Publications

@article{nokey,

title = {Divergent Attitudes of Eurosceptic Parties Towards Intergovernmental and Supranational EU Institutions},

author = {Nikolai Gad and Eugénia C. Heldt and Robert Csehi},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13701},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-12-09},

urldate = {2024-10-31},

journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},

abstract = {How do Eurosceptic parties position themselves regarding individual European Union (EU) institutions? Using Euromanifesto data from 1979 to 2019, this study addresses this question by disaggregating the attitudes of party families towards separate intergovernmental and supranational EU institutions. It focuses on the relationship between the identities of radical left- and right-wing parties and Euroscepticism. The findings reveal that post-communist parties are more sceptical of intergovernmental institutions than nationalist parties, whilst nationalist parties are more sceptical of supranational institutions. Despite widespread Euroscepticism in both nationalist and post-communist party families, nationalist parties' attitudes towards intergovernmental institutions align with those of other party families. In contrast, post-communist parties support the transfer of more competences to the European Parliament but are sceptical of intergovernmental institutions. These results suggest that foundational party identities influence party-based Euroscepticism, which has implications for the EU's handling of increasing Euroscepticism.},

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@article{nokey,

title = {In Europe We Trust: Selecting and Empowering EU Institutions in Disruptive Sircumstances},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Elena Ríos Camacho and Tony Mueller },

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2272037},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-00-00},

urldate = {2024-00-00},

journal = {Journal of European Integration},

volume = {46},

issue = {2},

pages = {235-255},

abstract = {Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) made significant strides in economic and fiscal policy integration without formal treaty-based changes. After the euro crisis, member states granted the European Central Bank banking supervisory powers. During the pandemic, they entrusted the European Commission with raising EU debt through NextGenerationEurope. This article examines the empowerment of supranational institutions as a deliberate ajustment to disruptive circumstances. By so doing, it demonstrates that empowerment can happen through legislative acts and joint decisions by member states. The study reveals that when states have multiple agent options, like in the banking union, they select the institution they trust the most. Conversely, in nested delegation games, extensive monitoring and reporting requirements, as in the case of NextGenerationEurope, are aimed at avoiding the defection of single member states, what we call ”principal slack”, at the implementation stage.},

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@article{10.17645/pag.v11i4.7098,

title = {Europe’s Global Gateway: A New Instrument of Geopolitics},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7098},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-00-00},

urldate = {2023-01-01},

journal = {Politics and Governance},

volume = {11},

issue = {4},

abstract = {In December 2021, the EU member states agreed on the Global Gateway strategy to mobilize public and private funds of up to €300 billion between 2021 and 2027, to invest in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research fields. With a geographical focus on Africa, Global Gateway links infrastructure investment projects with condition principles—including democratic values, good governance, and transparency—and catalyzes private investment into EU development financing. Against this backdrop, this study explores why EU member states agreed on this new geopolitical instrument. This piece posits that the confluence of three factors enabled the creation of Global Gateway. First, the EU established this new instrument to counter China’s role as a global infrastructure lender in Africa. Second, Global Gateway was possible through the shift to private investment in multilateral development financing. Equally important for the establishment of Global Gateway was the European Commission’s transformational leadership as an entrepreneurial agent in designing this geopolitical strategy of the EU’s power projection. The conclusion outlines future research avenues and enables readers to consider the wider prospects and caveats of the Global Gateway strategy.},

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@article{10.1111/rego.12432,

title = {Orchestrating Private Investors for Development: How the World Bank Revitalizes},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Thomas Dörfler},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221098487},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-10-01},

urldate = {2022-10-01},

journal = {Regulation & Governance},

volume = {16},

issue = {4},

pages = {1382-1398},

abstract = {Confronted with a new wave of criticism on the in effectiveness of its development programs, the World Bank embarked on a revitalization process, turning to private investors to finance International Development Association projects and widening its mandate. To explain these adaptation strategies of the World Bank to regain relevance, this piece draws on organizational ecology and orchestration scholarship. We contend that international organizations rely on two adaptation mechanisms, orchestration and scope expansion, when they lose their role as focal actors in an issue area. We find that the World Bank has indeed lost market share and has relied on these two mechanisms to revitalize itself. We show that the World Bank responded to changes in the environment by orchestrating a private sector-oriented capital increase, prioritizing private funding for development through a “cascade approach,” and expanding the scope of its mandate into adjacent domains of transnational governance, including climate change and global health.},

