2020
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mahrenbach, Laura C.
Reforming International Organizations: How Partisanship and Ministerial Control Shape States Preferences towards the World Bank Journal Article
In: Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, vol. 26, iss. 4, pp. 601–627, 2020.
@article{nokey,
title = {Reforming International Organizations: How Partisanship and Ministerial Control Shape States Preferences towards the World Bank},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Laura C. Mahrenbach},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02604001},
doi = {10.1163/19426720-02604001},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
urldate = {2020-01-01},
journal = {Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations},
volume = {26},
issue = {4},
pages = {601–627},
abstract = {Recent scholarship has highlighted the role of domestic pressures in determining state preferences toward the reform of international organizations (IO s). This article adds a new dimension by examining how partisanship and ministerial control affect state preferences toward IO empowerment. The article derives two expectations from the existing literature. First, partisan position will determine preferences toward IO empowerment. Second, when a government is constituted by multiple parties, the position of the party with the IO’s ministerial portfolio will determine the government’s position toward IO empowerment. The article illustrates this argument by examining the positions of four net donors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and two net recipients (Brazil and India) during the World Bank’s reforms. By bringing domestic politics back in, this article complements existing studies on the politics of IO reform and weighs in on central debates in comparative politics and international political economy.},
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Recent scholarship has highlighted the role of domestic pressures in determining state preferences toward the reform of international organizations (IO s). This article adds a new dimension by examining how partisanship and ministerial control affect state preferences toward IO empowerment. The article derives two expectations from the existing literature. First, partisan position will determine preferences toward IO empowerment. Second, when a government is constituted by multiple parties, the position of the party with the IO’s ministerial portfolio will determine the government’s position toward IO empowerment. The article illustrates this argument by examining the positions of four net donors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and two net recipients (Brazil and India) during the World Bank’s reforms. By bringing domestic politics back in, this article complements existing studies on the politics of IO reform and weighs in on central debates in comparative politics and international political economy.
2019
Fioretos, Orfeo; Heldt, Eugénia C.
Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance since Bretton Woods Journal Article
In: Review of International Political Economy, vol. 26, iss. 6, pp. 1089–1111, 2019.
@article{doi:10.1080/09692290.2019.1635513,
title = {Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance since Bretton Woods},
author = {Orfeo Fioretos and Eugénia C. Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1635513},
doi = {10.1080/09692290.2019.1635513},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-07-08},
urldate = {2019-01-01},
journal = {Review of International Political Economy},
volume = {26},
issue = {6},
pages = {1089–1111},
publisher = {Routledge},
abstract = {The international economic system that emerged after the 1944 Bretton Woods conference became the most durable international arrangement devoted to economic openness. Seventy-five years after the conference, however, global shifts in power, institutional gridlock, and populist backlash figure prominently in accounts predicting the system’s demise. This article examines the legacies of the Bretton Woods conference for structures and practices of global economic governance and innovations that emerged over time to adapt the system to new political and economic circumstances. It explores how and why the Bretton Woods system became a more variegated system over time with respect to four features of governance: membership, legalization, organizational focality, and market embeddedness. It identifies sources and effects of expanding membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the emergence of new formal and informal institutions, the challenges of a more fragmented institutional landscape, and shifts in the underlying principles of economic governance. Finally, the article discusses lessons from past crises in and reforms to the Bretton Woods system, and their implications for understanding recent challenges to global economic cooperation.},
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The international economic system that emerged after the 1944 Bretton Woods conference became the most durable international arrangement devoted to economic openness. Seventy-five years after the conference, however, global shifts in power, institutional gridlock, and populist backlash figure prominently in accounts predicting the system’s demise. This article examines the legacies of the Bretton Woods conference for structures and practices of global economic governance and innovations that emerged over time to adapt the system to new political and economic circumstances. It explores how and why the Bretton Woods system became a more variegated system over time with respect to four features of governance: membership, legalization, organizational focality, and market embeddedness. It identifies sources and effects of expanding membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the emergence of new formal and informal institutions, the challenges of a more fragmented institutional landscape, and shifts in the underlying principles of economic governance. Finally, the article discusses lessons from past crises in and reforms to the Bretton Woods system, and their implications for understanding recent challenges to global economic cooperation.
