2017
Heldt, Eugénia C.
Regaining Control of Errant Agents? Agency Slack at the European Commission and the World Health Organization Journal Article
In: Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 469–484, 2017.
@article{nokey,
title = {Regaining Control of Errant Agents? Agency Slack at the European Commission and the World Health Organization},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010836717703673},
doi = {10.1177/0010836717703673},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-04-25},
urldate = {2017-01-01},
journal = {Cooperation and Conflict},
volume = {52},
number = {4},
pages = {469–484},
abstract = {Under which conditions are principals able to regain control when agency slack has occured? While existing research highlights a number of important factors related to the conditions under which agents engage in slack, scholars have to a less extent investigated which causal mechanisms affect the ability of states to regain control of their errant agents. Extending the principal–agent literature, this contribution argues that the ability of principals to regain control of their agents depends on three causal mechanisms: the type of monitoring mechanisms; the extent of fragmentation within an international organization; and the credibility of sanctions available to member states. To illustrate this argument, I compare two cases of agency slack: at the European Commission during the Eurozone crisis in 2015; and at the World Health Organization in the 1990s. The findings suggest that regaining control of runaway agents after slack has occurred is easier when there is a low level of fragmentation within an organization and states have centralized monitoring mechanisms and credible sanction mechanisms, such as budgetary contractions, at their disposal.},
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Under which conditions are principals able to regain control when agency slack has occured? While existing research highlights a number of important factors related to the conditions under which agents engage in slack, scholars have to a less extent investigated which causal mechanisms affect the ability of states to regain control of their errant agents. Extending the principal–agent literature, this contribution argues that the ability of principals to regain control of their agents depends on three causal mechanisms: the type of monitoring mechanisms; the extent of fragmentation within an international organization; and the credibility of sanctions available to member states. To illustrate this argument, I compare two cases of agency slack: at the European Commission during the Eurozone crisis in 2015; and at the World Health Organization in the 1990s. The findings suggest that regaining control of runaway agents after slack has occurred is easier when there is a low level of fragmentation within an organization and states have centralized monitoring mechanisms and credible sanction mechanisms, such as budgetary contractions, at their disposal.
Heldt, Eugénia C.
Shaping Global Trade Governance Rules: New Powers’ Hard and Soft Strategies of Influence at the WTO Journal Article
In: European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 22, iss. Special Issue, pp. 19-36, 2017, ISSN: 1384-6299.
@article{nokey,
title = {Shaping Global Trade Governance Rules: New Powers’ Hard and Soft Strategies of Influence at the WTO},
author = {Eugénia C. Heldt},
issn = { 1384-6299},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-01-01},
urldate = {2017-01-01},
journal = {European Foreign Affairs Review},
volume = {22},
issue = {Special Issue},
pages = {19-36},
abstract = {How do new powers seek to influence global trade governance rules? In this contribution, I posit that, contrary to the EU and the US, which act predominantly as regulatory powers, rising powers use a variety of hard and soft strategies to shape global trade governance. The article finds that a combination of hard strategies, such as coalition-building or obstruction, and soft strategies, including placing their own nationals at the top of the WTO or pursuing incremental procedural changes to make trade governance more inclusive, enabled new powers to shape global trade governance rules over the past fifteen years.},
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How do new powers seek to influence global trade governance rules? In this contribution, I posit that, contrary to the EU and the US, which act predominantly as regulatory powers, rising powers use a variety of hard and soft strategies to shape global trade governance. The article finds that a combination of hard strategies, such as coalition-building or obstruction, and soft strategies, including placing their own nationals at the top of the WTO or pursuing incremental procedural changes to make trade governance more inclusive, enabled new powers to shape global trade governance rules over the past fifteen years.
2016
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Verantwortungszurechnung im EU-Mehrebenensystem während der Eurokrise: Wer kontrollierte die Troika-Institutionen? Journal Article
In: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, vol. 26, pp. 115–129, 2016.
