Publications

@article{10.1093/isagsq/ksac035,

title = {When Do International Organizations Engage in Agency Slack? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of United Nations Institutions},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Patrick A. Mello and Anna Novoselova and Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac035},

doi = {10.1093/isagsq/ksac035},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-07-01},

urldate = {2022-01-01},

journal = {Global Studies Quarterly},

volume = {2},

issue = {3},

pages = {1-15},

abstract = {The extensive delegation of power to international organizations (IOs) has been accompanied by occasional agency slack. While prior studies suggest that IOs’ propensity for agency slack may be rooted in their organizational characteristics, this has rarely been explored empirically. To address this lacuna, in this article we propose a conceptualization and measurement of agency slack and develop a framework of organizational characteristics. Our empirical analysis applies qualitative comparative analysis to assess the conditions under which agency slack occurs across sixteen United Nations institutions. We complement the cross-case analysis with two case illustrations. Our results document the empirical existence of two paths to agency slack, providing confirmatory evidence for our theoretical expectations. Path 1 combines staffing rules that are favorable for the agent with wide access to third parties. Path 2 entails the combination of favorable staffing rules with extensive delegation of authority and a vague organizational mandate.



L'importante délégation de pouvoir aux organisations internationales (OI) a occasionnellement été accompagnée d'une marge d'agentivité. Bien que des études précédentes suggèrent que la propension des OI à obtenir une marge d'agentivité puisse être ancrée dans les caractéristiques de ces organisations, cela a rarement été étudié d'un point de vue empirique. Dans cet article, nous proposons une conceptualisation et une mesure de cette marge d'agentivité et nous développons un cadre de caractéristiques organisationnelles pour combler cette lacune. Pour notre étude empirique, nous appliquons une Analyse comparative qualitative (ACQ) afin d’évaluer les conditions dans lesquelles la marge d'agentivité intervient dans 16 institutions de l'ONU. Nous complétons l'analyse de cas croisés par deux illustrations de cas. Nos résultats documentent l'existence empirique de deux voies vers la marge d'agentivité tout en fournissant des preuves confirmant nos hypothèses théoriques. La première allie des règles de dotation en personnel qui sont favorables à l'agent puisqu'elles lui offrent un large accès aux tierces parties. Et la deuxième consiste à combiner des règles de dotation en personnel favorables avec une vaste délégation de pouvoir et un mandat organisationnel vague.



La amplia delegación de poderes en las organizaciones internacionales (OI) ha ido acompañada de una ocasional inactividad de los organismos. Si bien estudios anteriores sugieren que la tendencia de las OI a la inactividad está basada en sus características organizativas, esto no se ha estudiado empíricamente. Para abordar esta situación, proponemos en este documento una conceptualización y una valoración de la inactividad de las instituciones y desarrollamos un marco de características organizativas. Nuestro análisis empírico aplica el análisis comparativo cualitativo (Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA) para evaluar las condiciones en las que ocurre dicha inactividad en 16 instituciones de la ONU. Además, complementamos el análisis cruzado de casos con dos ejemplos ilustrativos. Nuestros resultados documentan la existencia empírica de dos caminos hacia la inactividad de las instituciones, lo que brinda evidencia confirmatoria de nuestras expectativas teóricas. El camino 1 combina normas para el personal que son favorables para el agente con amplio acceso a terceros. El camino 2 supone la combinación de normas favorables para el personal con la amplia delegación de la autoridad y un mandato organizativo impreciso.},

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@article{10.1177/14651165221098487,

title = {Measuring Actual Discretion of the European Commission: Using the Discretion Index to Guide Empirical Research},

author = {Markus Gastinger and Eugénia C. Heldt},

doi = {10.1177/14651165221098487},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-05-16},

urldate = {2022-05-16},

journal = {European Union Politics},

volume = {23},

number = {3},

pages = {541–558},

abstract = {One key question in the study of the European Union has always been the extent of Commission discretion. We take the discretion index, typically used by principal–agent scholars to measure the Commission's designed discretion, to measure its actual discretion. Commission designed discretion can today be computationally generated with sufficient accuracy across all secondary acts. The study of designed discretion thus reaches considerable maturity. Therefore, we argue that scholars should prioritize studying Commission actual discretion. We present a systematic and transparent investigative technique based on the discretion index, which we use as a roadmap to guide our empirical investigation. The index facilitates the accumulation of knowledge across policy areas and time by providing exact values for Commission discretion. We illustrate our approach with the Development Cooperation Instrument.},

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@article{10.1017/gov.2020.36,

title = {The Limits of Transparency: Expert Knowledge and Meaningful Accountability in Central Banking},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Lisa Herzog},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2020.36},

doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.36},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-04-01},

urldate = {2022-01-01},

journal = {Government and Opposition},

volume = {57},

number = {2},

pages = {217-232},

abstract = {Recent discussions of accountability in contexts of expert knowledge raise questions about the limits of transparency. Against this background, we discuss the nexus between expert knowledge and meaningful accountability – that is, context-sensitive accountability based on a genuine understanding of a situation. We argue that the concentration of expertise in certain institutions makes it difficult to hold those institutions accountable. In particular, three components challenge meaningful accountability: specialization, inaccessibility and potential biases or conflict of interest. We emphasize the role of ‘epistemic communities’ and their impact on the tension between expert knowledge and independence. Drawing on the deliberative systems literature, we discuss how expert knowledge might be communicated to outsiders to enable meaningful accountability. To illustrate our argument, we draw on the European Central Bank, a case study in which states have chosen a delegation design characterized by a high degree of independence and trust in expert knowledge, to the detriment of accountability. We sketch possible avenues for creating the conditions for meaningful accountability even in the case of institutions with highly concentrated expertise.},