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Schmidtke, Henning
Global Democracy in Decline?: How Rising Authoritarianism Limits Democratic Control over International Institutions Journal Article
In: Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, vol. 25, iss. 2, pp. 231 - 254, 2019.
@article{GlobalDemocracyinDecline,
title = {Global Democracy in Decline?: How Rising Authoritarianism Limits Democratic Control over International Institutions},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Henning Schmidtke},
url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/25/2/article-p231_6.xml},
doi = {10.1163/19426720-02502005},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-06-10},
urldate = {2019-01-01},
journal = {Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations},
volume = {25},
issue = {2},
pages = {231 - 254},
publisher = {Brill | Nijhoff},
address = {Leiden, Niederlande},
abstract = {Over the past decade, rising authoritarian regimes have begun to challenge the liberal international order. This challenge is particularly pronounced in the field of multilateral development finance, where China and its coalition partners from Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa have created two new multilateral development banks. This article argues that China and its partners have used the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to increase their power and to restrict democratic control mechanisms. By comparing formal mechanisms of democratic control in both organizations to the World Bank, this article shows that civil society access, transparency, and accountability are lower at the AIIB and NDB than they are at the World Bank.},
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Over the past decade, rising authoritarian regimes have begun to challenge the liberal international order. This challenge is particularly pronounced in the field of multilateral development finance, where China and its coalition partners from Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa have created two new multilateral development banks. This article argues that China and its partners have used the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to increase their power and to restrict democratic control mechanisms. By comparing formal mechanisms of democratic control in both organizations to the World Bank, this article shows that civil society access, transparency, and accountability are lower at the AIIB and NDB than they are at the World Bank.
Heldt, Eugénia C.
Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time Book Chapter
In: Goetz, Klaus H. (Ed.): Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics, Chapter 19, pp. 391–412, Oxford University Press, 2019, ISBN: 9780190862084.
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
editor = {Klaus H. Goetz},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190862084.013.12},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190862084.013.12},
isbn = {9780190862084},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-04-04},
urldate = {2019-01-01},
booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics},
pages = {391–412},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
chapter = {19},
abstract = {Time plays a central role in international organizations (IOs). Interactions among actors are embedded in a temporal dimension, and actors use formal and informal time rules, time discourses, and time pressure to obtain concessions from their counterparts. By the same token, legacies and innovations within and outside IOs can be examined as a dynamic process evolving over time. Against this background, this chapter has a twofold aim. First, it examines how actors use time in IOs with a particular focus on multilateral negotiations to justify their actions. Drawing on international relations studies and negotiation analysis, this piece explores six different dimensions of time in the multilateral system: time pressure, time discourse, time rules, time costs, time horizons, and time as a resource. Second, this chapter delineates the evolution of IOs over time with the focus on innovations that emerge to adapt their institutional system to new political and economic circumstances. This piece looks particularly at endogenous and exogenous changes in IOs, recurring to central concepts used by historical institutionalism, including path dependence, critical junctures, and sequencing. This allows us to map patterns of incremental change, such as displacement, conversion, drift, and layering.},
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Time plays a central role in international organizations (IOs). Interactions among actors are embedded in a temporal dimension, and actors use formal and informal time rules, time discourses, and time pressure to obtain concessions from their counterparts. By the same token, legacies and innovations within and outside IOs can be examined as a dynamic process evolving over time. Against this background, this chapter has a twofold aim. First, it examines how actors use time in IOs with a particular focus on multilateral negotiations to justify their actions. Drawing on international relations studies and negotiation analysis, this piece explores six different dimensions of time in the multilateral system: time pressure, time discourse, time rules, time costs, time horizons, and time as a resource. Second, this chapter delineates the evolution of IOs over time with the focus on innovations that emerge to adapt their institutional system to new political and economic circumstances. This piece looks particularly at endogenous and exogenous changes in IOs, recurring to central concepts used by historical institutionalism, including path dependence, critical junctures, and sequencing. This allows us to map patterns of incremental change, such as displacement, conversion, drift, and layering.