@article{pop00047,
title = {Verantwortungszurechnung im EU-Mehrebenensystem während der Eurokrise: Wer kontrollierte die Troika-Institutionen?},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-015-0009-9},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-015-0009-9},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-03-02},
urldate = {2016-01-01},
journal = {Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft},
volume = {26},
pages = {115–129},
abstract = {Mit der Einrichtung der Troika-Institutionen hat die Frage der Kontrollmöglichkeiten und Verschränkung von Macht im EU-Mehrebenensystem an Bedeutung gewonnen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht dieser Beitrag die Verantwortungszurechnung (accountability) der Troika-Institutionen während der Eurokrise. Dabei argumentiere ich, dass Delegations- und Treuhandmodi unterschiedlichen Logiken der Verantwortungszurechnung entsprechen, in denen die Kontrolle der Agenten oder Treuhänder durch die Prinzipale oder Begünstigten auf verschiedenen Ebenen stattfindet. Während im Delegationsmodus formale Kontrollmechanismen überwiegen, sind diese im Treuhandmodus informeller Art. Zur Illustration des Arguments vergleicht der Beitrag diese zwei Modi im Hinblick auf die darin verankerten Kontrollmechanismen: die Delegationsbeziehung zwischen der Kommission und dem Rat der Europäischen Union einerseits sowie die Treuhandbeziehung zwischen der Europäischen Zentralbank und den Eurostaaten andererseits.
With the establishment of the troika institutions during the Euro crisis, issues related to possibilities for control and constraint of these institutions, as well as their accountability, became prominent. This contribution analyses the accountability of the troika institutions, that is, the extent to which agents and trustees are controlled at different levels by their principals or beneficiaries. Specifically, I distinguish between a delegation and a fiduciary mode of accountability in EU governance. While the delegation mode is characterised by formal hierarchical, supervisory and legal control mechanisms, the fiduciary mode is marked by informal peer organisations and public reputational mechanisms. In order to illustrate these two modes of accountability, this article examines a delegation relation (European Commission and Council of Ministers) and a fiduciary relation (European Central Bank and Eurozone-Member States) during the financial bailout assistance programmes.},
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Mit der Einrichtung der Troika-Institutionen hat die Frage der Kontrollmöglichkeiten und Verschränkung von Macht im EU-Mehrebenensystem an Bedeutung gewonnen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht dieser Beitrag die Verantwortungszurechnung (accountability) der Troika-Institutionen während der Eurokrise. Dabei argumentiere ich, dass Delegations- und Treuhandmodi unterschiedlichen Logiken der Verantwortungszurechnung entsprechen, in denen die Kontrolle der Agenten oder Treuhänder durch die Prinzipale oder Begünstigten auf verschiedenen Ebenen stattfindet. Während im Delegationsmodus formale Kontrollmechanismen überwiegen, sind diese im Treuhandmodus informeller Art. Zur Illustration des Arguments vergleicht der Beitrag diese zwei Modi im Hinblick auf die darin verankerten Kontrollmechanismen: die Delegationsbeziehung zwischen der Kommission und dem Rat der Europäischen Union einerseits sowie die Treuhandbeziehung zwischen der Europäischen Zentralbank und den Eurostaaten andererseits.
With the establishment of the troika institutions during the Euro crisis, issues related to possibilities for control and constraint of these institutions, as well as their accountability, became prominent. This contribution analyses the accountability of the troika institutions, that is, the extent to which agents and trustees are controlled at different levels by their principals or beneficiaries. Specifically, I distinguish between a delegation and a fiduciary mode of accountability in EU governance. While the delegation mode is characterised by formal hierarchical, supervisory and legal control mechanisms, the fiduciary mode is marked by informal peer organisations and public reputational mechanisms. In order to illustrate these two modes of accountability, this article examines a delegation relation (European Commission and Council of Ministers) and a fiduciary relation (European Central Bank and Eurozone-Member States) during the financial bailout assistance programmes.
With the establishment of the troika institutions during the Euro crisis, issues related to possibilities for control and constraint of these institutions, as well as their accountability, became prominent. This contribution analyses the accountability of the troika institutions, that is, the extent to which agents and trustees are controlled at different levels by their principals or beneficiaries. Specifically, I distinguish between a delegation and a fiduciary mode of accountability in EU governance. While the delegation mode is characterised by formal hierarchical, supervisory and legal control mechanisms, the fiduciary mode is marked by informal peer organisations and public reputational mechanisms. In order to illustrate these two modes of accountability, this article examines a delegation relation (European Commission and Council of Ministers) and a fiduciary relation (European Central Bank and Eurozone-Member States) during the financial bailout assistance programmes.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
The European Commission Experienced a ‘Subtle Disempowerment’ During the Eurozone Crisis Online
2016.
