2022
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Herzog, Lisa
The Limits of Transparency: Expert Knowledge and Meaningful Accountability in Central Banking Journal Article
In: Government and Opposition, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 217-232, 2022.
@article{10.1017/gov.2020.36,
title = {The Limits of Transparency: Expert Knowledge and Meaningful Accountability in Central Banking},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Lisa Herzog},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2020.36},
doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.36},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-04-01},
urldate = {2022-01-01},
journal = {Government and Opposition},
volume = {57},
number = {2},
pages = {217-232},
abstract = {Recent discussions of accountability in contexts of expert knowledge raise questions about the limits of transparency. Against this background, we discuss the nexus between expert knowledge and meaningful accountability – that is, context-sensitive accountability based on a genuine understanding of a situation. We argue that the concentration of expertise in certain institutions makes it difficult to hold those institutions accountable. In particular, three components challenge meaningful accountability: specialization, inaccessibility and potential biases or conflict of interest. We emphasize the role of ‘epistemic communities’ and their impact on the tension between expert knowledge and independence. Drawing on the deliberative systems literature, we discuss how expert knowledge might be communicated to outsiders to enable meaningful accountability. To illustrate our argument, we draw on the European Central Bank, a case study in which states have chosen a delegation design characterized by a high degree of independence and trust in expert knowledge, to the detriment of accountability. We sketch possible avenues for creating the conditions for meaningful accountability even in the case of institutions with highly concentrated expertise.},
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Recent discussions of accountability in contexts of expert knowledge raise questions about the limits of transparency. Against this background, we discuss the nexus between expert knowledge and meaningful accountability – that is, context-sensitive accountability based on a genuine understanding of a situation. We argue that the concentration of expertise in certain institutions makes it difficult to hold those institutions accountable. In particular, three components challenge meaningful accountability: specialization, inaccessibility and potential biases or conflict of interest. We emphasize the role of ‘epistemic communities’ and their impact on the tension between expert knowledge and independence. Drawing on the deliberative systems literature, we discuss how expert knowledge might be communicated to outsiders to enable meaningful accountability. To illustrate our argument, we draw on the European Central Bank, a case study in which states have chosen a delegation design characterized by a high degree of independence and trust in expert knowledge, to the detriment of accountability. We sketch possible avenues for creating the conditions for meaningful accountability even in the case of institutions with highly concentrated expertise.
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mello, Patrick A.; Novoselova, Anna; Oswald, Omar Ramon Serrano
Persistence Against the Odds: How Entrepreneurial Agents Helped the UN Joint Inspection Unit to Prevail Journal Article
In: Global Policy, vol. 13, iss. 2, pp. 235-246, 2022.
@article{10.1111/1758-5899.13048,
title = {Persistence Against the Odds: How Entrepreneurial Agents Helped the UN Joint Inspection Unit to Prevail},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Patrick A. Mello and Anna Novoselova and Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13048},
doi = {10.1111/1758-5899.13048},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-03-17},
urldate = {2022-01-01},
journal = {Global Policy},
volume = {13},
issue = {2},
pages = {235-246},
abstract = {Since its inception in 1966, the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has prevailed in the face of significant existential challenges. Against this backdrop, we investigate how and why the JIU persisted over time. Combining delegation and historical institutionalist approaches, we posit that entrepreneurial agents and layering processes together help us better understand persistence of international organizations. Based on semi-structured interviews with UN staff and JIU inspectors, we examine three critical junctures in the history of the JIU. Our results show that entrepreneurial agents and stakeholders in the JIU managed to avoid the closure or demotion of the JIU by engaging in a strategy of institutional layering. Our analysis, however, also demonstrates that the JIU survived at the price of losing its privilege as the central UN oversight body. These findings have implications for the study of international organizations and for the reform of the UN system at large.},
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Since its inception in 1966, the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has prevailed in the face of significant existential challenges. Against this backdrop, we investigate how and why the JIU persisted over time. Combining delegation and historical institutionalist approaches, we posit that entrepreneurial agents and layering processes together help us better understand persistence of international organizations. Based on semi-structured interviews with UN staff and JIU inspectors, we examine three critical junctures in the history of the JIU. Our results show that entrepreneurial agents and stakeholders in the JIU managed to avoid the closure or demotion of the JIU by engaging in a strategy of institutional layering. Our analysis, however, also demonstrates that the JIU survived at the price of losing its privilege as the central UN oversight body. These findings have implications for the study of international organizations and for the reform of the UN system at large.
