2013
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Explaining Brazil's Negotiating Position in the Doha Round Journal Article
In: The International Trade Journal, vol. 27, iss. 2, pp. 173–194, 2013.
@article{pop00026,
title = {The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Explaining Brazil's Negotiating Position in the Doha Round},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08853908.2013.764251},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08853908.2013.764251},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-03-08},
urldate = {2013-01-01},
journal = {The International Trade Journal},
volume = {27},
issue = {2},
pages = {173–194},
abstract = {Under the Cardoso presidency (1995–2002), Brazil adopted a reactive and defensive posture on trade liberalization. However, when Lula da Silva came into power in 2003, Brazil took a more offensive and proactive position on the issue in creating the G-20 and putting forward proposals of its own. How can this shift in the Brazilian negotiating position be explained? The main argument is that under the Lula da Silva administration, Brazil's position in the Doha round primarily reflected domestic political constraints on multilateral trade cooperation. Three domestic dynamics shaped the national preference for Brazil: a heterogeneous governing coalition with a high number of veto players, divisions within the Workers’ Party, and the demands of interest groups. This explanation is discussed on the basis of Brazil's negotiating position in WTO negotiations from 2003 to 2006.},
keywords = {},
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tppubtype = {article}
}
Under the Cardoso presidency (1995–2002), Brazil adopted a reactive and defensive posture on trade liberalization. However, when Lula da Silva came into power in 2003, Brazil took a more offensive and proactive position on the issue in creating the G-20 and putting forward proposals of its own. How can this shift in the Brazilian negotiating position be explained? The main argument is that under the Lula da Silva administration, Brazil's position in the Doha round primarily reflected domestic political constraints on multilateral trade cooperation. Three domestic dynamics shaped the national preference for Brazil: a heterogeneous governing coalition with a high number of veto players, divisions within the Workers’ Party, and the demands of interest groups. This explanation is discussed on the basis of Brazil's negotiating position in WTO negotiations from 2003 to 2006.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round Journal Article
In: Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, vol. 15, iss. 1, pp. 21–36, 2013.
@article{,
title = {Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2012.754152},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2012.754152},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-14},
urldate = {2013-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice},
volume = {15},
issue = {1},
pages = {21–36},
abstract = {There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority (agency slack), while at other times they do not. How and under what conditions do agents engage in slack? To answer this question, the article builds on principal–agent theories by comparing different forms of power delegation at the national and international levels. It argues that the institutional design of delegation contract and oversight mechanisms have an impact on the extent of agency slack. In developing this argument, it compares the delegation of power from the legislature (the US Congress) to a national public administration (the United States Trade Representative) and from an intergovernmental organization (the Council of Ministers) to a supranational organization (the European Commission) in the negotiation of international trade agreements. The findings show that agency slack is less likely when the institutional design of the delegation mandate is rule-based and principals have a combination of police-patrol and fire-alarm oversight mechanisms at their disposal to control their agents.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority (agency slack), while at other times they do not. How and under what conditions do agents engage in slack? To answer this question, the article builds on principal–agent theories by comparing different forms of power delegation at the national and international levels. It argues that the institutional design of delegation contract and oversight mechanisms have an impact on the extent of agency slack. In developing this argument, it compares the delegation of power from the legislature (the US Congress) to a national public administration (the United States Trade Representative) and from an intergovernmental organization (the Council of Ministers) to a supranational organization (the European Commission) in the negotiation of international trade agreements. The findings show that agency slack is less likely when the institutional design of the delegation mandate is rule-based and principals have a combination of police-patrol and fire-alarm oversight mechanisms at their disposal to control their agents.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations Journal Article
In: International Negotiation, vol. 18, iss. 1, pp. 111–130, 2013, ISSN: 1382-340X.