@online{pop00066,
title = {The European Commission Experienced a ‘Subtle Disempowerment’ During the Eurozone Crisis},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/02/16/the-european-commission-experienced-a-subtle-disempowerment-during-the-eurozone-crisis/},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-02-16},
publisher = {LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog},
institution = {LSE},
abstract = {How did the Eurozone crisis affect the balance of power between the EU’s institutions? As Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt writes, opinion has been split over whether the crisis strengthened or damaged the European Commission’s role in EU decision-making. She argues that while some authors have highlighted an apparent increase in the Commission’s responsibilities over economic governance during the crisis, the Commission actually experienced a ‘subtle disempowerment’ in relation to other institutions such as the European Central Bank.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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How did the Eurozone crisis affect the balance of power between the EU’s institutions? As Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt writes, opinion has been split over whether the crisis strengthened or damaged the European Commission’s role in EU decision-making. She argues that while some authors have highlighted an apparent increase in the Commission’s responsibilities over economic governance during the crisis, the Commission actually experienced a ‘subtle disempowerment’ in relation to other institutions such as the European Central Bank.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Why the European Commission is not the “Unexpected Winner” of the Euro Crisis: A Comment on Bauer and Becker Journal Article
In: Journal of European Integration, vol. 38, iss. 1, pp. 95–100, 2016.
@article{pop00013,
title = {Why the European Commission is not the “Unexpected Winner” of the Euro Crisis: A Comment on Bauer and Becker},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2015.1101957},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2015.1101957},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-01-01},
urldate = {2016-01-01},
journal = {Journal of European Integration},
volume = {38},
issue = {1},
pages = {95–100},
abstract = {The protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic interest in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Commission is undergoing “subtle disempowerment”, that is, a gradual transfer of decision-making authority and resources from the Commission to the intergovernmental level and to the European Central Bank. I illustrate the Commission's subtle disempowerment along three dimensions: the creation of the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism; enhanced oversight mechanisms of the Commission via the troika constellation; and the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union and Single Supervisory Mechanism under the aegis of the European Central Bank.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic interest in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Commission is undergoing “subtle disempowerment”, that is, a gradual transfer of decision-making authority and resources from the Commission to the intergovernmental level and to the European Central Bank. I illustrate the Commission's subtle disempowerment along three dimensions: the creation of the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism; enhanced oversight mechanisms of the Commission via the troika constellation; and the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union and Single Supervisory Mechanism under the aegis of the European Central Bank.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
O futuro da União Europeia Book
Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2016, ISBN: 978-989-8819-36-9.
@book{pop00023,
title = {O futuro da União Europeia},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
isbn = {978-989-8819-36-9},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-01-01},
urldate = {2016-01-01},
journal = {Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos},
publisher = {Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos},
abstract = {Como pode a União Europeia (UE) sair fortalecida da crise atual? Como se transformou ao longo das últimas décadas? Que novos processos e dinâmicas políticas se tornaram predominantes com a crise do euro? Como é possível ultrapassar alguns dos impasses da política europeia? Este ensaio defende que para conseguir ultrapassar as atuais tendências centrífugas, a União terá de se adaptar em vários aspetos. Para abordar esta temática complexa, na primeira parte analisa-se a evolução da UE, mostrando a estreita interligação entre o processo de integração e as várias explicações avançadas pelas teorias de integração europeia. Na segunda parte, identificam-se diversos desafios políticos, institucionais, económicos e financeiros e perspetivam-se as mudanças necessárias para que a União ultrapasse a sua crise. A terceira parte incide sobre a relação de Portugal com a UE e apresenta algumas estratégias negociais para que Portugal consiga influenciar o processo de transformação da União.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
Como pode a União Europeia (UE) sair fortalecida da crise atual? Como se transformou ao longo das últimas décadas? Que novos processos e dinâmicas políticas se tornaram predominantes com a crise do euro? Como é possível ultrapassar alguns dos impasses da política europeia? Este ensaio defende que para conseguir ultrapassar as atuais tendências centrífugas, a União terá de se adaptar em vários aspetos. Para abordar esta temática complexa, na primeira parte analisa-se a evolução da UE, mostrando a estreita interligação entre o processo de integração e as várias explicações avançadas pelas teorias de integração europeia. Na segunda parte, identificam-se diversos desafios políticos, institucionais, económicos e financeiros e perspetivam-se as mudanças necessárias para que a União ultrapasse a sua crise. A terceira parte incide sobre a relação de Portugal com a UE e apresenta algumas estratégias negociais para que Portugal consiga influenciar o processo de transformação da União.
