@article{Heldt2026c,

title = {The Evolution of International Regime Complexes: Adaptation and Maladaptation in International Cooperation},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and C. Randall Henning and Orfeo Fioretos},

doi = {10.1093/isagsq/ksag139},

issn = {2634-3797},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-09-29},

urldate = {2026-09-29},

journal = {Global Studies Quarterly},

volume = {6},

number = {4},

publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},

abstract = {This article introduces a special forum devoted to the evolution of international regime complexes in three parts. First, it develops a novel distinction between adaptive and maladaptive evolution and maps diverse patterns of change in well-known and emerging international regime complexes. Second, it theorizes a variety of exogenous and endogenous sources of change that impact the configuration and effects of regime complexes. Here it draws on theories of regime complexity, along with theories of power transition, institutions, and delegation, to explain variations in evolutionary patterns. Finally, the paper summarizes eleven original contributions that make up the special forum and lays the groundwork for further theorizing about the conditions under which regime complexes adapt in ways that enhance or undermine international cooperation. We find, among other things, that the prevalence of endogenous sources of change is positively associated with adaptation of regime complexes, and invite further investigation of this relationship.},

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@article{Heldt2026d,

title = {Adaptive and Maladaptive Differentiation within the World Bank’s Accountability Complex: How Rivalry between Principals and Agents Affects Accountability},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},

doi = {10.1093/isagsq/ksag141},

issn = {2634-3797},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-09-29},

urldate = {2026-09-29},

journal = {Global Studies Quarterly},

volume = {6},

issue = {4},

publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},

abstract = {Over the last 30 years, the accountability system of the World Bank Group institutions has evolved into a complex ecosystem, encompassing the Inspection Panel, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), and the Grievance Redress Service (GRS). The creation of the World Bank Accountability Mechanism (WBAM) in 2020, which encompassed the existing Inspection Panel and Dispute Resolution Service, added another layer of complexity to the Bank’s accountability system. This study examines the evolution of the World Bank’s accountability mechanisms by combining principal–agent theory with scholarship on regime complexity. It contends that the emergence of multiple, sometimes overlapping accountability bodies within the World Bank Group arose from competitive interactions and rivalry between the Executive Board (the principals) and World Bank management (the agent). Over time, the proliferation of accountability bodies has led to adaptive differentiation, with the creation of the CAO and GRS, increasing efficiency and introducing a division of labor between the Inspection Panel and the CAO. Conversely, as part of the principal–agent contest, the establishment of the WBAM introduced maladaptive differentiation and fragmentation into the Bank’s accountability system. By tracing the development of these multiple accountability mechanisms, the study helps us to better understand the evolution of the Bank’s complex multilayered accountability ecosystem.},

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@article{Dafe2026b,

title = {The Political Power of Digital Multinational Companies in an Era of Geo-Technological Competition},

author = {Florence Dafe and Eugénia C. Heldt},

doi = {10.1080/09692290.2026.2645101},

issn = {1466-4526},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-09-03},

urldate = {2026-09-03},

journal = {Review of International Political Economy},

volume = {33},

number = {5},

pages = {2446--2467},

publisher = {Informa UK Limited},

abstract = {This commentary examines the political power of digital multinational companies (MNCs). Our review of the existing literature finds that comparative scholarship has focused on state-business relationships at the country level and sheds light on the sources of power flowing from the positions of digital companies in national political economies. However, to a lesser extent, comparativists have studied the power flowing from digital companies within global network structures. To address this research gap, this commentary makes two contributions to the literature. First, it systematizes extant scholarship and expands it by bringing together two different strands of literature – comparative political economy scholarship on business power and scholarship on interdependence in global networks in international relations and international political economy – to illuminate the power of digital MNCs in an era of geo-technological competition. Second, this commentary identifies factors countervailing the power of digital MNCs: replacement networks, international regimes, and mutual interdependence.},