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@article{10.1111/1758-5899.13048,

title = {Persistence Against the Odds: How Entrepreneurial Agents Helped the UN Joint Inspection Unit to Prevail},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Patrick A. Mello and Anna Novoselova and Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13048},

doi = {10.1111/1758-5899.13048},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-03-17},

urldate = {2022-01-01},

journal = {Global Policy},

volume = {13},

issue = {2},

pages = {235-246},

abstract = {Since its inception in 1966, the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has prevailed in the face of significant existential challenges. Against this backdrop, we investigate how and why the JIU persisted over time. Combining delegation and historical institutionalist approaches, we posit that entrepreneurial agents and layering processes together help us better understand persistence of international organizations. Based on semi-structured interviews with UN staff and JIU inspectors, we examine three critical junctures in the history of the JIU. Our results show that entrepreneurial agents and stakeholders in the JIU managed to avoid the closure or demotion of the JIU by engaging in a strategy of institutional layering. Our analysis, however, also demonstrates that the JIU survived at the price of losing its privilege as the central UN oversight body. These findings have implications for the study of international organizations and for the reform of the UN system at large.},

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@article{10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590,

title = {Bringing Independence and Accountability Together: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Tony Mueller},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590},

doi = {10.1080/07036337.2021.2005590},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-02-28},

urldate = {2022-01-01},

journal = {Journal of European Integration},

volume = {44},

issue = {6},

pages = {837-853},

abstract = {The European Central Bank’s (ECB) role as a political actor during the euro crisis raised concerns about its independence and insufficient accountability. Against this backdrop, the article investigates how and why the ECB reacted to demands for more accountability during and following the crisis. To this end, we revisit the independence-accountability nexus, adding three qualifications to the conventional wisdom that independence and accountability do not go together. First, recurring to the governor’s dilemma, we argue that a delegation relationship characterized by a high level of independence favours competence over controllability. Second, we open the black box of accountability by investigating the extent to which the ECB made the strategic choice to improve selected accountability dimensions. Third, against the commonsensical view that ECB accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped, this piece shows that certain accountability dimensions have been continuously improved to defend independence. The findings contribute to the literature on accountability and the causes and consequences of delegating power to supranational institutions.

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@article{10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4,

title = {A New Delegation Design for EU Governance: How Preference Cohesiveness of Multiple Principals Shapes the European Commission’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4},

doi = {10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-06-24},

urldate = {2021-01-01},

journal = {Comparative European Politics},

volume = {19},

pages = {576–593},

abstract = {The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the role of the European Parliament in free trade agreements. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of this new delegation design in EU trade governance. Specifically, it addresses the question how the preference cohesiveness of multiple principals—the Council of Ministers as a de jure principal and the Parliament as a de facto principal—shapes the Commission’s discretion in negotiating trade agreements. Exploring these two conjectures through a combination of primary materials and interviews, this contribution posits that those configurations of low degree of cohesiveness within the Council and high cohesiveness within the Parliament or high cohesiveness of the Council and low cohesiveness within the Parliament increase Commission discretion. A configuration of low cohesiveness within and between multiple principals, by contrast, is more likely to lead to paralysis of the negotiation process.},

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@article{10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3,

title = {Populism as a ‘Corrective’ to Trade Agreements? ‘America First’ and the Readjustment of NAFTA},

author = {Robert Csehi and Eugénia C. Heldt},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3},

doi = {10.1057/s41311-021-00306-3},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-05-27},

urldate = {2021-01-01},

journal = {International Politics},

abstract = {The past few years have seen an upsurge in populist politics around the globe. Yet, its potential impact on the liberal international order has been analyzed mainly from a discursive perspective, and much less is known about actual policy implications. Adopting an ideational approach to populism and taking the case of the NAFTA renegotiation process as a building block in the liberal economic order, this article studies the populist imprints of the revised agreement. First, we demonstrate how the populist division of society between ‘the corrupt elite’ and ‘the honest people’ and the emphasis on popular sovereignty were used as narrative frames in criticizing NAFTA. In a second step, through selected provisions, we show how alterations to NAFTA are considered as ‘populist corrections’ to guarantee greater representation for ‘the people’ and better safeguards for popular sovereignty under the USMCA. The article concludes with a discussion of potential implications for global trade.},

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@article{doi:10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145,

title = {The (Self-)Empowerment of the European Central Bank during the Sovereign Debt Crisis},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Tony Mueller},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145},

doi = {10.1080/07036337.2020.1729145},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-01-30},

urldate = {2021-01-30},

journal = {Journal of European Integration},

volume = {43},

issue = {1},

pages = {83–98},

publisher = {Routledge},

abstract = {The European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the sovereign debt crisis as one of the most powerful supranational institutions. Against this background, this article explains how and why the ECB became empowered during the euro area crisis. Building on the delegation, governor’s dilemma, and epistemic community approaches, we argue that the ECB ability to play a strong role in this empowerment process and to convince member states to entrust it with more competences was the outcome of a combination of three factors: limited cohesiveness within the collective principal (Eurogroup); a fiduciary relationship characterized by broad discretion and independence on the trustee side (ECB); and strong specialization with the ECB acting as epistemic entrepreneur. We illustrate our argument with two cases: the Trichet letters exemplify an autonomous emergency empowerment and the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism demonstrates ECB influence on institutional design decisions in negotiating processes.},

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