2015
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia; Koch, Martin; Liese, Andrea (Ed.)
Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, interorganisationale Beziehungen und Wandel Book
1., Nomos, 2015, ISBN: 978-3-8487-0484-2.
@book{pop00020,
title = {Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, interorganisationale Beziehungen und Wandel},
editor = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Martin Koch and Andrea Liese},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516},
isbn = {978-3-8487-0484-2},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-02},
publisher = {Nomos},
edition = {1.},
series = {Sonderheft PVS},
abstract = {Das PVS-Sonderheft nimmt internationale Organisationen als partiell eigenständige Akteure zum Ausgangspunkt, deren Verhalten sich nicht (ausschließlich) aus dem Einfluss von Mitgliedstaaten ableiten lässt, um konzeptionell offen und theorieübergreifend grundlegende Fragen nach Delegation und Autonomie, Verrechtlichung und Politisierung, den interorganisationalen Beziehungen und dem Wandel von internationalen Organisationen nachzugehen. Damit greift das Sonderheft nicht nur zentrale Fragen der jüngeren Forschung auf, sondern konzentriert sich auch auf das Verhältnis internationaler Organisationen zu ihrer sich wandelnden Umwelt.
Dazu initiiert das Sonderheft einen Dialog zwischen verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätzen (rationalistische, sozialkonstruktivistische und soziologische Ansätze) und Herangehensweisen (erklärende und interpretative Studien) und lotet das Potential der Synthese aus.},
keywords = {},
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tppubtype = {book}
}
Das PVS-Sonderheft nimmt internationale Organisationen als partiell eigenständige Akteure zum Ausgangspunkt, deren Verhalten sich nicht (ausschließlich) aus dem Einfluss von Mitgliedstaaten ableiten lässt, um konzeptionell offen und theorieübergreifend grundlegende Fragen nach Delegation und Autonomie, Verrechtlichung und Politisierung, den interorganisationalen Beziehungen und dem Wandel von internationalen Organisationen nachzugehen. Damit greift das Sonderheft nicht nur zentrale Fragen der jüngeren Forschung auf, sondern konzentriert sich auch auf das Verhältnis internationaler Organisationen zu ihrer sich wandelnden Umwelt.
Dazu initiiert das Sonderheft einen Dialog zwischen verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätzen (rationalistische, sozialkonstruktivistische und soziologische Ansätze) und Herangehensweisen (erklärende und interpretative Studien) und lotet das Potential der Synthese aus.
Dazu initiiert das Sonderheft einen Dialog zwischen verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätzen (rationalistische, sozialkonstruktivistische und soziologische Ansätze) und Herangehensweisen (erklärende und interpretative Studien) und lotet das Potential der Synthese aus.
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Journal Articles
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Books
0
Book Chapters
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Edited Volumes
Other Publications
- 2025: China’s Rise and the Reconfiguration of Global Economic Governance, Review of International Political Economy (with Susan Park).
- 2019: Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance Since Bretton Woods, Review of International Political Economy 26 (6) (with Orfeo Fioretos).
- 2015: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance. London/New York: Routledge (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2015: Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, Koordination und Wandel, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 49, Baden-Baden: Nomos (with Andrea Liese and Martin Koch).
- 2014: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance, Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 21 (7) (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2024: The IMF and the Future of the Liberal International Order, Chapter 36, pp. 724-740 (with Orfeo Fioretos), In: Momani, Bessma and Hibben, Mark (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the International Monetary Fund, London: Oxford University Press.
- 2024: Revitalizing the World Bank: Engagement with the Private sector and Scope Expansion, Chapter 12, pp. 143–153 (with Thomas Dörfler), In: Antje Vetterlein & Tobias Schmidtke (eds.), 2024. “The Elgar Companion to the World Bank,” Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 21163.