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mueller, Tony
Bringing Independence and Accountability Together: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank? Journal Article
In: Journal of European Integration, vol. 44, iss. 6, pp. 837-853, 2022.
@article{10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590,
title = {Bringing Independence and Accountability Together: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Tony Mueller},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590},
doi = {10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-02-28},
urldate = {2022-01-01},
journal = {Journal of European Integration},
volume = {44},
issue = {6},
pages = {837-853},
abstract = {The European Central Bank’s (ECB) role as a political actor during the euro crisis raised concerns about its independence and insufficient accountability. Against this backdrop, the article investigates how and why the ECB reacted to demands for more accountability during and following the crisis. To this end, we revisit the independence-accountability nexus, adding three qualifications to the conventional wisdom that independence and accountability do not go together. First, recurring to the governor’s dilemma, we argue that a delegation relationship characterized by a high level of independence favours competence over controllability. Second, we open the black box of accountability by investigating the extent to which the ECB made the strategic choice to improve selected accountability dimensions. Third, against the commonsensical view that ECB accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped, this piece shows that certain accountability dimensions have been continuously improved to defend independence. The findings contribute to the literature on accountability and the causes and consequences of delegating power to supranational institutions.
},
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The European Central Bank’s (ECB) role as a political actor during the euro crisis raised concerns about its independence and insufficient accountability. Against this backdrop, the article investigates how and why the ECB reacted to demands for more accountability during and following the crisis. To this end, we revisit the independence-accountability nexus, adding three qualifications to the conventional wisdom that independence and accountability do not go together. First, recurring to the governor’s dilemma, we argue that a delegation relationship characterized by a high level of independence favours competence over controllability. Second, we open the black box of accountability by investigating the extent to which the ECB made the strategic choice to improve selected accountability dimensions. Third, against the commonsensical view that ECB accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped, this piece shows that certain accountability dimensions have been continuously improved to defend independence. The findings contribute to the literature on accountability and the causes and consequences of delegating power to supranational institutions.
2021
Heldt, Eugénia C.
Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung? Book Chapter
In: Flick, Corinne Michaela (Ed.): pp. 113 - 128, Wallstein Verlag, 2021, ISBN: 978-3-8353-3931-6, (Query date: 2024-10-04 10:56:01).
@inbook{pop00062,
title = {Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung?},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
editor = {Corinne Michaela Flick},
url = {https://www.wallstein-verlag.de/9783835339316-neue-konstellationen-der-gegenwart-annaeherungen-institutionen-und-legitimitaet.html},
isbn = {978-3-8353-3931-6},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-08-03},
urldate = {2021-08-03},
journal = {Neue Konstellationen der Gegenwart: Annäherungen, Institutionen und …},
pages = {113 - 128},
publisher = {Wallstein Verlag},
series = {Convoco! Edition},
abstract = {Sind internationale Organisationen (IOs) die tragischen Helden der gegenwärtigen Weltpolitik? Wenn sie zu erfolgreich agieren und ihre Aufgaben vollständig erfüllen, riskieren sie, abgeschafft zu werden. Verselbstständigen sie sich und bewegen sich jenseits ihres übertragenen Mandats, werden sie von den Regierungschefs und der Öffentlichkeit kritisiert. Warum stehen IOs zunehmend am Pranger? Warum befinden sie sich in einer Art Dauerkrisenzustand? Und wie konnte es so weit kommen? Damit wir die gegenwärtige Krisensituation verstehen, ist es hilfreich, sich zu erinnern, wie alles begann. IOs gibt es schon seit über 200 Jahren und seitdem hat nicht nur ihre Anzahl stetig zugenommen, sondern auch der Umfang und die Komplexität ihrer Zuständigkeiten. Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts gab es um die 30 internationale Institutionen, heute sind es über 7.700. Die Mehrheit der heute existierenden internationalen Institutionen und Organisationen sind in der Nachkriegszeit entstanden – wie z. B. die Vereinten Nationen. Der Rückzug der alten Weltmacht USA, der Aufstieg Chinas zur neuen Weltmacht, aber auch die Fragmentierung der institutionellen Landschaft und der damit einhergehenden Entstehung neuer informeller Kooperationsformen – u. a. G7-, G8- oder G20-Gipfel – stellen die internationale Kooperation vor enorme Herausforderungen und zeigen, wie der Multilateralismus aus unterschiedlichen Richtungen angegriffen wird. Einige Beispiele aus der internationalen Politik verdeutlichen dies:
–– Bei der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) blockieren die USA die Neubesetzung wichtiger Posten am Berufungsgericht und torpedieren somit die Funktionalität dieser Institution.