@article{pop00029,
title = {The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341247},
doi = {10.1163/15718069-12341247},
issn = {1382-340X},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
urldate = {2013-01-01},
journal = {International Negotiation},
volume = {18},
issue = {1},
pages = {111–130},
abstract = {While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis literature, arguing that the proliferation of PTAs draws negotiating capacity away from the multilateral level and thus reduces the incentives to agree on multilateral trade agreements. The willingness of actors to move from their initial bargaining positions and make concessions at the multilateral level depends on their outside options, that is, their best or worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The more credible an actor’s argument that he has a good alternative to multilateralism, the greater his bargaining power will be. In order to support the argument we will analyze the negotiation process at the multilateral level and link it to PTAs under negotiation by the EU, US, Brazil, Australia, and India.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis literature, arguing that the proliferation of PTAs draws negotiating capacity away from the multilateral level and thus reduces the incentives to agree on multilateral trade agreements. The willingness of actors to move from their initial bargaining positions and make concessions at the multilateral level depends on their outside options, that is, their best or worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The more credible an actor’s argument that he has a good alternative to multilateralism, the greater his bargaining power will be. In order to support the argument we will analyze the negotiation process at the multilateral level and link it to PTAs under negotiation by the EU, US, Brazil, Australia, and India.
2011
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Australian Trade Policy under the Howard Government: The Impact of Organised Interested Groups Journal Article
In: Global Society, vol. 25, iss. 4, pp. 513–529, 2011.
@article{doi:10.1080/13600826.2011.605769,
title = {Australian Trade Policy under the Howard Government: The Impact of Organised Interested Groups},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2011.605769},
doi = {10.1080/13600826.2011.605769},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-10-21},
urldate = {2011-01-01},
journal = {Global Society},
volume = {25},
issue = {4},
pages = {513–529},
publisher = {Routledge},
abstract = {There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of globalisation on the Australian economy, but few studies focus on the domestic determinants of Australia's negotiating position in international trade negotiations. In order to close this gap, this article analyses the impact of organised interest groups in the Australian trade policy under the Howard government in the different World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings from 1999 to 2006. In particular, the article explores the link between parties and interest groups in the Australian political system. It suggests that the Australian negotiating position reflects the demands put forward by interest groups closely linked to the government parties and the change of the international environment towards bilateral and regional trade agreements.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of globalisation on the Australian economy, but few studies focus on the domestic determinants of Australia's negotiating position in international trade negotiations. In order to close this gap, this article analyses the impact of organised interest groups in the Australian trade policy under the Howard government in the different World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings from 1999 to 2006. In particular, the article explores the link between parties and interest groups in the Australian political system. It suggests that the Australian negotiating position reflects the demands put forward by interest groups closely linked to the government parties and the change of the international environment towards bilateral and regional trade agreements.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Variation in EU Member States' Preferences and the Commission's Discretion in the Doha Round Journal Article
In: Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, iss. 3, pp. 403–419, 2011.
@article{,
title = {Variation in EU Member States' Preferences and the Commission's Discretion in the Doha Round},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.551078},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.551078},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-04-13},
urldate = {2011-04-13},
journal = {Journal of European Public Policy},
volume = {18},
issue = {3},
pages = {403–419},
abstract = {During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO: Domestic Politics and Bargaining Dynamics Book
Palgrave Macmillan London, 2011, ISBN: 978-1-349-32405-7.
@book{,
title = {Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO: Domestic Politics and Bargaining Dynamics},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306998},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306998},
isbn = {978-1-349-32405-7},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-01-01},
pages = {275},
publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan London},
series = { International Political Economy Series},
abstract = {This book shows how domestic political institutions and the lack of time pressure have an impact on negotiations at the WTO. It provides detailed information on WTO ministerial meetings as well as on the political economy of trade policy in the EU, U.S., Brazil, and Australia.
},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
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This book shows how domestic political institutions and the lack of time pressure have an impact on negotiations at the WTO. It provides detailed information on WTO ministerial meetings as well as on the political economy of trade policy in the EU, U.S., Brazil, and Australia.