- 2024: Time in International Organizations and International Organizations in Time. In: Goetz, Klaus H. (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford University Press (2. Edition).
- 2022: China und die BRICS in globalen ökonomischen Institutionen, in: Schirm, S. A.; Busch, A.; Lütz, S.; Walter, S.; Zimmermann, H. (Hrsg.) De-Globalisierung: Forschungsstand und Perspektiven, Baden Baden: Nomos, 123-138.
- 2021: Are International Organizations the Tragic Heroes of World Politics?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) New Global Alliances: Institutions, Alignments and Legitimacy in the Contemporary World, Wallstein Verlag, forthcoming
- 2021: Decreasing Importance of the UN: The Rise of Informal Organizations. In: Molls, Michael et al. (eds.): Science, Reason & Sustainability. Munich: Technical University Press. forthcoming.
- 2021: Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) Neue Konstellationen der Gegenwart: Annäherungen, Institutionen und Legitimität, Wallstein Verlag, 113-128.
- 2020: Sinkende Bedeutung der UNO: Stärkung informeller Organisationen (with Tony Müller). In: Molls, Michael et al. (Hrsg.): Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit. Technische Universität München.
- 2019: Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time, in: Klaus H. Goetz (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2018: Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, in: Cameron Thies (ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/97801902228637.013.496 (with Patrick Mello).
- 2017: Multiple Principals’ preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations, in: Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen (eds.): The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 203-226.
- 2016: The European Agricultural Fortress under Attack, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.), Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 2013: Adaptation and Change in EU Trade Governance: The EU’s Paradigm Shift from Multilateralism to Regionalism and Bilateralism, in: Manuela Moschella and Catherine Weaver (eds.) Handbook of Global Economic Governance, London: Routledge, 57-69.
- 2012: EU Agricultural and Fisheries Policies: An Economic and Environmental Disaster!, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.): Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-244.
- 2010: Portugal: An Active and Influential Parliament?, in: Bjørn Eric Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.): The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, New York & London: Routledge.
- 2007: France: the Importance of the Electoral Cycle, in: Ellen M. Immergut, Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds.): The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 150-199.
- 2012: Dür, Andreas Protection for Exporters. Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-2010, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 53(3): 555-557
- 2011: Zimmermann, Hubert Drachenzähmung: Die EU und die USA in den Verhandlungen um die Integration Chinas in den Welthandel, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 52(1): 149-150.
- 2020: Corona-Krise: Professorin warnt vor Egoismus in der EU, BR24, 26.03.2020, München
- Survival and Resilience of the UN Joint Inspection Unit over Time (with Patrick A. Mello, Anna Novoselova, & Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald), ECPR 14th General Conference, Panel: International Organizations in Times of Crisis, August 2020.
- The European Central Bank during the sovereign debt crisis: Revisiting the independence- accountability nexus, paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Denver, 9-11 May, 2019 (with Tony Mueller).
- The systematic study of Commission discretion using principal-agent theory: lessons from the EU’s development cooperation policy, paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Denver, 9- 11 May, 2019.
- The Complex Relationship between Independence and Accountability: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 2019 Joint Sessions, UCL Mons, Belgium, April 08-12, 2019 (with Tony Mueller).
- How Organizational Structure Affects Agency Slack: A Fuzzy-Set Ideal-Type Analysis of International Bureaucracies, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 2019 Joint Sessions, UCL Mons, Belgium, April 08-12, 2019 (with Patrick Mello, Omar Serrano, Anna Novoselova).
- Privatization of Development Governance: Adaptation Strategies of the World Bank in Turbulent Times, paper presented at the International Studies Association 2019, Toronto, March 25-30, 2019 (with Thomas Doerfler).
- Back to Bretton Woods: How Institutional Proliferation Has Increased the Resilience of the World Bank, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 30-September 2, 2018. (with Henning Schmidtke).
- European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2018/36, 2018.
- Independence, Accountability, and Legitimacy: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28- 30, 2018 and at the ECPR Standing Groups Sciences Po, June 13-15, 2018 (with Tony Müller).
- European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28-30, 2018 and at the ECPR Standing Groups Sciences Po, June 13-15, 2018.
- The EU Performance During the Refugee Crisis, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28-30, 2018 (with Vittoria Meissner).
