2013
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations Journal Article
In: International Negotiation, vol. 18, iss. 1, pp. 111–130, 2013, ISSN: 1382-340X.
@article{pop00029,
title = {The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341247},
doi = {10.1163/15718069-12341247},
issn = {1382-340X},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
urldate = {2013-01-01},
journal = {International Negotiation},
volume = {18},
issue = {1},
pages = {111–130},
abstract = {While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis literature, arguing that the proliferation of PTAs draws negotiating capacity away from the multilateral level and thus reduces the incentives to agree on multilateral trade agreements. The willingness of actors to move from their initial bargaining positions and make concessions at the multilateral level depends on their outside options, that is, their best or worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The more credible an actor’s argument that he has a good alternative to multilateralism, the greater his bargaining power will be. In order to support the argument we will analyze the negotiation process at the multilateral level and link it to PTAs under negotiation by the EU, US, Brazil, Australia, and India.},
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While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis literature, arguing that the proliferation of PTAs draws negotiating capacity away from the multilateral level and thus reduces the incentives to agree on multilateral trade agreements. The willingness of actors to move from their initial bargaining positions and make concessions at the multilateral level depends on their outside options, that is, their best or worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The more credible an actor’s argument that he has a good alternative to multilateralism, the greater his bargaining power will be. In order to support the argument we will analyze the negotiation process at the multilateral level and link it to PTAs under negotiation by the EU, US, Brazil, Australia, and India.
2011
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Australian Trade Policy under the Howard Government: The Impact of Organised Interested Groups Journal Article
In: Global Society, vol. 25, iss. 4, pp. 513–529, 2011.
@article{doi:10.1080/13600826.2011.605769,
title = {Australian Trade Policy under the Howard Government: The Impact of Organised Interested Groups},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2011.605769},
doi = {10.1080/13600826.2011.605769},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-10-21},
urldate = {2011-01-01},
journal = {Global Society},
volume = {25},
issue = {4},
pages = {513–529},
publisher = {Routledge},
abstract = {There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of globalisation on the Australian economy, but few studies focus on the domestic determinants of Australia's negotiating position in international trade negotiations. In order to close this gap, this article analyses the impact of organised interest groups in the Australian trade policy under the Howard government in the different World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings from 1999 to 2006. In particular, the article explores the link between parties and interest groups in the Australian political system. It suggests that the Australian negotiating position reflects the demands put forward by interest groups closely linked to the government parties and the change of the international environment towards bilateral and regional trade agreements.},
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There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of globalisation on the Australian economy, but few studies focus on the domestic determinants of Australia's negotiating position in international trade negotiations. In order to close this gap, this article analyses the impact of organised interest groups in the Australian trade policy under the Howard government in the different World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings from 1999 to 2006. In particular, the article explores the link between parties and interest groups in the Australian political system. It suggests that the Australian negotiating position reflects the demands put forward by interest groups closely linked to the government parties and the change of the international environment towards bilateral and regional trade agreements.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Variation in EU Member States' Preferences and the Commission's Discretion in the Doha Round Journal Article
In: Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, iss. 3, pp. 403–419, 2011.
@article{,
title = {Variation in EU Member States' Preferences and the Commission's Discretion in the Doha Round},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.551078},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.551078},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-04-13},
urldate = {2011-04-13},
journal = {Journal of European Public Policy},
volume = {18},
issue = {3},
pages = {403–419},
abstract = {During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.},
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During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO: Domestic Politics and Bargaining Dynamics Book
Palgrave Macmillan London, 2011, ISBN: 978-1-349-32405-7.
@book{,
title = {Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO: Domestic Politics and Bargaining Dynamics},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306998},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306998},
isbn = {978-1-349-32405-7},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-01-01},
pages = {275},
publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan London},
series = { International Political Economy Series},
abstract = {This book shows how domestic political institutions and the lack of time pressure have an impact on negotiations at the WTO. It provides detailed information on WTO ministerial meetings as well as on the political economy of trade policy in the EU, U.S., Brazil, and Australia.
},
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This book shows how domestic political institutions and the lack of time pressure have an impact on negotiations at the WTO. It provides detailed information on WTO ministerial meetings as well as on the political economy of trade policy in the EU, U.S., Brazil, and Australia.
2010
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics Journal Article
In: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 48, iss. 4, pp. 1107–1126, 2010.