2010
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics Journal Article
In: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 48, iss. 4, pp. 1107–1126, 2010.
@article{,
title = {Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02086.x},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02086.x},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-08-12},
urldate = {2010-01-01},
journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
volume = {48},
issue = {4},
pages = {1107–1126},
abstract = {There has been considerable debate about power delegation in EU trade politics, but few studies explore the question of how and why agency losses occur. Focusing on agricultural issues in the Doha Round, this article analyses the impact of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade politics. Are agency losses the result of the delegation structure, which stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage), or do conflict situations arise because of conflicting interests between the interests of the Member States and those of the European Commission (agency shirking)? Based on information collected from Agence Europe and interviews with European officials, the main conclusions are that: (1) the Council–Commission relationship can be conflict-laden or co-operative depending on the negotiating stage at the international level; (2) a low degree of interest alignment among Member States increases the Commission's discretion at the international level; (3) inter-institutional conflict weakens the EU negotiating position at the international level because the other WTO members know that the EU is divided and ask for further concessions.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There has been considerable debate about power delegation in EU trade politics, but few studies explore the question of how and why agency losses occur. Focusing on agricultural issues in the Doha Round, this article analyses the impact of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade politics. Are agency losses the result of the delegation structure, which stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage), or do conflict situations arise because of conflicting interests between the interests of the Member States and those of the European Commission (agency shirking)? Based on information collected from Agence Europe and interviews with European officials, the main conclusions are that: (1) the Council–Commission relationship can be conflict-laden or co-operative depending on the negotiating stage at the international level; (2) a low degree of interest alignment among Member States increases the Commission's discretion at the international level; (3) inter-institutional conflict weakens the EU negotiating position at the international level because the other WTO members know that the EU is divided and ask for further concessions.
2009
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Delegation of Power and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics Working paper
2009, ISSN: 1028-3625.
@workingpaper{pop00045,
title = {Delegation of Power and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/1814/11193},
issn = {1028-3625},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-01-01},
urldate = {2009-01-01},
publisher = {European University Institute},
series = {EUI RSCAS; 2009/18},
abstract = {This paper addresses the problem of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade policy. The central question is whether a conflictual situation exists between the interests of the member states and those of the European Commission (agency shirking), or whether the structure of delegation in itself stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage). Drawing on the principal-agent approach, I argue that agency losses are due to the structure of delegation and that the existence of multiple principals with diverging preferences facilitates agency. I find empirical evidence that the Council-Commission relationship on trade politics has different dynamics depending on the negotiating stage. In the initial negotiating stage, when defining the negotiating mandate of the Commission, the relationship is cooperative. Conflict between the Commission and the Council only breaks out in a latter stage of negotiations, when the Commission makes concessions at the international level.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {workingpaper}
}
This paper addresses the problem of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade policy. The central question is whether a conflictual situation exists between the interests of the member states and those of the European Commission (agency shirking), or whether the structure of delegation in itself stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage). Drawing on the principal-agent approach, I argue that agency losses are due to the structure of delegation and that the existence of multiple principals with diverging preferences facilitates agency. I find empirical evidence that the Council-Commission relationship on trade politics has different dynamics depending on the negotiating stage. In the initial negotiating stage, when defining the negotiating mandate of the Commission, the relationship is cooperative. Conflict between the Commission and the Council only breaks out in a latter stage of negotiations, when the Commission makes concessions at the international level.
2008
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Trade Unions and the Timing of the Electoral Cycle Journal Article
In: Policy Studies, vol. 29, iss. 1, pp. 19–34, 2008.