- Global Democracy in Decline? How Rising Authoritarianism limits Democratic Control over Multilateral Development Banks, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, April 4-7, 2018 (with Henning Schmidtke).
- EU Governance in Crisis Mode: Disempowering the European Commission, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6-9, 2017.
- Contested Multilateralism and the World Bank: Explaining the Establishment of the New Development Bank, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6 – 9, 2017 and at the DVPW IP-Sektionstagung, October 4-6, 2017.
- Power without Control? Explaining variety of accountability mechanisms across troika institutions, paper presented at the European Workshops in International Studies, Accountability in Global Governance, Cardiff, June 07-10, 2017.
- The Systematic Study of Commission Discretion using Principal–Agent Theory: Lessons from the EU’s Development Cooperation Policy, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017 (with Markus Gastinger).
- Disintegration Dynamics in Europe? Mass Migration, Cacophony of Voices, and External Spill- Back Processes, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017.
- The Silent Empowerment of the ECB During the Euro Crisis, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017 (with Tony Müller).
- Explaining the Empowerment of International Organizations” ISA Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017 (with Henning Schmidtke).
- Rise and Decline of Old Bretton Woods Institutions: Dysfunctionality and Insulation at the World Bank ISA Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017.
- Exploring the Paradox of Increasing Transparency in TTIP Negotiations, paper presented at the Council for European Studies 23rd International Conference for Europeanists, Philadelphia, April 14-16 and at the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) at the University of Gothenburg March 14-15, 2016.
- Empowering International Organizations, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 and University of Munich Workshop on “Resourcing International Organizations” 2016 (with Henning Schmidtke).
- Partisan Orientation of Old and New Power Governments towards Empowerment at the World Bank, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with Laura Mahrenbach).
- Variation Without Influence? (In)formal Policy-making in EU Development Cooperation, paper presented at the Council for European Studies 23rd International Conference for Europeanists, Philadelphia, April 14-16 (with Markus Gastinger).
- How Effective are Informal Coalitions in Global Governance? Rising Powers as shapers of global health rules, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with André Isidro).
- The World Health Organization’s adaptive capacity in a complex inter-organizational environment” paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with André Isidro).
- Lost in Internal Evaluation: Accountability and Insulation at the World Bank, Paper presented at the workshop, “The Transformative Power of Regulatory Governance”, Copenhagen Business School, February 4-5, 2016.
- Negotiating Styles of Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance, paper presented at the Workshop “From Rule-Takers to Rule-Makers: Emerging Powers in the Regulation of International Trade”, University of Geneva February 9-10, 2016.
- Emerging Power Preferences towards Institutional Empowerment of International Organizations, paper presented at the ISA 2015 Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 18-21, 2015 (with Laura Mahrenbach).
- Accountable to Whom and How? Logics of Accountability in EU Governance during the Sovereign Debt Crisis, paper presented at the AKI-DVPW and Comparative Politics joint conference „Gewaltenteilung und Demokratie im Mehrebenensystem der EU – neu, anders – oder weniger legitim?, FU Berlin, 9-10 October 2014 and updated version to be presented at the European Union Studies Association, Boston 5-7 March 2015.
- Internationale Organisationen als Forschungsgegenstand. Oder “Über Blinde und die Gestalt des Elefanten”, paper presented at the International Relations Session of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft, Magdeburg 25-27 September 2014.
- Acting on Behalf of Collective and Multiple Principals: The European’s Commission Discretion after Lisbon, paper presented at the Workshop The EU in International Negotiations, Global Governance Program, European University Institute (EUI), 23-24 Juni 2014 and updated version to be presented at the European Union Studies Association, Boston 5-7 March 2015.
- The Perils of Delegation: Using Oversight Mechanisms to Minimize Agency Slack, paper presented at the Eurofort Workshop on European Integration, Princeton University and HU Berlin joint conference, July 21, 2014.
- Controlling International Organizations after Delegation of Power: The Use of Oversight Mechanisms to Minimize Agency Losses, paper to be presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Salamanca, 11-14 April 2014.
- Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in World Politics, paper presented at the Conference for European Studies, Washington D.C., 14-16 March 2014.