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@article{Basedow2026,

title = {Team Europe Goes Global Gateway: How China’s Geopolitical Rise affects EU Governance in Development and Infrastructure Financing},

author = {Robert Basedow and Eugénia C. Heldt and Sophie Meunier},

doi = {10.1080/07036337.2026.2715686},

issn = {1477-2280},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-08-18},

urldate = {2026-08-18},

journal = {Journal of European Integration},

volume = {48},

number = {6},

pages = {1011--1031},

publisher = {Informa UK Limited},

abstract = {While existing research explains how China’s geopolitical rise caused the enactment of the EU’s Global Gateway (GG) Initiative, this paper examines how the EU adjusted its governance of development policy. European integration scholarship suggests four possible responses to exogenous pressure: additional supranational delegation, greater intergovernmental coordination, institutional status quo, or disintegration. Drawing on primary research and elite interviews, we argue that geopolitical competition with China has not produced a transfer of competences to the supranational level. Instead, it has accelerated coordination without delegation: member states and EU institutions have developed new mechanisms that reorganize how the Union formulates and delivers development and infrastructure finance. Empirically, the paper documents how the GG was implemented via Team Europe, producing institutional adaptation without supranational centralization. Theoretically, we identify when geopolitical pressure favours tighter intergovernmental coordination over supranational delegation, particularly in domains with fragmented competences and strong member-state preferences for visibility and bilateral ties.},

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@article{Heldt2026b,

title = {The EU’s Global Gateway Initiative: The Geopoliticization of Development Aid and Foreign Economic Policy},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Sophie Meunier},

doi = {10.1080/07036337.2026.2716369},

issn = {1477-2280},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-08-18},

urldate = {2026-08-18},

journal = {Journal of European Integration},

volume = {48},

number = {6},

pages = {901--921},

publisher = {Informa UK Limited},

abstract = {The European Union (EU) launched the Global Gateway initiative in 2021 as a strategic pivot in European approaches to development aid and foreign policy amid intensifying great power competition. This Special Issue examines the extent to which the Global Gateway constitutes a genuine geoeconomic innovation or consolidates and rebrands existing development policy with a new framing. Five years after its launch, contributors analyze three critical dimensions: the initiative’s novelty as an economic security instrument; its implications for intra-EU institutional balance between the Commission, Member States, and European Parliament; and its impact on the EU’s positioning in great power competition vis-à-vis China’s Belt and Road Initiative and U.S. infrastructure partnerships. Drawing on empirical analyses of flagship projects, financing mechanisms, Team Europe coordination, and perceptions across the Global South, this collection advances understanding of the EU’s geoeconomic turn and its capacity to act as a geopolitical actor in global infrastructure finance.},

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@article{Heldt2026,

title = {How EU Industrial Policy Got Its Groove Back: Securitisation and Governance Shifts in the Geoeconomic Era},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Sophie Meunier},

doi = {10.1080/13501763.2026.2627350},

issn = {1466-4429},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-02-10},

urldate = {2026-02-10},

journal = {Journal of European Public Policy},

volume = {33},

issue = {10},

pages = {2761-2789},

publisher = {Informa UK Limited},

abstract = {This paper analyzes the transformation of European Union (EU) industrial policy from market-oriented to securitised approaches. We argue that external pressures – the weaponization of economic interdependence and security-driven industrial policies by China and the United States – enabled the European Commission to reframe industrial policy through a security lens, making interventionist measures politically acceptable despite long-standing opposition from market-liberal Member States. Our theoretical contribution specifies three mechanisms through which securitisation transforms EU governance without treaty change: (1) bureaucratic shifts creating new coordination bodies focused on economic security; (2) procedural shifts from ex-post competition enforcement to ex-ante risk screening and emergency powers; and (3) coalition shifts that co-opt business opposition by framing intervention as necessary to protect, rather than distort, the Single Market. Through four case studies – the EU Chips Act, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, Important Projects of Common European Interest, and the Critical Raw Materials Act – we demonstrate how the Commission acts entrepreneurially to deepen integration in a core state power domain. However, securitisation has outpaced formal legal change: fiscal constraints and persistent Member State divisions limit the EU's ability to match U.S. and Chinese scale, revealing both the possibilities and limits of securitised industrial policy.},