–– Mitten in der Corona-Pandemie kündigten die USA und Brasilien an, aus der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) austreten zu wollen.
–– Das Brexit-Referendum sowie der darauffolgende EU-Austritt Großbritanniens stellt eine Zäsur im Europäischen Integrationsprozess dar. Mit dem Vollzug des Brexits im Jahr 2020 kommt auch das Ende der Illusionen über die Irreversibilität des europäischen Integrationsprozesses.
–– Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat zwar den Euro gerettet, sieht sich aber seit der Eurokrise mit Anschuldigungen wie Vertragsbruch und Überschreitung ihres Mandats konfrontiert. Das jüngste Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Anleihenkauf stellt einen weiteren Höhepunkt dieser Kontroverse dar.
All diese Ereignisse zeigen, dass IOs heute mehr denn je umstritten sind. Einige Staaten erwägen inzwischen sogar, ihre Mitgliedschaft in diesen multilateralen Foren aufzugeben. Es war kein Zufall, dass das Motto der Brexit-Kampagne der UKIP-Partei »Vote Leave, Take Control« war oder dass Donald Trump im USPräsidentschaftswahlkampf eine »America First«-Kampagne verfolgte. Um zu verstehen, warum sich IOs momentan in einer Art Dauerkrisenzustand befinden und ihre Autorität permanent angezweifelt wird, werde ich in diesem Beitrag auf zentrale Forschungsgegenstände und -wellen in den Internationalen Beziehungen eingehen sowie Erklärungen anbieten, warum der Multilateralismus und insbesondere internationale Institutionen und Organisationen in Frage gestellt werden. Dabei werde ich auf folgende drei Bereiche eingehen, die die Forschung über IOs in den letzten Jahrzehnten geprägt haben: (1) Entstehung, Übertragung von Kompetenzen und Ermächtigung von IOs; (2) Politisierung und Infragestellung ihrer Autorität; und (3) Anpassungsfähigkeit und Resilienz von IOs. Der Beitrag endet mit einem Appell für mehr Multilateralismus.},
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Sind internationale Organisationen (IOs) die tragischen Helden der gegenwärtigen Weltpolitik? Wenn sie zu erfolgreich agieren und ihre Aufgaben vollständig erfüllen, riskieren sie, abgeschafft zu werden. Verselbstständigen sie sich und bewegen sich jenseits ihres übertragenen Mandats, werden sie von den Regierungschefs und der Öffentlichkeit kritisiert. Warum stehen IOs zunehmend am Pranger? Warum befinden sie sich in einer Art Dauerkrisenzustand? Und wie konnte es so weit kommen? Damit wir die gegenwärtige Krisensituation verstehen, ist es hilfreich, sich zu erinnern, wie alles begann. IOs gibt es schon seit über 200 Jahren und seitdem hat nicht nur ihre Anzahl stetig zugenommen, sondern auch der Umfang und die Komplexität ihrer Zuständigkeiten. Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts gab es um die 30 internationale Institutionen, heute sind es über 7.700. Die Mehrheit der heute existierenden internationalen Institutionen und Organisationen sind in der Nachkriegszeit entstanden – wie z. B. die Vereinten Nationen. Der Rückzug der alten Weltmacht USA, der Aufstieg Chinas zur neuen Weltmacht, aber auch die Fragmentierung der institutionellen Landschaft und der damit einhergehenden Entstehung neuer informeller Kooperationsformen – u. a. G7-, G8- oder G20-Gipfel – stellen die internationale Kooperation vor enorme Herausforderungen und zeigen, wie der Multilateralismus aus unterschiedlichen Richtungen angegriffen wird. Einige Beispiele aus der internationalen Politik verdeutlichen dies:
–– Bei der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) blockieren die USA die Neubesetzung wichtiger Posten am Berufungsgericht und torpedieren somit die Funktionalität dieser Institution.