- A Cacophony of Voices? The EU’s Cohesiveness in the Negotiation of Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Agreements, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3-6 April 2013 and at the European Union Studies Association, Baltimore, 9-11 May 2013.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Institutional Empowerment over Time: A Research Design, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3-6 April 2013.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Institutional Empowerment over Time, paper presented at the die European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Mainz, 12- 15 March 2013.
- The EU as a Global Actor: The Impact of Asymmetrical Bargaining Power and BATNAS on Trade Agreements, paper presented at the Conference for European Studies, Boston, 22-24 March 2012.
- The EU as an Actor in the Negotiation of Trade Agreements: Asymmetrical Bargaining Power and Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement, paper presented at the Workshop “Regional Organizations as Global Players: Active=Influential?”, Zeuthen, 28-29 October 2011.
- Do Agents Run Amok? Explaining Different Forms of Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Agency Slack over Time, paper presented at the Workshop “Public Administration in the Multilevel System”, Humboldt University Berlin, 23-24 June 2011.
- Embedding International Institutions in Time: the Impact of Time Rules on Multilateral Trade Negotiations, paper presented at the Workshop “Institutional Dynamics in World Politics: Explaining Variation in Scope, Pace, and Direction of International Institutional Change” at the Social Science Research Center (Wissenschaftszentrum [WZB]), Berlin, 7-8 April 2011.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Control Gaps, Agents’ Discretion and Autonomy in the Principal-Agent Relationship over Time, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montréal, 15-19 March 2011.
- Embedding International Negotiations in Time: Stages of Negotiation, Time Pressure, BATNA, and Time Horizons Effects on Barganing Outcomes, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montréal, 15-19 March 2011.
- The WTO at the Crossroads? Negotiating under the Shadow of Time and Domestic Political Constraints, paper presented at the conference “Myth or Reality? The Promise of Economic Multilateralism” at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 20-21 December 2010.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses and Unintended Consequences over Time, paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010.
- Explaining the Doha Impasse: The Impact of Domestic Political Institutions on the EU, U.S., Brazilian and Australian Negotiating Positions, paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010.
- The Commission-as-Agent at the Interface between Internal EU Decision-Making and External WTO Negotiations: An Analysis of Tactical Opportunities and Agency Losses, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, 17-21 February 2010.
- Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics, EUI Working Paper, San Domenico, Fiesole: RSCAS 2009/18.
- Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics, paper presented at the Second Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Geneva, 29-31 January 2009.
- On the Time Dimension of International Trade Negotiations, paper presented at the Workshop Political Science and Political Time, University of Potsdam, 2-3 April 2009.
- Agricultural Trade Liberalization and the Doha Round: A Two-level Game Analysis of the EU Negotiating Position, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Lisbon, 14-19 April 2009.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses and Unintended Consequences, paper presented at the 8ste Nederlands-Belgisch PoliticologenEtmaal, Nijmegen, 28-29 May 2009.
- Delegation of Power to Supranational Institutions: Agency Shirking or Agency Slippage?, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Rennes, 11-16 April 2008.
- Die Interaktion von Innen- und Außenpolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen: eine historisch- institutionalistische Analyse der WTO-Agrarverhandlungen 1995-2005, paper presented at the International Relations Session of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft, Mannheim, 6- 7 October 2005.
- Executive Supremacy in the French Legislature: The Impact of Institutional Procedures in the Reform of the French Welfare State, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Granada, 14-19 April 2005.
- Die Interaktion zwischen Akteurspräferenzen und dem institutionellen Rahmen in EU- Verhandlungen am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik, paper presented at the conference „Forschungslogik und Methoden der Internationalen Beziehungen und der Europaforschung”, Hofgeismar, 2-4 April 2003.
- Die Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik: Anpassungsbedarf und Reformvorschläge. Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik, 2003.
- France: Some Failed and Successful Attempts to Reform the French Pensions System, paper presented at the Workshop on Pension Politics, Humboldt-University, 7-8 December 2003.
- The EU Negotiation Process: Interests, Institutions, Decision Rules, and Iterated Bargaining, paper presented at the BP Transatlantic Programme Workshop for Advanced Ph.D. Students on EU Politics, European University Institute, 7-8 June 2002.
- A Micro-model of the EU Negotiation Process: Interests, Institutional Rules and Iterated Bargaining – The Case of Fisheries, European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on Analytical Politics and Public Choice, Working Paper 26, 2001.
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