizations can use their position to prevent incoherence.}, keywords = {Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Bretton Woods, coherence, development finance, historical institutionalism, New Development Bank, regime complexity, World Bank}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @collection{ech004, title = {Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance Since Bretton Woods}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Orfeo Fioretos}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, publisher = {Review of International Political Economy, Volume 26, Issue 6}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {collection} } @online{ech024, title = {John McCain Award Ceremony}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://securityconference.org/mediathek/asset/john-mccain-award-ceremony-1815-15-02-2019/}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, urldate = {2019-01-01}, howpublished = {Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz 2019}, note = {Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz 2019, 15.02.2019, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @misc{ech036, title = {The European Central Bank during the sovereign debt crisis: Revisiting the independence- accountability nexus}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Tony Mueller}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Denver, 9-11 May, 2019}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech037, title = {The systematic study of Commission discretion using principal-agent theory: lessons from the EU’s development cooperation policy}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Denver, 9- 11 May, 2019}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech038, title = {The Complex Relationship between Independence and Accountability: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Tony Mueller}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 2019 Joint Sessions, UCL Mons, Belgium, April 08-12, 2019}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech039, title = {How Organizational Structure Affects Agency Slack: A Fuzzy-Set Ideal-Type Analysis of International Bureaucracies}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Patrick Mello and Omar Serrano and Anna Novoselova}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 2019 Joint Sessions, UCL Mons, Belgium, April 08-12, 2019}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech040, title = {Privatization of Development Governance: Adaptation Strategies of the World Bank in Turbulent Times}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Thomas Doerfler}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Studies Association 2019, Toronto, March 25-30, 2019}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @workingpaper{nokey, title = {European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/1814/56404}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-05-01}, urldate = {2018-01-01}, journal = {EUI Working Papers RSCAS}, issue = { 2018/36}, pages = {1-13}, abstract = {How can we explain the EU’s policy failure during the refugee crisis? In this contribution, I argue that EU policy failure was a function of four causal mechanisms. First, a complex delegation design with partial empowerment of supranational institutions on migration and asylum policy issues hindered an effective response and strengthened disintegration dynamics. Second, a reluctant European Commission was unable to provide leadership during the refugee crisis. Third, Member States’ inability to speak with a single voice negatively impacted their external and internal effectiveness and reinforced disintegration dynamics. Finally, this cacophony of voices led to unilateral action eroding the authority of the Commission and explains EU policy failure during the refugee crisis. The findings of this paper suggest that the mantra that the EU undergoes many crises but always emerges stronger has lost plausibility.}, keywords = {Policy failure; Refugee crisis; Partial empowerment; Unilateral action; Delegation design}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } @article{10.1111/1758-5899.12643, title = {Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Laura C. Mahrenbach}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12643}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, urldate = {2018-01-01}, journal = {Global Policy}, volume = {10}, issue = {1}, pages = {19-28}, abstract = {Given long-standing criticism of global economic institutions by rising powers, it is puzzling that these same governments supported the transfer of substantial resources and responsibilities to the IMF and the World Bank during recent reform negotiations. We argue rising powers’ support for international organization (IO) empowerment is linked to their concerns regarding an IO's flexibility. We introduce two types of flexibility as being most relevant for rising powers. These include governance flexibility – the extent to which rising powers may participate in IO decision-making – and issue flexibility – the extent to which rising power preferences are incorporated into IO policies and programs. We illustrate our argument by examining the preferences of the BIC states (Brazil, India and China) towards IMF and World Bank reforms between 2008 and 2012. Drawing on archival material with over 50 statements from BIC representatives, we find, first, that there were clear links between Bank and Fund governance flexibility and the BICs’ support for empowerment of these IOs, but that this was not true for issue flexibility. Second, we find evidence indicating the strategies of individual BIC governments differ within these IOs, suggesting a need to undertake more differentiated studies of rising powers’ IO activities.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{nokey, title = {Lost in Internal Evaluation? Accountability and Insulation at the World Bank}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2018.1455491}, doi = {10.1080/13569775.2018.1455491}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, urldate = {2018-01-01}, journal = {Contemporary Politics}, volume = {24}, issue = {5}, pages = {568-587}, abstract = {Over past decades, the World Bank has been criticized by scholars, policymakers, and civil society groups for being unaccountable and inefficient. Confronted with this wave of contestation, the Bank established several internal accountability mechanisms, including the Inspection Panel, the Independent Evaluation Group, and the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman. Against this background, this article investigates how the proliferation of accountability mechanisms in a large and complex organization such as the World Bank reduces rather than enhances transparency and lines of accountability. I argue that the establishment of a myriad of accountability mechanisms has paradoxically made the Bank even more encapsulated and less accountable to the outside world. Unpacking the differential effects of external and internal accountability mechanisms makes this contribution of significant interest to scholars working on the accountability and performance of international organizations.}, keywords = {Accountability mechanisms, international organizations, performance, World Bank}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @online{ech025, title = {Fronteiras XXI – Afinal, Que Europa Queremos?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.rtp.pt/play/p4259/e346859/fronteiras-xxi}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, urldate = {2018-01-01}, howpublished = {Diskussion zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union im portugiesischen Fernsehen (RTP3)}, note = {Diskussion zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union im portugiesischen Fernsehen (RTP3), 16.05.2018}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @misc{ech041, title = {Back to Bretton Woods: How Institutional Proliferation Has Increased the Resilience of the World Bank}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Henning Schmidtke}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 30-September 2, 2018.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech042, title = {Independence, Accountability, and Legitimacy: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Tony Müller}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28- 30, 2018 and at the ECPR Standing Groups Sciences Po, June 13-15, 2018}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech043, title = {European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28-30, 2018 and at the ECPR Standing Groups Sciences Po, June 13-15, 2018}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech044, title = {The EU Performance During the Refugee Crisis}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Vittoria Meissner}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28-30, 2018}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech045, title = {Global Democracy in Decline? How Rising Authoritarianism limits Democratic Control over Multilateral Development Banks}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Henning Schmidtke}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, April 4-7, 2018}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @inbook{nokey, title = {Multiple Principals’ Preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, editor = {Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_9}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_9}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-10-18}, urldate = {2017-10-18}, booktitle = {The Principal Agent Model and the European Union}, pages = {203–226}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, abstract = {The European Parliament is now granted joint powers with the Council of the EU on trade policy issues. In this chapter, I explore how changing the delegation structure that now relies on multiple principals shapes the Commission’s discretion in the negotiation of trade agreements. I argue that an agent’s amount of discretion can be high or low depending on the preference heterogeneity between multiple principals and the type of control mechanisms available to principals during the negotiation process. To illustrate the argument made, this chapter analyzes two case studies of the negotiation of free trade agreements with South Korea and with Singapore.