–– Mitten in der Corona-Pandemie kündigten die USA und Brasilien an, aus der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) austreten zu wollen.
–– Das Brexit-Referendum sowie der darauffolgende EU-Austritt Großbritanniens stellt eine Zäsur im Europäischen Integrationsprozess dar. Mit dem Vollzug des Brexits im Jahr 2020 kommt auch das Ende der Illusionen über die Irreversibilität des europäischen Integrationsprozesses.
–– Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat zwar den Euro gerettet, sieht sich aber seit der Eurokrise mit Anschuldigungen wie Vertragsbruch und Überschreitung ihres Mandats konfrontiert. Das jüngste Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Anleihenkauf stellt einen weiteren Höhepunkt dieser Kontroverse dar.
All diese Ereignisse zeigen, dass IOs heute mehr denn je umstritten sind. Einige Staaten erwägen inzwischen sogar, ihre Mitgliedschaft in diesen multilateralen Foren aufzugeben. Es war kein Zufall, dass das Motto der Brexit-Kampagne der UKIP-Partei »Vote Leave, Take Control« war oder dass Donald Trump im USPräsidentschaftswahlkampf eine »America First«-Kampagne verfolgte. Um zu verstehen, warum sich IOs momentan in einer Art Dauerkrisenzustand befinden und ihre Autorität permanent angezweifelt wird, werde ich in diesem Beitrag auf zentrale Forschungsgegenstände und -wellen in den Internationalen Beziehungen eingehen sowie Erklärungen anbieten, warum der Multilateralismus und insbesondere internationale Institutionen und Organisationen in Frage gestellt werden. Dabei werde ich auf folgende drei Bereiche eingehen, die die Forschung über IOs in den letzten Jahrzehnten geprägt haben: (1) Entstehung, Übertragung von Kompetenzen und Ermächtigung von IOs; (2) Politisierung und Infragestellung ihrer Autorität; und (3) Anpassungsfähigkeit und Resilienz von IOs. Der Beitrag endet mit einem Appell für mehr Multilateralismus.
–– Bei der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) blockieren die USA die Neubesetzung wichtiger Posten am Berufungsgericht und torpedieren somit die Funktionalität dieser Institution.
–– Mitten in der Corona-Pandemie kündigten die USA und Brasilien an, aus der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) austreten zu wollen.
–– Das Brexit-Referendum sowie der darauffolgende EU-Austritt Großbritanniens stellt eine Zäsur im Europäischen Integrationsprozess dar. Mit dem Vollzug des Brexits im Jahr 2020 kommt auch das Ende der Illusionen über die Irreversibilität des europäischen Integrationsprozesses.
–– Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat zwar den Euro gerettet, sieht sich aber seit der Eurokrise mit Anschuldigungen wie Vertragsbruch und Überschreitung ihres Mandats konfrontiert. Das jüngste Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Anleihenkauf stellt einen weiteren Höhepunkt dieser Kontroverse dar.
All diese Ereignisse zeigen, dass IOs heute mehr denn je umstritten sind. Einige Staaten erwägen inzwischen sogar, ihre Mitgliedschaft in diesen multilateralen Foren aufzugeben. Es war kein Zufall, dass das Motto der Brexit-Kampagne der UKIP-Partei »Vote Leave, Take Control« war oder dass Donald Trump im USPräsidentschaftswahlkampf eine »America First«-Kampagne verfolgte. Um zu verstehen, warum sich IOs momentan in einer Art Dauerkrisenzustand befinden und ihre Autorität permanent angezweifelt wird, werde ich in diesem Beitrag auf zentrale Forschungsgegenstände und -wellen in den Internationalen Beziehungen eingehen sowie Erklärungen anbieten, warum der Multilateralismus und insbesondere internationale Institutionen und Organisationen in Frage gestellt werden. Dabei werde ich auf folgende drei Bereiche eingehen, die die Forschung über IOs in den letzten Jahrzehnten geprägt haben: (1) Entstehung, Übertragung von Kompetenzen und Ermächtigung von IOs; (2) Politisierung und Infragestellung ihrer Autorität; und (3) Anpassungsfähigkeit und Resilienz von IOs. Der Beitrag endet mit einem Appell für mehr Multilateralismus.