@article{pop00051,
title = {Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Trade Unions and the Timing of the Electoral Cycle},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/01442870701848004},
doi = {10.1080/01442870701848004},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-06-05},
urldate = {2008-01-01},
journal = {Policy Studies},
volume = {29},
issue = {1},
pages = {19–34},
abstract = {The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade unions matter in France and under what conditions they might cause governments to abstain from making welfare cuts. Second, it is argued that focusing solely on the veto power of trade unions appears implausible, since during the 2003 pension reform process the government ignored union protests. Hence it is further argued that a further critical variable needs to be investigated – the timing of the electoral cycle. It is therefore anticipated that governments will be more successful in passing legislation that implements unpopular reforms in the first two and a half years of a legislative period.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade unions matter in France and under what conditions they might cause governments to abstain from making welfare cuts. Second, it is argued that focusing solely on the veto power of trade unions appears implausible, since during the 2003 pension reform process the government ignored union protests. Hence it is further argued that a further critical variable needs to be investigated – the timing of the electoral cycle. It is therefore anticipated that governments will be more successful in passing legislation that implements unpopular reforms in the first two and a half years of a legislative period.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy Journal Article
In: International Negotiation, vol. 13, iss. 2, pp. 285–300, 2008, ISSN: 1571-8069.
@article{pop00032,
title = {Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1163/157180608X320243},
doi = {10.1163/157180608X320243},
issn = {1571-8069},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-01-01},
urldate = {2008-01-01},
journal = {International Negotiation},
volume = {13},
issue = {2},
pages = {285–300},
abstract = {Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural policy. This article attempts to demonstrate how deals can be completed through issue linkage packages and to identify the conditions that make issue linkage more likely.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural policy. This article attempts to demonstrate how deals can be completed through issue linkage packages and to identify the conditions that make issue linkage more likely.
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Journal Articles
0
Books
0
Book Chapters
0
Edited Volumes
- 2025: China’s Rise and the Reconfiguration of Global Economic Governance, Review of International Political Economy (with Susan Park).
- 2019: Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance Since Bretton Woods, Review of International Political Economy 26 (6) (with Orfeo Fioretos).
- 2015: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance. London/New York: Routledge (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2015: Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, Koordination und Wandel, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 49, Baden-Baden: Nomos (with Andrea Liese und Martin Koch).
- 2014: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance, Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 21 (7) (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2024: The IMF and the Future of the Liberal International Order, Chapter 36, pp. 724-740 (with Orfeo Fioretos), In: Momani, Bessma and Hibben, Mark (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the International Monetary Fund, London: Oxford University Press.
- 2024: Revitalizing the World Bank: Engagement with the Private sector and Scope Expansion, Chapter 12, pp. 143–153 (with Thomas Dörfler), In: Antje Vetterlein & Tobias Schmidtke (eds.), 2024. “The Elgar Companion to the World Bank,” Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 21163.
- 2024: Time in International Organizations and International Organizations in Time. In: Goetz, Klaus H. (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford University Press (2. Edition).
- 2022: China und die BRICS in globalen ökonomischen Institutionen, in: Schirm, S. A.; Busch, A.; Lütz, S.; Walter, S.; Zimmermann, H. (Hrsg.) De-Globalisierung: Forschungsstand und Perspektiven, Baden Baden: Nomos, 123-138.
- 2021: Are International Organizations the Tragic Heroes of World Politics?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) New Global Alliances: Institutions, Alignments and Legitimacy in the Contemporary World, Wallstein Verlag, forthcoming
- 2021: Decreasing Importance of the UN: The Rise of Informal Organizations. In: Molls, Michael et al. (eds.): Science, Reason & Sustainability. Munich: Technical University Press. forthcoming.
- 2021: Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) Neue Konstellationen der Gegenwart: Annäherungen, Institutionen und Legitimität, Wallstein Verlag, 113-128.
- 2020: Sinkende Bedeutung der UNO: Stärkung informeller Organisationen (with Tony Müller). In: Molls, Michael et al. (Hrsg.): Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit. Technische Universität München.