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{nokey, title = {Measuring the Empowerment of International Organizations: The Evolution of Financial and Staff Capabilities}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Henning Schmidtke}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12449}, doi = {10.1111/1758-5899.12449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-08-24}, urldate = {2017-01-01}, journal = {Global Policy}, volume = {8}, issue = {S5}, pages = {51-61}, abstract = {International organizations’ (IOs) power in shaping global governance outcomes is not only determined by the formal delegation of tasks and issue areas but also by the necessary capabilities to fulfill these tasks. Yet, extant research on the delegation of power to IOs gives few insights into the financial and staff capabilities of IOs and focuses mainly on the formal rules that specify IOs’ tasks and issue scope. To address these limitations, this paper makes three contributions. First, we propose a more encompassing concept of IO power which incorporates three principal components: tasks, issue scope, and capabilities. Second, we introduce a new concept – IO empowerment (IOE) – which encapsulates formal and informal changes in IO power over time. Third, we introduce a novel dataset on IO capabilities, which measures the formal rules governing IO staff and financial resources as well as the actual capabilities available to six well‐known IOs over 65 years. These original data show that capabilities vary not only across IOs but also over time.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @inbook{nokey, title = {Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Patrick A. Mello}, editor = {Cameron Thies}, url = {https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-496}, doi = {10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.496}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-06-28}, urldate = {2017-06-28}, booktitle = {Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis}, pages = {1-31}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {Whether in multilateral negotiations or bilateral meetings, government leaders regularly engage in “two-level games” played simultaneously at the domestic and the international level. From the two-level-games perspective, executives are “chief negotiators” involved in some form of international negotiations for which they ultimately need to gain domestic approval at the ratification stage. This ratification requirement provides the critical link between the international and domestic level, but it can be based on formal voting requirements or more informal ways of ratification, such as public approval ratings. With its focus on government leaders as “gatekeepers” and central actors in international negotiations, the two-level games perspective constitutes a distinct approach in foreign policy analysis and serves to reintegrate the subfields of comparative politics and international relations. While there are similarities to a liberal perspective, two-level games emphasize that executives hold a certain degree of autonomy in their decision making that cannot be purely derived from their constituencies. Unlike realism, however, the approach recognizes the importance of domestic veto players and institutional constraints. Since its inception in the late 1980s, a vast body of literature on two-level games has evolved, including refinements of its theoretical foundation and applications in various policy areas. Against this background, key controversies in two-level games and foreign policy analysis since the late 1980s are examined. The discussion is organized along six debates concerning the levels of analysis, domestic political institutions, the interaction between the domestic and international levels, relevant actors, their interests and preferences, and the relationship between comparative politics and international relations.}, keywords = {bargaining, domestic politics, interests, levels of analysis, negotiation analysis, ratification, two-level games, veto players, win sets}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{nokey, title = {Regaining Control of Errant Agents? Agency Slack at the European Commission and the World Health Organization}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010836717703673}, doi = {10.1177/0010836717703673}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-04-25}, urldate = {2017-01-01}, journal = {Cooperation and Conflict}, volume = {52}, number = {4}, pages = {469–484}, abstract = {Under which conditions are principals able to regain control when agency slack has occured? While existing research highlights a number of important factors related to the conditions under which agents engage in slack, scholars have to a less extent investigated which causal mechanisms affect the ability of states to regain control of their errant agents. Extending the principal–agent literature, this contribution argues that the ability of principals to regain control of their agents depends on three causal mechanisms: the type of monitoring mechanisms; the extent of fragmentation within an international organization; and the credibility of sanctions available to member states. To illustrate this argument, I compare two cases of agency slack: at the European Commission during the Eurozone crisis in 2015; and at the World Health Organization in the 1990s. The findings suggest that regaining control of runaway agents after slack has occurred is easier when there is a low level of fragmentation within an organization and states have centralized monitoring mechanisms and credible sanction mechanisms, such as budgetary contractions, at their disposal.}, keywords = {agency slack; agent preferences; control mechanisms; European Commission; international organizations; principal–agent approach; World Health Organization}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{nokey, title = {Shaping Global Trade Governance Rules: New Powers’ Hard and Soft Strategies of Influence at the WTO}, author = {Eugénia C. Heldt}, issn = { 1384-6299}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, urldate = {2017-01-01}, journal = {European Foreign Affairs Review}, volume = {22}, issue = {Special Issue}, pages = {19-36}, abstract = {How do new powers seek to influence global trade governance rules? In this contribution, I posit that, contrary to the EU and the US, which act predominantly as regulatory powers, rising powers use a variety of hard and soft strategies to shape global trade governance. The article finds that a combination of hard strategies, such as coalition-building or obstruction, and soft strategies, including placing their own nationals at the top of the WTO or pursuing incremental procedural changes to make trade governance more inclusive, enabled new powers to shape global trade governance rules over the past fifteen years.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @online{ech026, title = {Big Data statt Platon}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/neues-profil-big-data-statt-platon-1.3346467}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, urldate = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {Süddeutsche Zeitung}, note = {Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24.01.2017, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech027, title = {Hochschule für Politik München – Politikwissenschaft an der Technischen Universität München}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.presseclub-muenchen.de/veranstaltung-detail/tu—die-neue-hochschule-fuer-politik.html}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, urldate = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {Vortrag Presseclub}, note = {Vortrag Presseclub, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @misc{ech046, title = {EU Governance in Crisis Mode: Disempowering the European Commission}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6-9, 2017}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech047, title = {Contested Multilateralism and the World Bank: Explaining the Establishment of the New Development Bank}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6 - 9, 2017 and at the DVPW IP-Sektionstagung, October 4-6, 2017}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech048, title = {Power without Control? Explaining variety of accountability