Heldt, Eugénia C.
In: Comparative European Politics, vol. 19, pp. 576–593, 2021.
@article{10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4,
title = {A New Delegation Design for EU Governance: How Preference Cohesiveness of Multiple Principals Shapes the European Commission’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4},
doi = {10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-06-24},
urldate = {2021-01-01},
journal = {Comparative European Politics},
volume = {19},
pages = {576–593},
abstract = {The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the role of the European Parliament in free trade agreements. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of this new delegation design in EU trade governance. Specifically, it addresses the question how the preference cohesiveness of multiple principals—the Council of Ministers as a de jure principal and the Parliament as a de facto principal—shapes the Commission’s discretion in negotiating trade agreements. Exploring these two conjectures through a combination of primary materials and interviews, this contribution posits that those configurations of low degree of cohesiveness within the Council and high cohesiveness within the Parliament or high cohesiveness of the Council and low cohesiveness within the Parliament increase Commission discretion. A configuration of low cohesiveness within and between multiple principals, by contrast, is more likely to lead to paralysis of the negotiation process.},
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The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the role of the European Parliament in free trade agreements. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of this new delegation design in EU trade governance. Specifically, it addresses the question how the preference cohesiveness of multiple principals—the Council of Ministers as a de jure principal and the Parliament as a de facto principal—shapes the Commission’s discretion in negotiating trade agreements. Exploring these two conjectures through a combination of primary materials and interviews, this contribution posits that those configurations of low degree of cohesiveness within the Council and high cohesiveness within the Parliament or high cohesiveness of the Council and low cohesiveness within the Parliament increase Commission discretion. A configuration of low cohesiveness within and between multiple principals, by contrast, is more likely to lead to paralysis of the negotiation process.
Csehi, Robert; Heldt, Eugénia C.
Populism as a ‘Corrective’ to Trade Agreements? ‘America First’ and the Readjustment of NAFTA Journal Article
In: International Politics, 2021.
@article{10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3,
title = {Populism as a ‘Corrective’ to Trade Agreements? ‘America First’ and the Readjustment of NAFTA},
author = {Robert Csehi and Eugénia C. Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3},
doi = {10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-05-27},
urldate = {2021-01-01},
journal = {International Politics},
abstract = {The past few years have seen an upsurge in populist politics around the globe. Yet, its potential impact on the liberal international order has been analyzed mainly from a discursive perspective, and much less is known about actual policy implications. Adopting an ideational approach to populism and taking the case of the NAFTA renegotiation process as a building block in the liberal economic order, this article studies the populist imprints of the revised agreement. First, we demonstrate how the populist division of society between ‘the corrupt elite’ and ‘the honest people’ and the emphasis on popular sovereignty were used as narrative frames in criticizing NAFTA. In a second step, through selected provisions, we show how alterations to NAFTA are considered as ‘populist corrections’ to guarantee greater representation for ‘the people’ and better safeguards for popular sovereignty under the USMCA. The article concludes with a discussion of potential implications for global trade.},
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The past few years have seen an upsurge in populist politics around the globe. Yet, its potential impact on the liberal international order has been analyzed mainly from a discursive perspective, and much less is known about actual policy implications. Adopting an ideational approach to populism and taking the case of the NAFTA renegotiation process as a building block in the liberal economic order, this article studies the populist imprints of the revised agreement. First, we demonstrate how the populist division of society between ‘the corrupt elite’ and ‘the honest people’ and the emphasis on popular sovereignty were used as narrative frames in criticizing NAFTA. In a second step, through selected provisions, we show how alterations to NAFTA are considered as ‘populist corrections’ to guarantee greater representation for ‘the people’ and better safeguards for popular sovereignty under the USMCA. The article concludes with a discussion of potential implications for global trade.
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mueller, Tony
The (Self-)Empowerment of the European Central Bank during the Sovereign Debt Crisis Journal Article
In: Journal of European Integration, vol. 43, iss. 1, pp. 83–98, 2021.