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@article{,

title = {Multilateralism à la Carte: How China Navigates Global Economic Institutions},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Henning Schmidtke and Omar Serrano Oswald},

doi = {10.1080/09692290.2025.2495694},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-05-15},

urldate = {2025-05-15},

journal = {Review of International Political Economy},

volume = {32},

issue = {4},

pages = {899-921},

abstract = {China’s engagement with multilateral economic institutions is neither fully supportive nor outright revisionist. While it supports institutions like the World Trade Organization and contributes to multilateral development banks, it also challenges aspects of the global economic order by withholding lending data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and bypassing the Paris Club. To capture this complexity, we introduce a framework that categorises China’s multilateral strategies into four types: Deep cooperation, shallow support, deep challenge, and shallow resistance. We argue that China’s strategic choices are shaped by three key factors: Domestic preferences, domestic capabilities, and the broader international strategic environment. These factors not only influence China’s engagement individually but also interact with each other, shaping its evolving multilateral strategies. Drawing on case studies from this special issue, we illustrate how China selectively supports or resists multilateral institutions across multiple issue areas—including global finance, multilateral development finance, and trade—depending on issue-area dynamics, domestic bureaucratic competition, and global power shifts. Rather than adopting a fixed position as a status quo power or a revisionist challenger, China pursues an à la carte approach to multilateralism—embracing cooperation where it aligns with national interests, resisting constraints when necessary, and even creating alternative institutions when opportunities arise. By offering a structured way to analyse these varied strategies, this framework provides insights into China’s broader role in multilateral economic governance and its implications for the future of multilateralism.},

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@article{,

title = {China’s Rise and the Reconfiguration of Global Economic Governance},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Susan Park},

doi = {10.1080/09692290.2025.2482853},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-04-02},

urldate = {2025-04-02},

journal = {Review of International Political Economy},

volume = {32},

issue = {4},

pages = { 891-898},

abstract = {China ‘s rapid economic and political ascension is changing the configuration of global economic governance. In some cases, Chinese initiatives have improved and complemented global governance structures, rather than fundamentally altering and undermining them. In other cases, a sometimes more fragile status quo endures. This special issue examines how China seeks to reconfigure global economic governance. It introduces the issue in two steps. First, it focuses on how China’s rise is altering global economic governance in development finance, trade, and sovereign debt restructuring. Second, the special issue provides detailed analysis of China’s actions in global economic governance, establishing varying degrees of support and opposition ranging from deep cooperation to deep challenging. The special issue features contributions that explore how China is interacting with the global economic order by pinpointing how and why China chooses to challenge, support, or alter multilateral economic institutions. This provides more substance to the claims that China is either a revisionist or a supporter of the liberal international order and offers a more nuanced way to understand how China (dis)engages with multilateral economic institutions. More specifically, it highlights how China has changed economic institutions through its actions and responses by the West to its actions.},

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@article{nokey,

title = {Divergent Attitudes of Eurosceptic Parties Towards Intergovernmental and Supranational EU Institutions},

author = {Nikolai Gad and Eugénia C. Heldt and Robert Csehi},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13701},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-03-01},

urldate = {2025-05-01},

journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},

volume = {63},

issue = {4},

pages = {1259-1279},

abstract = {How do Eurosceptic parties position themselves regarding individual European Union (EU) institutions? Using Euromanifesto data from 1979 to 2019, this study addresses this question by disaggregating the attitudes of party families towards separate intergovernmental and supranational EU institutions. It focuses on the relationship between the identities of radical left- and right-wing parties and Euroscepticism. The findings reveal that post-communist parties are more sceptical of intergovernmental institutions than nationalist parties, whilst nationalist parties are more sceptical of supranational institutions. Despite widespread Euroscepticism in both nationalist and post-communist party families, nationalist parties' attitudes towards intergovernmental institutions align with those of other party families. In contrast, post-communist parties support the transfer of more competences to the European Parliament but are sceptical of intergovernmental institutions. These results suggest that foundational party identities influence party-based Euroscepticism, which has implications for the EU's handling of increasing Euroscepticism.},

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pubstate = {published},

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@article{nokey,

title = {In Europe We Trust: Selecting and Empowering EU Institutions in Disruptive Sircumstances},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Elena Ríos Camacho and Tony Mueller },