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Schmidtke, Henning
Explaining Coherence in International Regime Complexes: How the World Bank Shapes the Field of Multilateral Development Finance Journal Article
In: Review of International Political Economy, vol. 26, iss. 6, pp. 1160-1186, 2019.
@article{10.1080/09692290.2019.1631205,
title = {Explaining Coherence in International Regime Complexes: How the World Bank Shapes the Field of Multilateral Development Finance},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Henning Schmidtke},
url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2019.1631205},
doi = {10.1080/09692290.2019.1631205},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-01-01},
urldate = {2019-01-01},
journal = {Review of International Political Economy},
volume = {26},
issue = {6},
pages = {1160-1186},
abstract = {The landscape of multilateral development finance has changed dramatically in the past decades. At Bretton Woods, delegates envisioned the World Bank as the focal organization mobilizing financial support for national development strategies. Today, this issue area is populated by no less than 27 multilateral development banks including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank created under Chinese leadership. This paper shows that, despite this institutional proliferation, the development finance regime remains largely coherent and core governance features designed at Bretton Woods continue to shape the emerging regime complex. We develop a historical institutionalist argument for why newly created institutions are likely to imitate extant institutions. We suggest that states add new institutions not only in response to deficiencies in extant institutions but also to increase their control and reputation. We analyze three causal pathways – path-dependence, orchestration, and independent learning – that contribute to a coherent regime complex. We show that focal international organizations can use their position to prevent incoherence.},
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The landscape of multilateral development finance has changed dramatically in the past decades. At Bretton Woods, delegates envisioned the World Bank as the focal organization mobilizing financial support for national development strategies. Today, this issue area is populated by no less than 27 multilateral development banks including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank created under Chinese leadership. This paper shows that, despite this institutional proliferation, the development finance regime remains largely coherent and core governance features designed at Bretton Woods continue to shape the emerging regime complex. We develop a historical institutionalist argument for why newly created institutions are likely to imitate extant institutions. We suggest that states add new institutions not only in response to deficiencies in extant institutions but also to increase their control and reputation. We analyze three causal pathways – path-dependence, orchestration, and independent learning – that contribute to a coherent regime complex. We show that focal international organizations can use their position to prevent incoherence.
2018
Heldt, Eugénia C.
2018.
@workingpaper{nokey,
title = {European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/1814/56404},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-05-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
journal = {EUI Working Papers RSCAS},
issue = { 2018/36},
pages = {1-13},
abstract = {How can we explain the EU’s policy failure during the refugee crisis? In this contribution, I argue that EU policy failure was a function of four causal mechanisms. First, a complex delegation design with partial empowerment of supranational institutions on migration and asylum policy issues hindered an effective response and strengthened disintegration dynamics. Second, a reluctant European Commission was unable to provide leadership during the refugee crisis. Third, Member States’ inability to speak with a single voice negatively impacted their external and internal effectiveness and reinforced disintegration dynamics. Finally, this cacophony of voices led to unilateral action eroding the authority of the Commission and explains EU policy failure during the refugee crisis. The findings of this paper suggest that the mantra that the EU undergoes many crises but always emerges stronger has lost plausibility.},
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How can we explain the EU’s policy failure during the refugee crisis? In this contribution, I argue that EU policy failure was a function of four causal mechanisms. First, a complex delegation design with partial empowerment of supranational institutions on migration and asylum policy issues hindered an effective response and strengthened disintegration dynamics. Second, a reluctant European Commission was unable to provide leadership during the refugee crisis. Third, Member States’ inability to speak with a single voice negatively impacted their external and internal effectiveness and reinforced disintegration dynamics. Finally, this cacophony of voices led to unilateral action eroding the authority of the Commission and explains EU policy failure during the refugee crisis. The findings of this paper suggest that the mantra that the EU undergoes many crises but always emerges stronger has lost plausibility.