@article{doi:10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145,
title = {The (Self-)Empowerment of the European Central Bank during the Sovereign Debt Crisis},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Tony Mueller},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145},
doi = {10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-30},
urldate = {2021-01-30},
journal = {Journal of European Integration},
volume = {43},
issue = {1},
pages = {83–98},
publisher = {Routledge},
abstract = {The European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the sovereign debt crisis as one of the most powerful supranational institutions. Against this background, this article explains how and why the ECB became empowered during the euro area crisis. Building on the delegation, governor’s dilemma, and epistemic community approaches, we argue that the ECB ability to play a strong role in this empowerment process and to convince member states to entrust it with more competences was the outcome of a combination of three factors: limited cohesiveness within the collective principal (Eurogroup); a fiduciary relationship characterized by broad discretion and independence on the trustee side (ECB); and strong specialization with the ECB acting as epistemic entrepreneur. We illustrate our argument with two cases: the Trichet letters exemplify an autonomous emergency empowerment and the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism demonstrates ECB influence on institutional design decisions in negotiating processes.},
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The European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the sovereign debt crisis as one of the most powerful supranational institutions. Against this background, this article explains how and why the ECB became empowered during the euro area crisis. Building on the delegation, governor’s dilemma, and epistemic community approaches, we argue that the ECB ability to play a strong role in this empowerment process and to convince member states to entrust it with more competences was the outcome of a combination of three factors: limited cohesiveness within the collective principal (Eurogroup); a fiduciary relationship characterized by broad discretion and independence on the trustee side (ECB); and strong specialization with the ECB acting as epistemic entrepreneur. We illustrate our argument with two cases: the Trichet letters exemplify an autonomous emergency empowerment and the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism demonstrates ECB influence on institutional design decisions in negotiating processes.
2020
Heldt, Eugénia C.
China’s “Health Silk Road” Offensive: How the West should Respond Online
2020, visited: 01.12.2020.
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title = {China’s “Health Silk Road” Offensive: How the West should Respond},
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date = {2020-12-09},
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Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mueller, Tony
Decreasing Importance of the UN - Rise of Informal Organizations Book Chapter
In: Molls, Michael; Eberspächer, Jörg; Auernhammer, Hermann; Färber, Georg; Herbst-Gaebel, Birgit; Lindemann, Udo; Mainzer, Klaus; Petry, Winfried; Reichwald, Ralf; Scheurle, Jürgen; van, Leo Hemmen; Wilderer, Peter (Ed.): Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit, pp. 48-51, Technische Universität München, 2020, ISBN: 978-3-00-065966-9.
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Decreasing Importance of the UN - Rise of Informal Organizations},
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editor = {Michael Molls and Jörg Eberspächer and Hermann Auernhammer and Georg Färber and Birgit Herbst-Gaebel and Udo Lindemann and Klaus Mainzer and Winfried Petry and Ralf Reichwald and Jürgen Scheurle and Leo Hemmen van and Peter Wilderer},
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Heldt, Eugénia C.
Contested EU Trade Governance: Transparency Conundrums in TTIP Negotiations Journal Article
In: Comparative European Politics, vol. 18, iss. 2, pp. 215-232, 2020.
@article{10.1057/s41295-019-00183-4,
title = {Contested EU Trade Governance: Transparency Conundrums in TTIP Negotiations},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41295-019-00183-4?utm_source=toc&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=toc_41295_18_2&utm_content=etoc_palgrave_20200403},
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issue = {2},
pages = {215-232},
abstract = {During TTIP negotiations, the European Commission was severely criticized by civil society organizations and public opinion for its secrecy regarding negotiation strategies and priorities. The Commission responded by making some negotiating texts publicly available. This article explores the implications of increasing transparency in trade negotiations. Drawing on negotiation, politicization, and informal governance literature, it examines how the Commission’s choice for a partial transparency approach had three paradoxical effects on negotiations. First, greater transparency did not help the public perception of TTIP. Second, greater transparency increased the EU’s bargaining leverage but led to a low degree of negotiating discretion for the Commission. Finally, greater transparency transformed the nature of the negotiating process by making it more informal, allowing bargaining parties to act outside the public scrutiny. This contribution solves these transparency puzzles by showing that partial transparency is a double-edged sword. Whilst greater transparency has become an important legitimation strategy in EU trade governance, adopting a partial transparency approach fuelled public protest instead of muting it and led to the failure of the negotiations.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
During TTIP negotiations, the European Commission was severely criticized by civil society organizations and public opinion for its secrecy regarding negotiation strategies and priorities. The Commission responded by making some negotiating texts publicly available. This article explores the implications of increasing transparency in trade negotiations. Drawing on negotiation, politicization, and informal governance literature, it examines how the Commission’s choice for a partial transparency approach had three paradoxical effects on negotiations. First, greater transparency did not help the public perception of TTIP. Second, greater transparency increased the EU’s bargaining leverage but led to a low degree of negotiating discretion for the Commission. Finally, greater transparency transformed the nature of the negotiating process by making it more informal, allowing bargaining parties to act outside the public scrutiny. This contribution solves these transparency puzzles by showing that partial transparency is a double-edged sword. Whilst greater transparency has become an important legitimation strategy in EU trade governance, adopting a partial transparency approach fuelled public protest instead of muting it and led to the failure of the negotiations.