- 2019: Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time, in: Klaus H. Goetz (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2018: Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, in: Cameron Thies (ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/97801902228637.013.496 (with Patrick Mello).
- 2017: Multiple Principals’ preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations, in: Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen (eds.): The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 203-226.
- 2016: The European Agricultural Fortress under Attack, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.), Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 2013: Adaptation and Change in EU Trade Governance: The EU’s Paradigm Shift from Multilateralism to Regionalism and Bilateralism, in: Manuela Moschella and Catherine Weaver (eds.) Handbook of Global Economic Governance, London: Routledge, 57-69.
- 2012: EU Agricultural and Fisheries Policies: An Economic and Environmental Disaster!, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.): Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-244.
- 2010: Portugal: An Active and Influential Parliament?, in: Bjørn Eric Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.): The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, New York & London: Routledge.
- 2007: France: the Importance of the Electoral Cycle, in: Ellen M. Immergut, Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds.): The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 150-199.
- 2012: Dür, Andreas Protection for Exporters. Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-2010, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 53(3): 555-557
- 2011: Zimmermann, Hubert Drachenzähmung: Die EU und die USA in den Verhandlungen um die Integration Chinas in den Welthandel, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 52(1): 149-150.
- 2020: Corona-Krise: Professorin warnt vor Egoismus in der EU, BR24, 26.03.2020, München
- Survival and Resilience of the UN Joint Inspection Unit over Time (with Patrick A. Mello, Anna Novoselova, & Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald), ECPR 14th General Conference, Panel: International Organizations in Times of Crisis, August 2020.
- The European Central Bank during the sovereign debt crisis: Revisiting the independence- accountability nexus, paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Denver, 9-11 May, 2019 (with Tony Mueller).
- The systematic study of Commission discretion using principal-agent theory: lessons from the EU’s development cooperation policy, paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Denver, 9- 11 May, 2019.
- The Complex Relationship between Independence and Accountability: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 2019 Joint Sessions, UCL Mons, Belgium, April 08-12, 2019 (with Tony Mueller).
- How Organizational Structure Affects Agency Slack: A Fuzzy-Set Ideal-Type Analysis of International Bureaucracies, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 2019 Joint Sessions, UCL Mons, Belgium, April 08-12, 2019 (with Patrick Mello, Omar Serrano, Anna Novoselova).
- Privatization of Development Governance: Adaptation Strategies of the World Bank in Turbulent Times, paper presented at the International Studies Association 2019, Toronto, March 25-30, 2019 (with Thomas Doerfler).
- Back to Bretton Woods: How Institutional Proliferation Has Increased the Resilience of the World Bank, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 30-September 2, 2018. (with Henning Schmidtke).
- European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2018/36, 2018.
- Independence, Accountability, and Legitimacy: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28- 30, 2018 and at the ECPR Standing Groups Sciences Po, June 13-15, 2018 (with Tony Müller).
- European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28-30, 2018 and at the ECPR Standing Groups Sciences Po, June 13-15, 2018.
- The EU Performance During the Refugee Crisis, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28-30, 2018 (with Vittoria Meissner).
- Global Democracy in Decline? How Rising Authoritarianism limits Democratic Control over Multilateral Development Banks, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, April 4-7, 2018 (with Henning Schmidtke).
- EU Governance in Crisis Mode: Disempowering the European Commission, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6-9, 2017.
- Contested Multilateralism and the World Bank: Explaining the Establishment of the New Development Bank, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6 – 9, 2017 and at the DVPW IP-Sektionstagung, October 4-6, 2017.
- Power without Control? Explaining variety of accountability mechanisms across troika institutions, paper presented at the European Workshops in International Studies, Accountability in Global Governance, Cardiff, June 07-10, 2017.
- The Systematic Study of Commission Discretion using Principal–Agent Theory: Lessons from the EU’s Development Cooperation Policy, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017 (with Markus Gastinger).