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mahrenbach, Laura C.
Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus Journal Article
In: Global Policy, vol. 10, iss. 1, pp. 19-28, 2018.
@article{10.1111/1758-5899.12643,
title = {Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Laura C. Mahrenbach},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12643},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
journal = {Global Policy},
volume = {10},
issue = {1},
pages = {19-28},
abstract = {Given long-standing criticism of global economic institutions by rising powers, it is puzzling that these same governments supported the transfer of substantial resources and responsibilities to the IMF and the World Bank during recent reform negotiations. We argue rising powers’ support for international organization (IO) empowerment is linked to their concerns regarding an IO's flexibility. We introduce two types of flexibility as being most relevant for rising powers. These include governance flexibility – the extent to which rising powers may participate in IO decision-making – and issue flexibility – the extent to which rising power preferences are incorporated into IO policies and programs. We illustrate our argument by examining the preferences of the BIC states (Brazil, India and China) towards IMF and World Bank reforms between 2008 and 2012. Drawing on archival material with over 50 statements from BIC representatives, we find, first, that there were clear links between Bank and Fund governance flexibility and the BICs’ support for empowerment of these IOs, but that this was not true for issue flexibility. Second, we find evidence indicating the strategies of individual BIC governments differ within these IOs, suggesting a need to undertake more differentiated studies of rising powers’ IO activities.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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Given long-standing criticism of global economic institutions by rising powers, it is puzzling that these same governments supported the transfer of substantial resources and responsibilities to the IMF and the World Bank during recent reform negotiations. We argue rising powers’ support for international organization (IO) empowerment is linked to their concerns regarding an IO's flexibility. We introduce two types of flexibility as being most relevant for rising powers. These include governance flexibility – the extent to which rising powers may participate in IO decision-making – and issue flexibility – the extent to which rising power preferences are incorporated into IO policies and programs. We illustrate our argument by examining the preferences of the BIC states (Brazil, India and China) towards IMF and World Bank reforms between 2008 and 2012. Drawing on archival material with over 50 statements from BIC representatives, we find, first, that there were clear links between Bank and Fund governance flexibility and the BICs’ support for empowerment of these IOs, but that this was not true for issue flexibility. Second, we find evidence indicating the strategies of individual BIC governments differ within these IOs, suggesting a need to undertake more differentiated studies of rising powers’ IO activities.
Heldt, Eugénia C.
Lost in Internal Evaluation? Accountability and Insulation at the World Bank Journal Article
In: Contemporary Politics, vol. 24, iss. 5, pp. 568-587, 2018.
@article{nokey,
title = {Lost in Internal Evaluation? Accountability and Insulation at the World Bank},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2018.1455491},
doi = {10.1080/13569775.2018.1455491},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
journal = {Contemporary Politics},
volume = {24},
issue = {5},
pages = {568-587},
abstract = {Over past decades, the World Bank has been criticized by scholars, policymakers, and civil society groups for being unaccountable and inefficient. Confronted with this wave of contestation, the Bank established several internal accountability mechanisms, including the Inspection Panel, the Independent Evaluation Group, and the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman. Against this background, this article investigates how the proliferation of accountability mechanisms in a large and complex organization such as the World Bank reduces rather than enhances transparency and lines of accountability. I argue that the establishment of a myriad of accountability mechanisms has paradoxically made the Bank even more encapsulated and less accountable to the outside world. Unpacking the differential effects of external and internal accountability mechanisms makes this contribution of significant interest to scholars working on the accountability and performance of international organizations.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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Over past decades, the World Bank has been criticized by scholars, policymakers, and civil society groups for being unaccountable and inefficient. Confronted with this wave of contestation, the Bank established several internal accountability mechanisms, including the Inspection Panel, the Independent Evaluation Group, and the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman. Against this background, this article investigates how the proliferation of accountability mechanisms in a large and complex organization such as the World Bank reduces rather than enhances transparency and lines of accountability. I argue that the establishment of a myriad of accountability mechanisms has paradoxically made the Bank even more encapsulated and less accountable to the outside world. Unpacking the differential effects of external and internal accountability mechanisms makes this contribution of significant interest to scholars working on the accountability and performance of international organizations.