mechanisms across troika institutions}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the European Workshops in International Studies, Accountability in Global Governance, Cardiff, June 07-10, 2017}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech049, title = {The Systematic Study of Commission Discretion using Principal–Agent Theory: Lessons from the EU’s Development Cooperation Policy}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Markus Gastinger}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech050, title = {Disintegration Dynamics in Europe? Mass Migration, Cacophony of Voices, and External Spill- Back Processes}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech051, title = {The Silent Empowerment of the ECB During the Euro Crisis}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Tony Müller}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech052, title = {Explaining the Empowerment of International Organizations}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Henning Schmidtke}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {ISA Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech053, title = {Rise and Decline of Old Bretton Woods Institutions: Dysfunctionality and Insulation at the World Bank}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, howpublished = {ISA Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @article{pop00047, title = {Verantwortungszurechnung im EU-Mehrebenensystem während der Eurokrise: Wer kontrollierte die Troika-Institutionen?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-015-0009-9}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-015-0009-9}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-03-02}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, journal = {Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft}, volume = {26}, pages = {115–129}, abstract = {Mit der Einrichtung der Troika-Institutionen hat die Frage der Kontrollmöglichkeiten und Verschränkung von Macht im EU-Mehrebenensystem an Bedeutung gewonnen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht dieser Beitrag die Verantwortungszurechnung (accountability) der Troika-Institutionen während der Eurokrise. Dabei argumentiere ich, dass Delegations- und Treuhandmodi unterschiedlichen Logiken der Verantwortungszurechnung entsprechen, in denen die Kontrolle der Agenten oder Treuhänder durch die Prinzipale oder Begünstigten auf verschiedenen Ebenen stattfindet. Während im Delegationsmodus formale Kontrollmechanismen überwiegen, sind diese im Treuhandmodus informeller Art. Zur Illustration des Arguments vergleicht der Beitrag diese zwei Modi im Hinblick auf die darin verankerten Kontrollmechanismen: die Delegationsbeziehung zwischen der Kommission und dem Rat der Europäischen Union einerseits sowie die Treuhandbeziehung zwischen der Europäischen Zentralbank und den Eurostaaten andererseits. With the establishment of the troika institutions during the Euro crisis, issues related to possibilities for control and constraint of these institutions, as well as their accountability, became prominent. This contribution analyses the accountability of the troika institutions, that is, the extent to which agents and trustees are controlled at different levels by their principals or beneficiaries. Specifically, I distinguish between a delegation and a fiduciary mode of accountability in EU governance. While the delegation mode is characterised by formal hierarchical, supervisory and legal control mechanisms, the fiduciary mode is marked by informal peer organisations and public reputational mechanisms. In order to illustrate these two modes of accountability, this article examines a delegation relation (European Commission and Council of Ministers) and a fiduciary relation (European Central Bank and Eurozone-Member States) during the financial bailout assistance programmes.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @online{pop00066, title = {The European Commission Experienced a ‘Subtle Disempowerment’ During the Eurozone Crisis}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/02/16/the-european-commission-experienced-a-subtle-disempowerment-during-the-eurozone-crisis/}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-02-16}, publisher = {LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog}, institution = {LSE}, abstract = {How did the Eurozone crisis affect the balance of power between the EU’s institutions? As Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt writes, opinion has been split over whether the crisis strengthened or damaged the European Commission’s role in EU decision-making. She argues that while some authors have highlighted an apparent increase in the Commission’s responsibilities over economic governance during the crisis, the Commission actually experienced a ‘subtle disempowerment’ in relation to other institutions such as the European Central Bank.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @article{pop00013, title = {Why the European Commission is not the “Unexpected Winner” of the Euro Crisis: A Comment on Bauer and Becker}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2015.1101957}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2015.1101957}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {38}, issue = {1}, pages = {95–100}, abstract = {The protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic interest in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Commission is undergoing “subtle disempowerment”, that is, a gradual transfer of decision-making authority and resources from the Commission to the intergovernmental level and to the European Central Bank. I illustrate the Commission's subtle disempowerment along three dimensions: the creation of the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism; enhanced oversight mechanisms of the Commission via the troika constellation; and the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union and Single Supervisory Mechanism under the aegis of the European Central Bank.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @book{pop00023, title = {O futuro da União Europeia}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, isbn = {978-989-8819-36-9}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, journal = {Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos}, publisher = {Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos}, abstract = {Como pode a União Europeia (UE) sair fortalecida da crise atual? Como se transformou ao longo das últimas décadas? Que novos processos e dinâmicas políticas se tornaram predominantes com a crise do euro? Como é possível ultrapassar alguns dos impasses da política europeia? Este ensaio defende que para conseguir ultrapassar as atuais tendências centrífugas, a União terá de se adaptar em vários aspetos. Para abordar esta temática complexa, na primeira parte analisa-se a evolução da UE, mostrando a estreita interligação entre o processo de integração e as várias explicações avançadas pelas teorias de integração europeia. Na segunda parte, identificam-se diversos desafios políticos, institucionais, económicos e financeiros e perspetivam-se as mudanças necessárias para que a União ultrapasse a sua crise. A terceira parte incide sobre a relação de Portugal com a UE e apresenta algumas estratégias negociais para que Portugal consiga influenciar o processo de transformação da União.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {book} } @inbook{ech009, title = {The European Agricultural Fortress under Attack}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, editor = {Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {Key Controversies in European Integration}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Basingstoke}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @online{ech028, title = {TU München gründet eigene Fakultät für Politikwissenschaft}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/technik-und-politik-tu-muenchen-gruendet-eigene-fakultaet-fuer-politikwissenschaft-1.3202821}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Süddeutsche Zeitung}, note = {Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.10.2016, München}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech029, title = {Folgen des Brexit für den Hochschulbereich}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.presseportal.de/pm/63354/3444423}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Deutscher Hochschulverband (DHV) und Santander Bank}, note = {Deutscher Hochschulverband (DHV) und Santander Bank}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech030, title = {EU and US negotiators gather for more TTIP talks}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://euobserver.com/economic/134285}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {EU Observer}, note = {EU Observer, 11.07.2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech031, title = {Apresentação do Ensaio „O Futuro da União Europeia“}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cFfLF9HO6zY}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Feira do Livro 2016}, note = {Feira do Livro 2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech032, title = {O Futuro da Europa: Crise, Transformação e Resiliência}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://ffms.pt/blog/artigo/11/o-futuro-da-europa-crise-transformacao-e-resiliencia}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Blog