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Journal Articles
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Books
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Book Chapters
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Edited Volumes
- 2019: Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance Since Bretton Woods, Review of International Political Economy 26 (6) (with Orfeo Fioretos).
- 2015: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance. London/New York: Routledge (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2015: Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, Koordination und Wandel, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 49, Baden-Baden: Nomos (with Andrea Liese und Martin Koch).
- 2014: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance, Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 21 (7) (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2024: The IMF and the Future of the Liberal International Order, Chapter 36, pp. 724-740 (with Orfeo Fioretos), In: Momani, Bessma and Hibben, Mark (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the International Monetary Fund, London: Oxford University Press.
- 2024: Revitalizing the World Bank: Engagement with the Private sector and Scope Expansion, Chapter 12, pp. 143–153 (with Thomas Dörfler), In: Antje Vetterlein & Tobias Schmidtke (eds.), 2024. “The Elgar Companion to the World Bank,” Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 21163.
- 2024: Time in International Organizations and International Organizations in Time. In: Goetz, Klaus H. (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford University Press (2. Edition).
- 2022: China und die BRICS in globalen ökonomischen Institutionen, in: Schirm, S. A.; Busch, A.; Lütz, S.; Walter, S.; Zimmermann, H. (Hrsg.) De-Globalisierung: Forschungsstand und Perspektiven, Baden Baden: Nomos, 123-138.
- 2021: Are International Organizations the Tragic Heroes of World Politics?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) New Global Alliances: Institutions, Alignments and Legitimacy in the Contemporary World, Wallstein Verlag, forthcoming
- 2021: Decreasing Importance of the UN: The Rise of Informal Organizations. In: Molls, Michael et al. (eds.): Science, Reason & Sustainability. Munich: Technical University Press. forthcoming.
- 2021: Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) Neue Konstellationen der Gegenwart: Annäherungen, Institutionen und Legitimität, Wallstein Verlag, 113-128.
- 2020: Sinkende Bedeutung der UNO: Stärkung informeller Organisationen (with Tony Müller). In: Molls, Michael et al. (Hrsg.): Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit. Technische Universität München.
- 2019: Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time, in: Klaus H. Goetz (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2018: Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, in: Cameron Thies (ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/97801902228637.013.496 (with Patrick Mello).
- 2017: Multiple Principals’ preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations, in: Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen (eds.): The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 203-226.
- 2016: The European Agricultural Fortress under Attack, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.), Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 2013: Adaptation and Change in EU Trade Governance: The EU’s Paradigm Shift from Multilateralism to Regionalism and Bilateralism, in: Manuela Moschella and Catherine Weaver (eds.) Handbook of Global Economic Governance, London: Routledge, 57-69.
- 2012: EU Agricultural and Fisheries Policies: An Economic and Environmental Disaster!, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.): Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-244.
- 2010: Portugal: An Active and Influential Parliament?, in: Bjørn Eric Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.): The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, New York & London: Routledge.
- 2007: France: the Importance of the Electoral Cycle, in: Ellen M. Immergut, Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds.): The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 150-199.
- 2012: Dür, Andreas Protection for Exporters. Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-2010, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 53(3): 555-557
- 2011: Zimmermann, Hubert Drachenzähmung: Die EU und die USA in den Verhandlungen um die Integration Chinas in den Welthandel, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 52(1): 149-150.