- Disintegration Dynamics in Europe? Mass Migration, Cacophony of Voices, and External Spill- Back Processes, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017.
- The Silent Empowerment of the ECB During the Euro Crisis, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017 (with Tony Müller).
- Explaining the Empowerment of International Organizations” ISA Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017 (with Henning Schmidtke).
- Rise and Decline of Old Bretton Woods Institutions: Dysfunctionality and Insulation at the World Bank ISA Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017.
- Exploring the Paradox of Increasing Transparency in TTIP Negotiations, paper presented at the Council for European Studies 23rd International Conference for Europeanists, Philadelphia, April 14-16 and at the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) at the University of Gothenburg March 14-15, 2016.
- Empowering International Organizations, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 and University of Munich Workshop on “Resourcing International Organizations” 2016 (with Henning Schmidtke).
- Partisan Orientation of Old and New Power Governments towards Empowerment at the World Bank, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with Laura Mahrenbach).
- Variation Without Influence? (In)formal Policy-making in EU Development Cooperation, paper presented at the Council for European Studies 23rd International Conference for Europeanists, Philadelphia, April 14-16 (with Markus Gastinger).
- How Effective are Informal Coalitions in Global Governance? Rising Powers as shapers of global health rules, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with André Isidro).
- The World Health Organization’s adaptive capacity in a complex inter-organizational environment” paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with André Isidro).
- Lost in Internal Evaluation: Accountability and Insulation at the World Bank, Paper presented at the workshop, “The Transformative Power of Regulatory Governance”, Copenhagen Business School, February 4-5, 2016.
- Negotiating Styles of Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance, paper presented at the Workshop “From Rule-Takers to Rule-Makers: Emerging Powers in the Regulation of International Trade”, University of Geneva February 9-10, 2016.
- Emerging Power Preferences towards Institutional Empowerment of International Organizations, paper presented at the ISA 2015 Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 18-21, 2015 (with Laura Mahrenbach).
- Accountable to Whom and How? Logics of Accountability in EU Governance during the Sovereign Debt Crisis, paper presented at the AKI-DVPW and Comparative Politics joint conference „Gewaltenteilung und Demokratie im Mehrebenensystem der EU – neu, anders – oder weniger legitim?, FU Berlin, 9-10 October 2014 and updated version to be presented at the European Union Studies Association, Boston 5-7 March 2015.
- Internationale Organisationen als Forschungsgegenstand. Oder “Über Blinde und die Gestalt des Elefanten”, paper presented at the International Relations Session of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft, Magdeburg 25-27 September 2014.
- Acting on Behalf of Collective and Multiple Principals: The European’s Commission Discretion after Lisbon, paper presented at the Workshop The EU in International Negotiations, Global Governance Program, European University Institute (EUI), 23-24 Juni 2014 and updated version to be presented at the European Union Studies Association, Boston 5-7 March 2015.
- The Perils of Delegation: Using Oversight Mechanisms to Minimize Agency Slack, paper presented at the Eurofort Workshop on European Integration, Princeton University and HU Berlin joint conference, July 21, 2014.
- Controlling International Organizations after Delegation of Power: The Use of Oversight Mechanisms to Minimize Agency Losses, paper to be presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Salamanca, 11-14 April 2014.
- Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in World Politics, paper presented at the Conference for European Studies, Washington D.C., 14-16 March 2014.
- A Cacophony of Voices? The EU’s Cohesiveness in the Negotiation of Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Agreements, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3-6 April 2013 and at the European Union Studies Association, Baltimore, 9-11 May 2013.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Institutional Empowerment over Time: A Research Design, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3-6 April 2013.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Institutional Empowerment over Time, paper presented at the die European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Mainz, 12- 15 March 2013.
- The EU as a Global Actor: The Impact of Asymmetrical Bargaining Power and BATNAS on Trade Agreements, paper presented at the Conference for European Studies, Boston, 22-24 March 2012.