FFMS}, note = {Blog FFMS}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @online{ech033, title = {O Brexit e o Fim das Ilusões}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://ffms.pt/blog/artigo/31/o-brexit-e-o-fim- das-ilusoes}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, urldate = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Blog FFMS}, note = {Blog FFMS}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @misc{ech055, title = {Empowering International Organizations}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Henning Schmidtke}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 and University of Munich Workshop on “Resourcing International Organizations” 2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech056, title = {Partisan Orientation of Old and New Power Governments towards Empowerment at the World Bank}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Laura Mahrenbach}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech057, title = {Variation Without Influence? (In)formal Policy-making in EU Development Cooperation}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Markus Gastinger}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Council for European Studies 23rd International Conference for Europeanists, Philadelphia, April 14-16}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech058, title = {How Effective are Informal Coalitions in Global Governance? Rising Powers as shapers of global health rules}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and André Isidro}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech059, title = {The World Health Organization’s adaptive capacity in a complex inter-organizational environment}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and André Isidro}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech060, title = {Lost in Internal Evaluation: Accountability and Insulation at the World Bank}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the workshop, “The Transformative Power of Regulatory Governance”, Copenhagen Business School, February 4-5, 2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech061, title = {Negotiating Styles of Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Workshop “From Rule-Takers to Rule-Makers: Emerging Powers in the Regulation of International Trade”, University of Geneva February 9-10, 2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech201, title = {Exploring the Paradox of Increasing Transparency in TTIP Negotiations}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Council for European Studies 23rd International Conference for Europeanists, Philadelphia, April 14-16, 2016}, note = {Also presented at the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), University of Gothenburg, March 14-15, 2016}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @collection{pop00020, title = {Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, interorganisationale Beziehungen und Wandel}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Martin Koch and Andrea Liese}, url = {https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516}, isbn = {978-3-8487-0484-2}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-02}, urldate = {2015-01-02}, publisher = {Nomos}, edition = {1.}, series = {Sonderheft PVS}, abstract = {Das PVS-Sonderheft nimmt internationale Organisationen als partiell eigenständige Akteure zum Ausgangspunkt, deren Verhalten sich nicht (ausschließlich) aus dem Einfluss von Mitgliedstaaten ableiten lässt, um konzeptionell offen und theorieübergreifend grundlegende Fragen nach Delegation und Autonomie, Verrechtlichung und Politisierung, den interorganisationalen Beziehungen und dem Wandel von internationalen Organisationen nachzugehen. Damit greift das Sonderheft nicht nur zentrale Fragen der jüngeren Forschung auf, sondern konzentriert sich auch auf das Verhältnis internationaler Organisationen zu ihrer sich wandelnden Umwelt. Dazu initiiert das Sonderheft einen Dialog zwischen verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätzen (rationalistische, sozialkonstruktivistische und soziologische Ansätze) und Herangehensweisen (erklärende und interpretative Studien) und lotet das Potential der Synthese aus.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {collection} } @inbook{pop00056, title = {Internationale Organisationen in einer komplexen Welt – Grenzen und Mehrwert einer pluralistischen Forschung}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Martin Koch and Andrea Liese}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Martin Koch and Andrea Liese}, url = {https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516-483}, doi = {10.5771/9783845248516-483}, isbn = { 978-3-8487-0484-2}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-02}, urldate = {2015-01-01}, booktitle = {Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, interorganisationale Beziehungen und Wandel}, pages = {483–498}, publisher = {Nomos}, edition = {1.}, series = {Sonderheft PVS}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @inbook{nokey, title = {Internationale Organisationen als Forschungsgegenstand. Oder: »Über Blinde und die Gestalt des Elefanten«}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Martin Koch and Andrea Liese}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Martin Koch and Andrea Liese}, url = {https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516-9}, doi = {10.5771/9783845248516-9}, isbn = {978-3-8487-0484-2}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-02}, urldate = {2015-01-01}, booktitle = {Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, interorganisationale Beziehungen und Wandel}, pages = {9-32}, publisher = {Nomos}, edition = {1}, series = {Sonderheft PVS}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @inbook{pop00025, title = {Autonomiekonzeptionen internationaler Organisationen im Vergleich}, author = {Michael W. Bauer and Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Jörn Ege}, url = {https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516-33}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516-33}, isbn = {978-3-8487-0484-2}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-01}, urldate = {2015-01-01}, journal = {Internationale Organisationen}, pages = {33-58}, publisher = {Nomos}, edition = {49}, series = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Sonderheft}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{pop00048, title = {Machtverschiebung in internationalen Organisationen? Schwellenländer als Gestaltungs- und Verweigerungsmächte}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.5771/1430-6387-2015-1-99}, doi = {10.5771/1430-6387-2015-1-99}, issn = {1430-6387}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-01}, urldate = {2015-01-01}, journal = {ZPol Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft}, volume = {25}, issue = {1}, pages = {99–106}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @collection{ech005, title = {Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Sophie Meunier}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-01}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London/New York}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {collection} } @misc{ech062, title = {Emerging Power Preferences towards Institutional Empowerment of International Organizations}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Laura Mahrenbach}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the ISA 2015 Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 18-21, 2015}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech202, title = {Accountable to Whom and How? Logics of Accountability in EU Governance during the Sovereign Debt Crisis}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association, Boston, 5-7 March 2015}, note = {Earlier version presented at the AKI-DVPW and Comparative Politics joint conference, FU Berlin, 9-10 October 2014}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech203, title = {Acting on Behalf of Collective and Multiple Principals: The European Commission’s Discretion after Lisbon}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association, Boston, 5-7 March 2015}, note = {Earlier version presented at the Workshop The EU in International Negotiations, Global Governance Programme, European University Institute (EUI), 23-24 June 2014}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @article{, title = {Speaking With a Single Voice: The EU As an Effective Actor in Global Governance}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Sophie Meunier}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.913219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.913219}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-06-16}, urldate = {2017-01-01}, journal = {Speaking With a Single Voice}, volume = {21}, issue = {7}, pages = {961-979}, abstract = {Under what conditions does the internal cohesiveness of the European Union (EU) determine its external effectiveness? In a first step, this introduction probes the frequent assumption that the more cohesive the EU presents itself to the world, the more effective it is in achieving its goals. The empirical contributions to this collection, which range from trade to foreign policy, highlight instead three configurations of internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness: internal cohesiveness has a positive impact on external effectiveness; internal cohesiveness has no impact on external effectiveness; and internal cohesiveness has a negative impact on external effectiveness. The international context in which the EU operates, including the bargaining configuration and the policy arena, functions as an intervening variable in these causal links. In a second step, this introduction launches a research agenda aimed at explaining these patterns more systematically and determining the impact of cohesiveness on effectiveness.