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2272037},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-00-00},

urldate = {2024-00-00},

journal = {Journal of European Integration},

volume = {46},

issue = {2},

pages = {235-255},

abstract = {Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) made significant strides in economic and fiscal policy integration without formal treaty-based changes. After the euro crisis, member states granted the European Central Bank banking supervisory powers. During the pandemic, they entrusted the European Commission with raising EU debt through NextGenerationEurope. This article examines the empowerment of supranational institutions as a deliberate ajustment to disruptive circumstances. By so doing, it demonstrates that empowerment can happen through legislative acts and joint decisions by member states. The study reveals that when states have multiple agent options, like in the banking union, they select the institution they trust the most. Conversely, in nested delegation games, extensive monitoring and reporting requirements, as in the case of NextGenerationEurope, are aimed at avoiding the defection of single member states, what we call ”principal slack”, at the implementation stage.},

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@article{10.17645/pag.v11i4.7098,

title = {Europe’s Global Gateway: A New Instrument of Geopolitics},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7098},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-00-00},

urldate = {2023-01-01},

journal = {Politics and Governance},

volume = {11},

issue = {4},

abstract = {In December 2021, the EU member states agreed on the Global Gateway strategy to mobilize public and private funds of up to €300 billion between 2021 and 2027, to invest in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research fields. With a geographical focus on Africa, Global Gateway links infrastructure investment projects with condition principles—including democratic values, good governance, and transparency—and catalyzes private investment into EU development financing. Against this backdrop, this study explores why EU member states agreed on this new geopolitical instrument. This piece posits that the confluence of three factors enabled the creation of Global Gateway. First, the EU established this new instrument to counter China’s role as a global infrastructure lender in Africa. Second, Global Gateway was possible through the shift to private investment in multilateral development financing. Equally important for the establishment of Global Gateway was the European Commission’s transformational leadership as an entrepreneurial agent in designing this geopolitical strategy of the EU’s power projection. The conclusion outlines future research avenues and enables readers to consider the wider prospects and caveats of the Global Gateway strategy.},

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@article{10.1111/rego.12432,

title = {Orchestrating Private Investors for Development: How the World Bank Revitalizes},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Thomas Dörfler},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221098487},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-10-01},

urldate = {2022-10-01},

journal = {Regulation & Governance},

volume = {16},

issue = {4},

pages = {1382-1398},

abstract = {Confronted with a new wave of criticism on the in effectiveness of its development programs, the World Bank embarked on a revitalization process, turning to private investors to finance International Development Association projects and widening its mandate. To explain these adaptation strategies of the World Bank to regain relevance, this piece draws on organizational ecology and orchestration scholarship. We contend that international organizations rely on two adaptation mechanisms, orchestration and scope expansion, when they lose their role as focal actors in an issue area. We find that the World Bank has indeed lost market share and has relied on these two mechanisms to revitalize itself. We show that the World Bank responded to changes in the environment by orchestrating a private sector-oriented capital increase, prioritizing private funding for development through a “cascade approach,” and expanding the scope of its mandate into adjacent domains of transnational governance, including climate change and global health.},

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@article{10.1093/isagsq/ksac035,

title = {When Do International Organizations Engage in Agency Slack? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of United Nations Institutions},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Patrick A. Mello and Anna Novoselova and Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac035},

doi = {10.1093/isagsq/ksac035},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-07-01},

urldate = {2022-01-01},

journal = {Global Studies Quarterly},

volume = {2},

issue = {3},

pages = {1-15},

abstract = {The extensive delegation of power to international organizations (IOs) has been accompanied by occasional agency slack. While prior studies suggest that IOs’ propensity for agency slack may be rooted in their organizational characteristics, this has rarely been explored empirically. To address this lacuna, in this article we propose a conceptualization and measurement of agency slack and develop a framework of organizational characteristics. Our empirical analysis applies qualitative comparative analysis to assess the conditions under which agency slack occurs across sixteen United Nations institutions. We complement the cross-case analysis with two case illustrations. Our results document the empirical existence of two paths to agency slack, providing confirmatory evidence for our theoretical expectations. Path 1 combines staffing rules that are favorable for the agent with wide access to third parties. Path 2 entails the combination of favorable staffing rules with extensive delegation of authority and a vague organizational mandate.