2017
Heldt, Eugénia C.
Multiple Principals’ Preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations Book Chapter
In: Delreux, Tom; Adriaensen, Johan (Ed.): The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, pp. 203–226, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Multiple Principals’ Preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
editor = {Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_9},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_9},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-10-18},
urldate = {2017-10-18},
booktitle = {The Principal Agent Model and the European Union},
pages = {203–226},
publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
abstract = {The European Parliament is now granted joint powers with the Council of the EU on trade policy issues. In this chapter, I explore how changing the delegation structure that now relies on multiple principals shapes the Commission’s discretion in the negotiation of trade agreements. I argue that an agent’s amount of discretion can be high or low depending on the preference heterogeneity between multiple principals and the type of control mechanisms available to principals during the negotiation process. To illustrate the argument made, this chapter analyzes two case studies of the negotiation of free trade agreements with South Korea and with Singapore.},
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The European Parliament is now granted joint powers with the Council of the EU on trade policy issues. In this chapter, I explore how changing the delegation structure that now relies on multiple principals shapes the Commission’s discretion in the negotiation of trade agreements. I argue that an agent’s amount of discretion can be high or low depending on the preference heterogeneity between multiple principals and the type of control mechanisms available to principals during the negotiation process. To illustrate the argument made, this chapter analyzes two case studies of the negotiation of free trade agreements with South Korea and with Singapore.
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Schmidtke, Henning
Measuring the Empowerment of International Organizations: The Evolution of Financial and Staff Capabilities Journal Article
In: Global Policy, vol. 8, iss. S5, pp. 51-61, 2017.
@article{nokey,
title = {Measuring the Empowerment of International Organizations: The Evolution of Financial and Staff Capabilities},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Henning Schmidtke},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12449},
doi = {10.1111/1758-5899.12449},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-08-24},
urldate = {2017-01-01},
journal = {Global Policy},
volume = {8},
issue = {S5},
pages = {51-61},
abstract = {International organizations’ (IOs) power in shaping global governance outcomes is not only determined by the formal delegation of tasks and issue areas but also by the necessary capabilities to fulfill these tasks. Yet, extant research on the delegation of power to IOs gives few insights into the financial and staff capabilities of IOs and focuses mainly on the formal rules that specify IOs’ tasks and issue scope. To address these limitations, this paper makes three contributions. First, we propose a more encompassing concept of IO power which incorporates three principal components: tasks, issue scope, and capabilities. Second, we introduce a new concept – IO empowerment (IOE) – which encapsulates formal and informal changes in IO power over time. Third, we introduce a novel dataset on IO capabilities, which measures the formal rules governing IO staff and financial resources as well as the actual capabilities available to six well‐known IOs over 65 years. These original data show that capabilities vary not only across IOs but also over time.},
keywords = {},
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International organizations’ (IOs) power in shaping global governance outcomes is not only determined by the formal delegation of tasks and issue areas but also by the necessary capabilities to fulfill these tasks. Yet, extant research on the delegation of power to IOs gives few insights into the financial and staff capabilities of IOs and focuses mainly on the formal rules that specify IOs’ tasks and issue scope. To address these limitations, this paper makes three contributions. First, we propose a more encompassing concept of IO power which incorporates three principal components: tasks, issue scope, and capabilities. Second, we introduce a new concept – IO empowerment (IOE) – which encapsulates formal and informal changes in IO power over time. Third, we introduce a novel dataset on IO capabilities, which measures the formal rules governing IO staff and financial resources as well as the actual capabilities available to six well‐known IOs over 65 years. These original data show that capabilities vary not only across IOs but also over time.