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{pop00009, title = {When Speaking with a Single Voice isn't Enough: Bargaining Power (A)Symmetry and EU External Effectiveness in Global Trade Governance}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.912146}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.912146}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-06-16}, urldate = {2017-01-01}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {21}, issue = {7}, pages = {980-995}, abstract = {Does the European Union (EU) need to be a cohesive actor internally in order to be effective in global trade governance? And is internal cohesiveness a necessary and sufficient condition for the Union's external effectiveness? Even though these questions are central to explaining the EU's effectiveness, only few studies have dealt with it. In this contribution, I argue that internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for EU external effectiveness. The bargaining configuration, determined by bargaining power symmetry or asymmetry, equally conditions effectiveness. This argument is illustrated by two case studies with varying bargaining power. The findings demonstrate, first, that high internal cohesiveness and bargaining power asymmetry can lead to high effectiveness, as in the EU–Mexico negotiations. Second, they show that, under a relationship of bargaining power symmetry, high cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for external effectiveness to occur, as is evident in the Doha round.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.913219, title = {Speaking with a Single Voice: Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in Global Governance}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Sophie Meunier}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.913219}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2014.913219}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-06-16}, urldate = {2014-01-01}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {21}, issue = {7}, pages = {961–979}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {Under what conditions does the internal cohesiveness of the European Union (EU) determine its external effectiveness? In a first step, this introduction probes the frequent assumption that the more cohesive the EU presents itself to the world, the more effective it is in achieving its goals. The empirical contributions to this collection, which range from trade to foreign policy, highlight instead three configurations of internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness: internal cohesiveness has a positive impact on external effectiveness; internal cohesiveness has no impact on external effectiveness; and internal cohesiveness has a negative impact on external effectiveness. The international context in which the EU operates, including the bargaining configuration and the policy arena, functions as an intervening variable in these causal links. In a second step, this introduction launches a research agenda aimed at explaining these patterns more systematically and determining the impact of cohesiveness on effectiveness.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @collection{ech006, title = {Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance}, editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Sophie Meunier}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-01-01}, publisher = {Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 21, Issue 7}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {collection} } @misc{ech064, title = {Internationale Organisationen als Forschungsgegenstand. Oder “Über Blinde und die Gestalt des Elefanten”}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Relations Session of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft, Magdeburg 25-27 September 2014}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech066, title = {The Perils of Delegation: Using Oversight Mechanisms to Minimize Agency Slack}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Eurofort Workshop on European Integration, Princeton University and HU Berlin joint conference, July 21, 2014}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech067, title = {Controlling International Organizations after Delegation of Power: The Use of Oversight Mechanisms to Minimize Agency Losses}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper to be presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Salamanca, 11-14 April 2014}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech068, title = {Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in World Politics}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Conference for European Studies, Washington D.C., 14-16 March 2014}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @inbook{pop00044, title = {Adaptation and Change in EU Trade Governance: The EU’s Paradigm Shift from Multilateralism to Regionalism and Bilateralism}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, editor = {Manuela Moschella and Catherine Weaver}, url = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203156377}, doi = {10.4324/9780203156377}, isbn = {9780203156377}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-12-24}, booktitle = {Handbook of Global Economic Governance}, pages = {57–69}, publisher = {Routledge}, edition = {1.}, chapter = {4.}, abstract = {Intellectual property is one of the most dynamic and volatile areas of global economic governance. Non-state actors always have played an important role in intellectual property policy, although states remain important as both the granters and guarantors of intellectual property rights. The dynamic and volatile evolution of the global economic governance of intellectual property underscores the unstable and changing relationships between power, paradigms and players. The chapter examines the evolution of international intellectual property policies, with a focus on the institutional and political contestation, players, paradigms and power. It examines the institutional proliferation and evolution of global governance of intellectual property. The chapter presents the contestation over intellectual property and public health. It discusses the tactic of vertical forum-shifting and the turning away from multilateral venues. It examines the implications of these changes for global economic governance of intellectual property.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{pop00017, title = {Emerging Powers in WTO Negotiations: The Domestic Sources of Trade Policy Preferences}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08853908.2013.838149}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08853908.2013.838149}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-10-15}, urldate = {2013-01-01}, journal = {The International Trade Journal}, volume = {27}, issue = {5}, pages = {431–449}, abstract = {In the current round of multilateral trade liberalization, emerging powers such as Brazil and India created the G-20 coalition and refused to accept further tariff rate reductions for industrial products before the United States and the European Union made reciprocal concessions in agriculture. This article examines how and why Brazil and India have taken a more offensive and proactive position at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Following Putnam's two-level games approach, I focus on domestic factors and specifically on interest groups to explain actors' policy preferences in WTO negotiations. From a theoretical perspective, the case studies Brazil and India lend credit to the literature discussing the impact of powerful, sector-specific interest groups on governments' trade policy preferences. From an empirical perspective, the findings show how these two countries translated these demands into government positions and influenced WTO outcomes as agenda-setters and coalition builders.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{pop00011, title = {Two-Level Games and Trade Cooperation: What do we now know?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.15}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.15}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-05-10}, urldate = {2013-01-01}, journal = {International Politics}, volume = {50}, pages = {579–599}, abstract = {A large body of literature in international relations has attempted to explain the interaction between domestic politics and International Relations in the field of trade policy. This article provides new critical insight into the literature on two-level games published during the last 25 years and their contribution to the study of international trade cooperation. I will outline the relevant two-level games literature to establish what we already know about international bargaining and domestic sources of multilateral trade cooperation. I first examine two major perspectives, the domestic political approach and the systemic (international) perspective by presenting a critical review of the literature. I then identify new avenues for theoretical and empirical research in the field. I suggest that to bridge the present rigid division between Comparative Politics and International Relations we need two-level games studies in the following areas: cross-country comparisons on domestic political processes; actor interactions at different levels; comparison of international bargaining processes; and middle-range theory-building.