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@article{10.1093/isagsq/ksac035,

title = {When Do International Organizations Engage in Agency Slack? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of United Nations Institutions},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Patrick A. Mello and Anna Novoselova and Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac035},

doi = {10.1093/isagsq/ksac035},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-07-01},

urldate = {2022-01-01},

journal = {Global Studies Quarterly},

volume = {2},

issue = {3},

pages = {1-15},

abstract = {The extensive delegation of power to international organizations (IOs) has been accompanied by occasional agency slack. While prior studies suggest that IOs’ propensity for agency slack may be rooted in their organizational characteristics, this has rarely been explored empirically. To address this lacuna, in this article we propose a conceptualization and measurement of agency slack and develop a framework of organizational characteristics. Our empirical analysis applies qualitative comparative analysis to assess the conditions under which agency slack occurs across sixteen United Nations institutions. We complement the cross-case analysis with two case illustrations. Our results document the empirical existence of two paths to agency slack, providing confirmatory evidence for our theoretical expectations. Path 1 combines staffing rules that are favorable for the agent with wide access to third parties. Path 2 entails the combination of favorable staffing rules with extensive delegation of authority and a vague organizational mandate.



L'importante délégation de pouvoir aux organisations internationales (OI) a occasionnellement été accompagnée d'une marge d'agentivité. Bien que des études précédentes suggèrent que la propension des OI à obtenir une marge d'agentivité puisse être ancrée dans les caractéristiques de ces organisations, cela a rarement été étudié d'un point de vue empirique. Dans cet article, nous proposons une conceptualisation et une mesure de cette marge d'agentivité et nous développons un cadre de caractéristiques organisationnelles pour combler cette lacune. Pour notre étude empirique, nous appliquons une Analyse comparative qualitative (ACQ) afin d’évaluer les conditions dans lesquelles la marge d'agentivité intervient dans 16 institutions de l'ONU. Nous complétons l'analyse de cas croisés par deux illustrations de cas. Nos résultats documentent l'existence empirique de deux voies vers la marge d'agentivité tout en fournissant des preuves confirmant nos hypothèses théoriques. La première allie des règles de dotation en personnel qui sont favorables à l'agent puisqu'elles lui offrent un large accès aux tierces parties. Et la deuxième consiste à combiner des règles de dotation en personnel favorables avec une vaste délégation de pouvoir et un mandat organisationnel vague.



La amplia delegación de poderes en las organizaciones internacionales (OI) ha ido acompañada de una ocasional inactividad de los organismos. Si bien estudios anteriores sugieren que la tendencia de las OI a la inactividad está basada en sus características organizativas, esto no se ha estudiado empíricamente. Para abordar esta situación, proponemos en este documento una conceptualización y una valoración de la inactividad de las instituciones y desarrollamos un marco de características organizativas. Nuestro análisis empírico aplica el análisis comparativo cualitativo (Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA) para evaluar las condiciones en las que ocurre dicha inactividad en 16 instituciones de la ONU. Además, complementamos el análisis cruzado de casos con dos ejemplos ilustrativos. Nuestros resultados documentan la existencia empírica de dos caminos hacia la inactividad de las instituciones, lo que brinda evidencia confirmatoria de nuestras expectativas teóricas. El camino 1 combina normas para el personal que son favorables para el agente con amplio acceso a terceros. El camino 2 supone la combinación de normas favorables para el personal con la amplia delegación de la autoridad y un mandato organizativo impreciso.},

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@article{10.1177/14651165221098487,

title = {Measuring Actual Discretion of the European Commission: Using the Discretion Index to Guide Empirical Research},

author = {Markus Gastinger and Eugénia C. Heldt},

doi = {10.1177/14651165221098487},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-05-16},

urldate = {2022-05-16},

journal = {European Union Politics},

volume = {23},

number = {3},

pages = {541–558},

abstract = {One key question in the study of the European Union has always been the extent of Commission discretion. We take the discretion index, typically used by principal–agent scholars to measure the Commission's designed discretion, to measure its actual discretion. Commission designed discretion can today be computationally generated with sufficient accuracy across all secondary acts. The study of designed discretion thus reaches considerable maturity. Therefore, we argue that scholars should prioritize studying Commission actual discretion. We present a systematic and transparent investigative technique based on the discretion index, which we use as a roadmap to guide our empirical investigation. The index facilitates the accumulation of knowledge across policy areas and time by providing exact values for Commission discretion. We illustrate our approach with the Development Cooperation Instrument.},

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