- The EU as an Actor in the Negotiation of Trade Agreements: Asymmetrical Bargaining Power and Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement, paper presented at the Workshop “Regional Organizations as Global Players: Active=Influential?”, Zeuthen, 28-29 October 2011.
- Do Agents Run Amok? Explaining Different Forms of Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Agency Slack over Time, paper presented at the Workshop “Public Administration in the Multilevel System”, Humboldt University Berlin, 23-24 June 2011.
- Embedding International Institutions in Time: the Impact of Time Rules on Multilateral Trade Negotiations, paper presented at the Workshop “Institutional Dynamics in World Politics: Explaining Variation in Scope, Pace, and Direction of International Institutional Change” at the Social Science Research Center (Wissenschaftszentrum [WZB]), Berlin, 7-8 April 2011.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Control Gaps, Agents’ Discretion and Autonomy in the Principal-Agent Relationship over Time, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montréal, 15-19 March 2011.
- Embedding International Negotiations in Time: Stages of Negotiation, Time Pressure, BATNA, and Time Horizons Effects on Barganing Outcomes, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montréal, 15-19 March 2011.
- The WTO at the Crossroads? Negotiating under the Shadow of Time and Domestic Political Constraints, paper presented at the conference “Myth or Reality? The Promise of Economic Multilateralism” at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 20-21 December 2010.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses and Unintended Consequences over Time, paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010.
- Explaining the Doha Impasse: The Impact of Domestic Political Institutions on the EU, U.S., Brazilian and Australian Negotiating Positions, paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010.
- The Commission-as-Agent at the Interface between Internal EU Decision-Making and External WTO Negotiations: An Analysis of Tactical Opportunities and Agency Losses, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, 17-21 February 2010.
- Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics, EUI Working Paper, San Domenico, Fiesole: RSCAS 2009/18.
- Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics, paper presented at the Second Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Geneva, 29-31 January 2009.
- On the Time Dimension of International Trade Negotiations, paper presented at the Workshop Political Science and Political Time, University of Potsdam, 2-3 April 2009.
- Agricultural Trade Liberalization and the Doha Round: A Two-level Game Analysis of the EU Negotiating Position, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Lisbon, 14-19 April 2009.
- Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses and Unintended Consequences, paper presented at the 8ste Nederlands-Belgisch PoliticologenEtmaal, Nijmegen, 28-29 May 2009.
- Delegation of Power to Supranational Institutions: Agency Shirking or Agency Slippage?, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Rennes, 11-16 April 2008.
- Die Interaktion von Innen- und Außenpolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen: eine historisch- institutionalistische Analyse der WTO-Agrarverhandlungen 1995-2005, paper presented at the International Relations Session of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft, Mannheim, 6- 7 October 2005.
- Executive Supremacy in the French Legislature: The Impact of Institutional Procedures in the Reform of the French Welfare State, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Granada, 14-19 April 2005.
- Die Interaktion zwischen Akteurspräferenzen und dem institutionellen Rahmen in EU- Verhandlungen am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik, paper presented at the conference „Forschungslogik und Methoden der Internationalen Beziehungen und der Europaforschung”, Hofgeismar, 2-4 April 2003.
- Die Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik: Anpassungsbedarf und Reformvorschläge. Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik, 2003.
- France: Some Failed and Successful Attempts to Reform the French Pensions System, paper presented at the Workshop on Pension Politics, Humboldt-University, 7-8 December 2003.
- The EU Negotiation Process: Interests, Institutions, Decision Rules, and Iterated Bargaining, paper presented at the BP Transatlantic Programme Workshop for Advanced Ph.D. Students on EU Politics, European University Institute, 7-8 June 2002.
- A Micro-model of the EU Negotiation Process: Interests, Institutional Rules and Iterated Bargaining – The Case of Fisheries, European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on Analytical Politics and Public Choice, Working Paper 26, 2001.
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