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{pop00026, title = {The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Explaining Brazil's Negotiating Position in the Doha Round}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08853908.2013.764251}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08853908.2013.764251}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-08}, urldate = {2013-01-01}, journal = {The International Trade Journal}, volume = {27}, issue = {2}, pages = {173–194}, abstract = {Under the Cardoso presidency (1995–2002), Brazil adopted a reactive and defensive posture on trade liberalization. However, when Lula da Silva came into power in 2003, Brazil took a more offensive and proactive position on the issue in creating the G-20 and putting forward proposals of its own. How can this shift in the Brazilian negotiating position be explained? The main argument is that under the Lula da Silva administration, Brazil's position in the Doha round primarily reflected domestic political constraints on multilateral trade cooperation. Three domestic dynamics shaped the national preference for Brazil: a heterogeneous governing coalition with a high number of veto players, divisions within the Workers’ Party, and the demands of interest groups. This explanation is discussed on the basis of Brazil's negotiating position in WTO negotiations from 2003 to 2006.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{, title = {Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2012.754152}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2012.754152}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-01-14}, urldate = {2013-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice}, volume = {15}, issue = {1}, pages = {21–36}, abstract = {There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority (agency slack), while at other times they do not. How and under what conditions do agents engage in slack? To answer this question, the article builds on principal–agent theories by comparing different forms of power delegation at the national and international levels. It argues that the institutional design of delegation contract and oversight mechanisms have an impact on the extent of agency slack. In developing this argument, it compares the delegation of power from the legislature (the US Congress) to a national public administration (the United States Trade Representative) and from an intergovernmental organization (the Council of Ministers) to a supranational organization (the European Commission) in the negotiation of international trade agreements. The findings show that agency slack is less likely when the institutional design of the delegation mandate is rule-based and principals have a combination of police-patrol and fire-alarm oversight mechanisms at their disposal to control their agents.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{pop00029, title = {The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341247}, doi = {10.1163/15718069-12341247}, issn = {1382-340X}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-01-01}, urldate = {2013-01-01}, journal = {International Negotiation}, volume = {18}, issue = {1}, pages = {111–130}, abstract = {While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis literature, arguing that the proliferation of PTAs draws negotiating capacity away from the multilateral level and thus reduces the incentives to agree on multilateral trade agreements. The willingness of actors to move from their initial bargaining positions and make concessions at the multilateral level depends on their outside options, that is, their best or worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The more credible an actor’s argument that he has a good alternative to multilateralism, the greater his bargaining power will be. In order to support the argument we will analyze the negotiation process at the multilateral level and link it to PTAs under negotiation by the EU, US, Brazil, Australia, and India.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @online{ech034, title = {Wer hat Europa im Griff?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://tu-dresden.de/zis/ressourcen/dateien/das-zentrum/presse/2013/SZ_Conceicao_2013.pdf?lang=de}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-01-01}, urldate = {2013-01-01}, howpublished = {Sächsische Zeitung}, note = {Sächsische Zeitung, 04.02.2013, Dresden}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {online} } @misc{ech069, title = {A Cacophony of Voices? The EU’s Cohesiveness in the Negotiation of Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Agreements}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3-6 April 2013 and at the European Union Studies Association, Baltimore, 9-11 May 2013}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech070, title = {Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Institutional Empowerment over Time: A Research Design}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3-6 April 2013}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech071, title = {Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Institutional Empowerment over Time}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the die European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Mainz, 12- 15 March 2013}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @inbook{ech010, title = {EU Agricultural and Fisheries Policies: An Economic and Environmental Disaster!}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, editor = {Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür}, year = {2012}, date = {2012-01-01}, booktitle = {Key Controversies in European Integration}, pages = {235-244}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Basingstoke}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @misc{ech012, title = {Review of: Andreas Dür, Protection for Exporters. Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-2010}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2012}, date = {2012-01-01}, howpublished = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift 53 (3): 555-557}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {misc} } @misc{ech072, title = {The EU as a Global Actor: The Impact of Asymmetrical Bargaining Power and BATNAS on Trade Agreements}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2012}, date = {2012-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Conference for European Studies, Boston, 22-24 March 2012}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @article{doi:10.1080/13600826.2011.605769, title = {Australian Trade Policy under the Howard Government: The Impact of Organised Interested Groups}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2011.605769}, doi = {10.1080/13600826.2011.605769}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-10-21}, urldate = {2011-01-01}, journal = {Global Society}, volume = {25}, issue = {4}, pages = {513–529}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of globalisation on the Australian economy, but few studies focus on the domestic determinants of Australia's negotiating position in international trade negotiations. In order to close this gap, this article analyses the impact of organised interest groups in the Australian trade policy under the Howard government in the different World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings from 1999 to 2006. In particular, the article explores the link between parties and interest groups in the Australian political system. It suggests that the Australian negotiating position reflects the demands put forward by interest groups closely linked to the government parties and the change of the international environment towards bilateral and regional trade agreements.