@article{,
title = {Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02086.x},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02086.x},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-08-12},
urldate = {2010-01-01},
journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
volume = {48},
issue = {4},
pages = {1107–1126},
abstract = {There has been considerable debate about power delegation in EU trade politics, but few studies explore the question of how and why agency losses occur. Focusing on agricultural issues in the Doha Round, this article analyses the impact of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade politics. Are agency losses the result of the delegation structure, which stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage), or do conflict situations arise because of conflicting interests between the interests of the Member States and those of the European Commission (agency shirking)? Based on information collected from Agence Europe and interviews with European officials, the main conclusions are that: (1) the Council–Commission relationship can be conflict-laden or co-operative depending on the negotiating stage at the international level; (2) a low degree of interest alignment among Member States increases the Commission's discretion at the international level; (3) inter-institutional conflict weakens the EU negotiating position at the international level because the other WTO members know that the EU is divided and ask for further concessions.},
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There has been considerable debate about power delegation in EU trade politics, but few studies explore the question of how and why agency losses occur. Focusing on agricultural issues in the Doha Round, this article analyses the impact of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade politics. Are agency losses the result of the delegation structure, which stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage), or do conflict situations arise because of conflicting interests between the interests of the Member States and those of the European Commission (agency shirking)? Based on information collected from Agence Europe and interviews with European officials, the main conclusions are that: (1) the Council–Commission relationship can be conflict-laden or co-operative depending on the negotiating stage at the international level; (2) a low degree of interest alignment among Member States increases the Commission's discretion at the international level; (3) inter-institutional conflict weakens the EU negotiating position at the international level because the other WTO members know that the EU is divided and ask for further concessions.
2009
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Delegation of Power and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics Working paper
2009, ISSN: 1028-3625.
@workingpaper{pop00045,
title = {Delegation of Power and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/1814/11193},
issn = {1028-3625},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-01-01},
urldate = {2009-01-01},
publisher = {European University Institute},
series = {EUI RSCAS; 2009/18},
abstract = {This paper addresses the problem of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade policy. The central question is whether a conflictual situation exists between the interests of the member states and those of the European Commission (agency shirking), or whether the structure of delegation in itself stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage). Drawing on the principal-agent approach, I argue that agency losses are due to the structure of delegation and that the existence of multiple principals with diverging preferences facilitates agency. I find empirical evidence that the Council-Commission relationship on trade politics has different dynamics depending on the negotiating stage. In the initial negotiating stage, when defining the negotiating mandate of the Commission, the relationship is cooperative. Conflict between the Commission and the Council only breaks out in a latter stage of negotiations, when the Commission makes concessions at the international level.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {workingpaper}
}
This paper addresses the problem of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade policy. The central question is whether a conflictual situation exists between the interests of the member states and those of the European Commission (agency shirking), or whether the structure of delegation in itself stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage). Drawing on the principal-agent approach, I argue that agency losses are due to the structure of delegation and that the existence of multiple principals with diverging preferences facilitates agency. I find empirical evidence that the Council-Commission relationship on trade politics has different dynamics depending on the negotiating stage. In the initial negotiating stage, when defining the negotiating mandate of the Commission, the relationship is cooperative. Conflict between the Commission and the Council only breaks out in a latter stage of negotiations, when the Commission makes concessions at the international level.
2008
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Trade Unions and the Timing of the Electoral Cycle Journal Article
In: Policy Studies, vol. 29, iss. 1, pp. 19–34, 2008.
@article{pop00051,
title = {Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Trade Unions and the Timing of the Electoral Cycle},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/01442870701848004},
doi = {10.1080/01442870701848004},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-06-05},
urldate = {2008-01-01},
journal = {Policy Studies},
volume = {29},
issue = {1},
pages = {19–34},
abstract = {The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade unions matter in France and under what conditions they might cause governments to abstain from making welfare cuts. Second, it is argued that focusing solely on the veto power of trade unions appears implausible, since during the 2003 pension reform process the government ignored union protests. Hence it is further argued that a further critical variable needs to be investigated – the timing of the electoral cycle. It is therefore anticipated that governments will be more successful in passing legislation that implements unpopular reforms in the first two and a half years of a legislative period.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade unions matter in France and under what conditions they might cause governments to abstain from making welfare cuts. Second, it is argued that focusing solely on the veto power of trade unions appears implausible, since during the 2003 pension reform process the government ignored union protests. Hence it is further argued that a further critical variable needs to be investigated – the timing of the electoral cycle. It is therefore anticipated that governments will be more successful in passing legislation that implements unpopular reforms in the first two and a half years of a legislative period.
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy Journal Article
In: International Negotiation, vol. 13, iss. 2, pp. 285–300, 2008, ISSN: 1571-8069.
@article{pop00032,
title = {Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1163/157180608X320243},
doi = {10.1163/157180608X320243},
issn = {1571-8069},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-01-01},
urldate = {2008-01-01},
journal = {International Negotiation},
volume = {13},
issue = {2},
pages = {285–300},
abstract = {Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural policy. This article attempts to demonstrate how deals can be completed through issue linkage packages and to identify the conditions that make issue linkage more likely.},
keywords = {},
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Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural policy. This article attempts to demonstrate how deals can be completed through issue linkage packages and to identify the conditions that make issue linkage more likely.
2007
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
France: The Importance of the Electoral Cycle Book Chapter
In: Immergut, Ellen M.; Anderson, Karen M.; Schulze, Isabelle (Ed.): The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Chapter 4., pp. 150-202, Oxford University Press, 2007, ISBN: 978-0199291472.