0+
Journal Articles
0
Books
0
Book Chapters
0
Edited Volumes
- 2019: Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance Since Bretton Woods, Review of International Political Economy 26 (6) (with Orfeo Fioretos).
- 2015: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance. London/New York: Routledge (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2015: Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, Koordination und Wandel, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 49, Baden-Baden: Nomos (with Andrea Liese und Martin Koch).
- 2014: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance, Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 21 (7) (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2024: The IMF and the Future of the Liberal International Order, Chapter 36, pp. 724-740 (with Orfeo Fioretos), In: Momani, Bessma and Hibben, Mark (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the International Monetary Fund, London: Oxford University Press.
- 2024: Revitalizing the World Bank: Engagement with the Private sector and Scope Expansion, Chapter 12, pp. 143–153 (with Thomas Dörfler), In: Antje Vetterlein & Tobias Schmidtke (eds.), 2024. “The Elgar Companion to the World Bank,” Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 21163.
- 2024: Time in International Organizations and International Organizations in Time. In: Goetz, Klaus H. (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford University Press (2. Edition).
- 2022: China und die BRICS in globalen ökonomischen Institutionen, in: Schirm, S. A.; Busch, A.; Lütz, S.; Walter, S.; Zimmermann, H. (Hrsg.) De-Globalisierung: Forschungsstand und Perspektiven, Baden Baden: Nomos, 123-138.
- 2021: Are International Organizations the Tragic Heroes of World Politics?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) New Global Alliances: Institutions, Alignments and Legitimacy in the Contemporary World, Wallstein Verlag, forthcoming
- 2021: Decreasing Importance of the UN: The Rise of Informal Organizations. In: Molls, Michael et al. (eds.): Science, Reason & Sustainability. Munich: Technical University Press. forthcoming.
- 2021: Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) Neue Konstellationen der Gegenwart: Annäherungen, Institutionen und Legitimität, Wallstein Verlag, 113-128.
- 2020: Sinkende Bedeutung der UNO: Stärkung informeller Organisationen (with Tony Müller). In: Molls, Michael et al. (Hrsg.): Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit. Technische Universität München.
- 2019: Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time, in: Klaus H. Goetz (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2018: Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, in: Cameron Thies (ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/97801902228637.013.496 (with Patrick Mello).
- 2017: Multiple Principals’ preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations, in: Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen (eds.): The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 203-226.
- 2016: The European Agricultural Fortress under Attack, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.), Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 2013: Adaptation and Change in EU Trade Governance: The EU’s Paradigm Shift from Multilateralism to Regionalism and Bilateralism, in: Manuela Moschella and Catherine Weaver (eds.) Handbook of Global Economic Governance, London: Routledge, 57-69.
- 2012: EU Agricultural and Fisheries Policies: An Economic and Environmental Disaster!, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.): Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-244.
- 2010: Portugal: An Active and Influential Parliament?, in: Bjørn Eric Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.): The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, New York & London: Routledge.
- 2007: France: the Importance of the Electoral Cycle, in: Ellen M. Immergut, Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds.): The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 150-199.
- 2012: Dür, Andreas Protection for Exporters. Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-2010, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 53(3): 555-557
- 2011: Zimmermann, Hubert Drachenzähmung: Die EU und die USA in den Verhandlungen um die Integration Chinas in den Welthandel, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 52(1): 149-150.