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{, title = {Variation in EU Member States' Preferences and the Commission's Discretion in the Doha Round}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.551078}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.551078}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-04-13}, urldate = {2011-04-13}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {18}, issue = {3}, pages = {403–419}, abstract = {During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @book{, title = {Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO: Domestic Politics and Bargaining Dynamics}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306998}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306998}, isbn = {978-1-349-32405-7}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, pages = {275}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan London}, series = { International Political Economy Series}, abstract = {This book shows how domestic political institutions and the lack of time pressure have an impact on negotiations at the WTO. It provides detailed information on WTO ministerial meetings as well as on the political economy of trade policy in the EU, U.S., Brazil, and Australia. }, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {book} } @misc{ech013, title = {Review of: Hubert Zimmermann, Drachenzähmung: Die EU und die USA in den Verhandlungen um die Integration Chinas in den Welthandel}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, howpublished = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift 52 (1): 149-150}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {misc} } @misc{ech073, title = {The EU as an Actor in the Negotiation of Trade Agreements: Asymmetrical Bargaining Power and Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Workshop “Regional Organizations as Global Players: Active=Influential?”, Zeuthen, 28-29 October 2011}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech074, title = {Do Agents Run Amok? Explaining Different Forms of Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Agency Slack over Time}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Workshop “Public Administration in the Multilevel System”, Humboldt University Berlin, 23-24 June 2011}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech076, title = {Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Control Gaps, Agents’ Discretion and Autonomy in the Principal-Agent Relationship over Time}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montréal, 15-19 March 2011}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech077, title = {Embedding International Negotiations in Time: Stages of Negotiation, Time Pressure, BATNA, and Time Horizons Effects on Barganing Outcomes}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montréal, 15-19 March 2011}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech204, title = {Embedding International Institutions in Time: the Impact of Time Rules on Multilateral Trade Negotiations}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Workshop “Institutional Dynamics in World Politics”, Social Science Research Center (WZB), Berlin, 7-8 April 2011}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @article{, title = {Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02086.x}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02086.x}, year = {2010}, date = {2010-08-12}, urldate = {2010-01-01}, journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies}, volume = {48}, issue = {4}, pages = {1107–1126}, abstract = {There has been considerable debate about power delegation in EU trade politics, but few studies explore the question of how and why agency losses occur. Focusing on agricultural issues in the Doha Round, this article analyses the impact of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade politics. Are agency losses the result of the delegation structure, which stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage), or do conflict situations arise because of conflicting interests between the interests of the Member States and those of the European Commission (agency shirking)? Based on information collected from Agence Europe and interviews with European officials, the main conclusions are that: (1) the Council–Commission relationship can be conflict-laden or co-operative depending on the negotiating stage at the international level; (2) a low degree of interest alignment among Member States increases the Commission's discretion at the international level; (3) inter-institutional conflict weakens the EU negotiating position at the international level because the other WTO members know that the EU is divided and ask for further concessions.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @inbook{ech011, title = {Portugal: An Active and Influential Parliament?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, editor = {Bjørn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis}, year = {2010}, date = {2010-01-01}, booktitle = {The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {New York & London}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @misc{ech079, title = {Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses and Unintended Consequences over Time}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2010}, date = {2010-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech080, title = {Explaining the Doha Impasse: The Impact of Domestic Political Institutions on the EU, U.S., Brazilian and Australian Negotiating Positions}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2010}, date = {2010-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech081, title = {The Commission-as-Agent at the Interface between Internal EU Decision-Making and External WTO Negotiations: An Analysis of Tactical Opportunities and Agency Losses}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2010}, date = {2010-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, 17-21 February 2010}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech205, title = {The WTO at the Crossroads? Negotiating under the Shadow of Time and Domestic Political Constraints}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2010}, date = {2010-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the conference “Myth or Reality? The Promise of Economic Multilateralism”, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 20-21 December 2010}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @workingpaper{pop00045, title = {Delegation of Power and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://hdl.handle.net/1814/11193}, issn = {1028-3625}, year = {2009}, date = {2009-01-01}, urldate = {2009-01-01}, publisher = {European University Institute}, series = {EUI RSCAS; 2009/18}, abstract = {This paper addresses the problem of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade policy. The central question is whether a conflictual situation exists between the interests of the member states and those of the European Commission (agency shirking), or whether the structure of delegation in itself stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage). Drawing on the principal-agent approach, I argue that agency losses are due to the structure of delegation and that the existence of multiple principals with diverging preferences facilitates agency. I find empirical evidence that the Council-Commission relationship on trade politics has different dynamics depending on the negotiating stage. In the initial negotiating stage, when defining the negotiating mandate of the Commission, the relationship is cooperative. Conflict between the Commission and the Council only breaks out in a latter stage of negotiations, when the Commission makes concessions at the international level.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } @misc{ech082, title = {Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2009}, date = {2009-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Second Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Geneva, 29-31 January 2009}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech083, title = {On the Time Dimension of International Trade Negotiations}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2009}, date = {2009-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Workshop Political Science and Political Time, University of Potsdam, 2-3 April 2009}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech084, title = {Agricultural Trade Liberalization and the Doha Round: A Two-level Game Analysis of the EU Negotiating Position}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2009}, date = {2009-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Lisbon, 14-19 April 2009}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech085, title = {Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses and Unintended Consequences}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2009}, date = {2009-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the 8ste Nederlands-Belgisch PoliticologenEtmaal, Nijmegen, 28-29 May 2009}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @article{pop00051, title = {Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Trade Unions and the Timing of the Electoral Cycle}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/01442870701848004}, doi = {10.1080/01442870701848004}, year = {2008}, date = {2008-06-05}, urldate = {2008-01-01}, journal = {Policy Studies}, volume = {29}, issue = {1}, pages = {19–34}, abstract = {The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade unions matter in France and under what conditions they might cause governments to abstain from making welfare cuts. Second, it is argued that focusing solely on the veto power of trade unions appears implausible, since during the 2003 pension reform process the government ignored union protests. Hence it is further argued that a further critical variable needs to be investigated – the timing of the electoral cycle. It is therefore anticipated that governments will be more successful in passing legislation that implements unpopular reforms in the first two and a half years of a legislative period.