L'importante délégation de pouvoir aux organisations internationales (OI) a occasionnellement été accompagnée d'une marge d'agentivité. Bien que des études précédentes suggèrent que la propension des OI à obtenir une marge d'agentivité puisse être ancrée dans les caractéristiques de ces organisations, cela a rarement été étudié d'un point de vue empirique. Dans cet article, nous proposons une conceptualisation et une mesure de cette marge d'agentivité et nous développons un cadre de caractéristiques organisationnelles pour combler cette lacune. Pour notre étude empirique, nous appliquons une Analyse comparative qualitative (ACQ) afin d’évaluer les conditions dans lesquelles la marge d'agentivité intervient dans 16 institutions de l'ONU. Nous complétons l'analyse de cas croisés par deux illustrations de cas. Nos résultats documentent l'existence empirique de deux voies vers la marge d'agentivité tout en fournissant des preuves confirmant nos hypothèses théoriques. La première allie des règles de dotation en personnel qui sont favorables à l'agent puisqu'elles lui offrent un large accès aux tierces parties. Et la deuxième consiste à combiner des règles de dotation en personnel favorables avec une vaste délégation de pouvoir et un mandat organisationnel vague.



La amplia delegación de poderes en las organizaciones internacionales (OI) ha ido acompañada de una ocasional inactividad de los organismos. Si bien estudios anteriores sugieren que la tendencia de las OI a la inactividad está basada en sus características organizativas, esto no se ha estudiado empíricamente. Para abordar esta situación, proponemos en este documento una conceptualización y una valoración de la inactividad de las instituciones y desarrollamos un marco de características organizativas. Nuestro análisis empírico aplica el análisis comparativo cualitativo (Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA) para evaluar las condiciones en las que ocurre dicha inactividad en 16 instituciones de la ONU. Además, complementamos el análisis cruzado de casos con dos ejemplos ilustrativos. Nuestros resultados documentan la existencia empírica de dos caminos hacia la inactividad de las instituciones, lo que brinda evidencia confirmatoria de nuestras expectativas teóricas. El camino 1 combina normas para el personal que son favorables para el agente con amplio acceso a terceros. El camino 2 supone la combinación de normas favorables para el personal con la amplia delegación de la autoridad y un mandato organizativo impreciso.},

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@article{10.1177/14651165221098487,

title = {Measuring Actual Discretion of the European Commission: Using the Discretion Index to Guide Empirical Research},

author = {Markus Gastinger and Eugénia C. Heldt},

doi = {10.1177/14651165221098487},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-05-16},

urldate = {2022-05-16},

journal = {European Union Politics},

volume = {23},

number = {3},

pages = {541–558},

abstract = {One key question in the study of the European Union has always been the extent of Commission discretion. We take the discretion index, typically used by principal–agent scholars to measure the Commission's designed discretion, to measure its actual discretion. Commission designed discretion can today be computationally generated with sufficient accuracy across all secondary acts. The study of designed discretion thus reaches considerable maturity. Therefore, we argue that scholars should prioritize studying Commission actual discretion. We present a systematic and transparent investigative technique based on the discretion index, which we use as a roadmap to guide our empirical investigation. The index facilitates the accumulation of knowledge across policy areas and time by providing exact values for Commission discretion. We illustrate our approach with the Development Cooperation Instrument.},

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@article{10.1017/gov.2020.36,

title = {The Limits of Transparency: Expert Knowledge and Meaningful Accountability in Central Banking},

author = {Eugénia C. Heldt and Lisa Herzog},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2020.36},

doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.36},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-04-01},

urldate = {2022-01-01},

journal = {Government and Opposition},

volume = {57},

number = {2},

pages = {217-232},

abstract = {Recent discussions of accountability in contexts of expert knowledge raise questions about the limits of transparency. Against this background, we discuss the nexus between expert knowledge and meaningful accountability – that is, context-sensitive accountability based on a genuine understanding of a situation. We argue that the concentration of expertise in certain institutions makes it difficult to hold those institutions accountable. In particular, three components challenge meaningful accountability: specialization, inaccessibility and potential biases or conflict of interest. We emphasize the role of ‘epistemic communities’ and their impact on the tension between expert knowledge and independence. Drawing on the deliberative systems literature, we discuss how expert knowledge might be communicated to outsiders to enable meaningful accountability. To illustrate our argument, we draw on the European Central Bank, a case study in which states have chosen a delegation design characterized by a high degree of independence and trust in expert knowledge, to the detriment of accountability. We sketch possible avenues for creating the conditions for meaningful accountability even in the case of institutions with highly concentrated expertise.},

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