@inbook{pop00016,
title = {France: The Importance of the Electoral Cycle},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
editor = {Ellen M. Immergut and Karen M. Anderson and Isabelle Schulze},
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year = {2007},
date = {2007-03-01},
urldate = {2007-03-01},
booktitle = {The Handbook of West European Pension Politics},
pages = {150-202},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
chapter = {4.},
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2006
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Taking Actors’ Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: The EU Common Fisheries Policy Journal Article
In: Journal of Public Policy, vol. 26, iss. 3, pp. 279–299, 2006.
@article{pop00021,
title = {Taking Actors’ Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: The EU Common Fisheries Policy},
author = {Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X06000572},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X06000572},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-10-30},
urldate = {2006-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Public Policy},
volume = {26},
issue = {3},
pages = {279–299},
abstract = {The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states' preferences and the institutional setting. This article is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It juxtaposes a conceptual framework for analyzing EU negotiations with an analysis of the bargaining process on the settlement of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy. The conceptual framework will identify a set of variables that can explain the bargaining outcome: preferences of national government representatives, preferences of the European Commission, and the institutional setting.},
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The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states' preferences and the institutional setting. This article is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It juxtaposes a conceptual framework for analyzing EU negotiations with an analysis of the bargaining process on the settlement of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy. The conceptual framework will identify a set of variables that can explain the bargaining outcome: preferences of national government representatives, preferences of the European Commission, and the institutional setting.
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Journal Articles
0
Books
0
Book Chapters
0
Edited Volumes
- 2019: Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance Since Bretton Woods, Review of International Political Economy 26 (6) (with Orfeo Fioretos).
- 2015: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance. London/New York: Routledge (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2015: Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, Koordination und Wandel, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 49, Baden-Baden: Nomos (with Andrea Liese und Martin Koch).
- 2014: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance, Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 21 (7) (with Sophie Meunier).
- 2024: The IMF and the Future of the Liberal International Order, Chapter 36, pp. 724-740 (with Orfeo Fioretos), In: Momani, Bessma and Hibben, Mark (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the International Monetary Fund, London: Oxford University Press.
- 2024: Revitalizing the World Bank: Engagement with the Private sector and Scope Expansion, Chapter 12, pp. 143–153 (with Thomas Dörfler), In: Antje Vetterlein & Tobias Schmidtke (eds.), 2024. “The Elgar Companion to the World Bank,” Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 21163.
- 2024: Time in International Organizations and International Organizations in Time. In: Goetz, Klaus H. (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford University Press (2. Edition).
- 2022: China und die BRICS in globalen ökonomischen Institutionen, in: Schirm, S. A.; Busch, A.; Lütz, S.; Walter, S.; Zimmermann, H. (Hrsg.) De-Globalisierung: Forschungsstand und Perspektiven, Baden Baden: Nomos, 123-138.
- 2021: Are International Organizations the Tragic Heroes of World Politics?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) New Global Alliances: Institutions, Alignments and Legitimacy in the Contemporary World, Wallstein Verlag, forthcoming
- 2021: Decreasing Importance of the UN: The Rise of Informal Organizations. In: Molls, Michael et al. (eds.): Science, Reason & Sustainability. Munich: Technical University Press. forthcoming.
- 2021: Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) Neue Konstellationen der Gegenwart: Annäherungen, Institutionen und Legitimität, Wallstein Verlag, 113-128.
- 2020: Sinkende Bedeutung der UNO: Stärkung informeller Organisationen (with Tony Müller). In: Molls, Michael et al. (Hrsg.): Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit. Technische Universität München.
- 2019: Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time, in: Klaus H. Goetz (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2018: Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, in: Cameron Thies (ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/97801902228637.013.496 (with Patrick Mello).
- 2017: Multiple Principals’ preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations, in: Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen (eds.): The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 203-226.
- 2016: The European Agricultural Fortress under Attack, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.), Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 2013: Adaptation and Change in EU Trade Governance: The EU’s Paradigm Shift from Multilateralism to Regionalism and Bilateralism, in: Manuela Moschella and Catherine Weaver (eds.) Handbook of Global Economic Governance, London: Routledge, 57-69.
- 2012: EU Agricultural and Fisheries Policies: An Economic and Environmental Disaster!, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.): Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-244.
- 2010: Portugal: An Active and Influential Parliament?, in: Bjørn Eric Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.): The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, New York & London: Routledge.
- 2007: France: the Importance of the Electoral Cycle, in: Ellen M. Immergut, Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds.): The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 150-199.
- 2012: Dür, Andreas Protection for Exporters. Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-2010, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 53(3): 555-557
- 2011: Zimmermann, Hubert Drachenzähmung: Die EU und die USA in den Verhandlungen um die Integration Chinas in den Welthandel, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 52(1): 149-150.
- 2020: Corona-Krise: Professorin warnt vor Egoismus in der EU, BR24, 26.03.2020, München