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{pop00032, title = {Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1163/157180608X320243}, doi = {10.1163/157180608X320243}, issn = {1571-8069}, year = {2008}, date = {2008-01-01}, urldate = {2008-01-01}, journal = {International Negotiation}, volume = {13}, issue = {2}, pages = {285–300}, abstract = {Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural policy. This article attempts to demonstrate how deals can be completed through issue linkage packages and to identify the conditions that make issue linkage more likely.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @misc{ech086, title = {Delegation of Power to Supranational Institutions: Agency Shirking or Agency Slippage?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2008}, date = {2008-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Rennes, 11-16 April 2008}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @inbook{pop00016, title = {France: The Importance of the Electoral Cycle}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, editor = {Ellen M. Immergut and Karen M. Anderson and Isabelle Schulze}, isbn = {978-0199291472}, year = {2007}, date = {2007-03-01}, urldate = {2007-03-01}, booktitle = {The Handbook of West European Pension Politics}, pages = {150-202}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, chapter = {4.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } @article{pop00021, title = {Taking Actors’ Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: The EU Common Fisheries Policy}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X06000572}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X06000572}, year = {2006}, date = {2006-10-30}, urldate = {2006-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Public Policy}, volume = {26}, issue = {3}, pages = {279–299}, abstract = {The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states' preferences and the institutional setting. This article is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It juxtaposes a conceptual framework for analyzing EU negotiations with an analysis of the bargaining process on the settlement of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy. The conceptual framework will identify a set of variables that can explain the bargaining outcome: preferences of national government representatives, preferences of the European Commission, and the institutional setting.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{pop00010, title = {Integrative and Distributive Bargaining Situations in the European Union: What Difference Does It Make?}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2006.00092.x}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2006.00092.x}, year = {2006}, date = {2006-04-12}, urldate = {2006-01-01}, journal = {Negotiation Journal}, volume = {22}, issue = {2}, pages = {145–165}, abstract = {Despite the distinction made between integrative and distributive bargaining situations in European studies literature, few studies have focused specifically on how these two situations differ. This article attempts to close this gap by examining two key bargaining situations involving fisheries that led to the Europeanization of this policy field. The integrative bargaining situation dealt with the negotiations about the structural policy and common organization of the market for fish products. In contrast, the distributive bargaining case focused on the protracted negotiations over resource conservation and management policies. The article focuses primarily on how the unanimity decision rule may affect negotiation patterns in the European Union and on how the specific type of bargaining situation affects policy outcomes. The thesis is that different bargaining tools are used to reach an agreement.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @article{pop00052, title = {Verhandlungssituationen in der EU: Eine theoriegeleitete Analyse der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2006.tb00383.x}, year = {2006}, date = {2006-01-01}, urldate = {2006-01-01}, journal = {Swiss Political Science Review}, volume = {12}, issue = {1}, pages = {73–104}, abstract = {Auf der Grundlage des akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus präsentiert der vorliegende Beitrag eine theoriegeleitete und empirisch angereicherte Analyse von Verhandlungsergebnissen in der EU am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik. Dabei fasst das zugrunde liegende Untersuchungsdesign die Verhandlungsergebnisse als die abhängige, die Präferenzen der Mitgliedstaaten, die Präferenzen der Kommission sowie den institutionellen Rahmen als die unabhängigen Variablen auf. Dieses Untersuchungsdesign wird dann empirisch an zwei wichtigen Verhandlungssituationen überprüft, die gleichzeitig mit der Kompetenzübertragung der Fischereipolitik auf die europäische Ebene einhergehen. In der ersten Verhandlungssituation geht es um die Einführung der Strukturpolitik und der Gemeinsamen Marktorganisation für den Fischereisektor im Jahr 1970. Bei der zweiten Verhandlungssituation steht die Einführung der Bestanderhaltungspolitik für die Fischbestände im Jahr 1983 im Mittelpunkt. Zusätzlich zu den Verhandlungspositionen der Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten wird in diesem Beitrag anhand der Rolle der Kommission und der formellen (Einstimmigkeitsprinzip) und informellen Regeln (Schatten der Zukunft) gezeigt, wie sich diese Variablen auf die Politikergebnisse auswirken.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } @misc{ech087, title = {Die Interaktion von Innen- und Außenpolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen: eine historisch- institutionalistische Analyse der WTO-Agrarverhandlungen 1995-2005}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2005}, date = {2005-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the International Relations Session of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft, Mannheim, 6- 7 October 2005}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech088, title = {Executive Supremacy in the French Legislature: The Impact of Institutional Procedures in the Reform of the French Welfare State}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2005}, date = {2005-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Granada, 14-19 April 2005}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @book{pop00019, title = {The Common Fisheries Policy in the European Union: A Study in Integrative and Distributive Bargaining}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, isbn = {9780415648943}, year = {2004}, date = {2004-01-01}, urldate = {2004-01-01}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {The purpose of this book is neither to duplicate overviews of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) nor to recapitulate narrative treatments of the European integration process. The aim is to comprehend how EU negotiations work theoretically and empirically so that a conceptual framework for analyzing EU international negotiations will be provided and juxtaposed to two key negotiations leading to the establishment of the CFP.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {book} } @misc{ech089, title = {Die Interaktion zwischen Akteurspräferenzen und dem institutionellen Rahmen in EU- Verhandlungen am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2003}, date = {2003-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the conference „Forschungslogik und Methoden der Internationalen Beziehungen und der Europaforschung", Hofgeismar, 2-4 April 2003}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @workingpaper{ech090, title = {Die Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik: Anpassungsbedarf und Reformvorschläge}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2003}, date = {2003-01-01}, institution = {Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik, 2003}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } @misc{ech091, title = {France: Some Failed and Successful Attempts to Reform the French Pensions System}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2003}, date = {2003-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the Workshop on Pension Politics, Humboldt-University, 7-8 December 2003}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @misc{ech206, title = {The EU Negotiation Process: Interests, Institutions, Decision Rules, and Iterated Bargaining}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2002}, date = {2002-01-01}, howpublished = {Paper presented at the BP Transatlantic Programme Workshop for Advanced Ph.D. Students on EU Politics, European University Institute, 7-8 June 2002}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {presentation} } @workingpaper{ech093, title = {A Micro-model of the EU Negotiation Process: Interests}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, year = {2001}, date = {2001-01-01}, institution = {Institutional Rules and Iterated Bargaining – The Case of Fisheries, European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on Analytical Politics and Public Choice, Working Paper 26, 2001}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } @book{pop00028, title = {Dezentralisierungstendenzen in westeuropäischen Ländern: Territorialreformen Belgiens, Spaniens und Italiens im Vergleich}, author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt}, isbn = {3870618302}, year = {1998}, date = {1998-01-01}, urldate = {1998-01-01}, journal = {Spitz}, publisher = {Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {book} }